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Abstract
Democracy substitutes election by the incompetent many for
appointment by the corrupt few.
—George Bernard Shaw, Man and Superman (1903)
This thesis consists of three essays in the field of empirical political economy. The
topics addressed in these essays are very diverse, as are the historico-institutional
settings. What they share is the quantitative analysis of election results and –
at least in the author’s opinion – the inquiry of relevant research questions about
political attitudes and institutions. This gives the dissertation its title “No Ordinary
Elections”.
Chapter one looks at the effect of war service on political attitudes. I analyse
the impact of WWI veterans on changes in electoral support for Germany’s anti-
democratic right after 1918. In order to quantify the effect, I construct the first
disaggregate estimates of German WWI veterans since official army records were
destroyed. I combine this data with a new panel of voting results from 1881 to
1933. Differences-in-Differences estimates show that war participation had a strong
positive effect on support for the right-wing at the expense of socialist parties. A one
standard deviation increase in veteran inflow shifted voting patterns to the right by
more than 2%. My findings are robust to a number of checks including an IV iden-
tification strategy based on draft exemption rules. The effect of veterans on voting
is highly persistent and strongest in working class areas. Gains for the right-wing,
however, are only observed after a time period of communist insurgencies. I argue
that veterans’ impact is consistent with the spread of a popular anti-communist
conspiracy theory, the stab-in-the-back myth. I provide suggestive evidence that
veterans must have picked this idea up during wartime, injected it into the working
class and facilitated the rise of right-wing parties.
The second chapter documents evidence on how election fraud in authori-
tarian regimes can be used by lower-tier officials to cast signals about their loyalty
or competence to the central government. I exploit a radical policy change in Rus-
sia in 2004 which allowed the president to replace governors of the country’s 89
regions at his own will. As a result, federal elections after 2004 were organised by
two types of governors: one was handpicked by the president, the other one elected
before the law change and re-appointed. Even though both types faced removal in
case of bad results, the need to signal loyalty was much lower for the first type.
xi
In order to estimate the effect of handpicked governors on electoral fraud, I use a
diff-in-diff framework over 7 federal elections between 2000 and 2012. For this time
period, I construct a new indicator of suspicious votes for each region which cor-
relates strongly with incidents of reported fraud. My baseline estimates show that
in territories with a handpicked governor the share of suspicious votes decreased by
more than 10% on average and dropped even further if the region’s economy had
done well over the past legislature. These findings suggest that officials have less
need to use rigging as a signal once loyalty is assured unless faced circumstances
raising doubts about their competence.
Finally, chapter three studies the Chernobyl nuclear disaster of April 1986
and voters’ response in West Germany. The analysis uses a diff-in-diff estimation
which exploits variation in proximity to the nearest nuclear power plant (NPP)
across 301 counties. Proximity is used as proxy for the shock from perceived risk
of a nuclear accident. Using data over a time period of almost 40 years and 11
elections, my results indicate that living closer to an NPP increased polarisation and
benefited anti - but even more pro-nuclear parties. While gains of Greens are shown
to be similar across social groups and therefore in line with home-voter effects, the
increase of conservatives runs counter to most expectations. Heterogeneity analysis
shows that the effect on conservatives is far stronger in areas with an above-median
share of adolescents in their impressionable years and of higher average education. I
argue that this can be explained by differences in assessing the economic losses from
exiting nuclear power over the risk of a nuclear accident after the disaster. Using
variation in the scheduling of state elections, I can also show that the pro-nuclear
response was stronger in counties which did not vote in the immediate aftermath of
Chernobyl leaving more time for a rational electoral choice.
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Chapter 1
War Service and the Flow of
Political Ideas: Evidence from
Germanys WWI veterans
1
1.1 Introduction
The economic analysis of war’s detrimental effects goes back at least a century by
now. Some of the earliest works in this field are probably Smith [1776] and Pigou
[1919] who both study the long-run monetary costs of war for a country’s society.
Nowadays, the large inter-state wars analysed by Smith and Pigou have become
rare events and most wars are taking place within countries. The main questions
asked by economists, however are still the same and center around war’s impact
on physical and human capital. The effect of war on institutions and their well-
established role for economic growth has so far been widely neglected as highlighted
in a survey by Blattman and Miguel [2010]. One specific mechanism behind such
a relationship could be the interaction of soldiers from different social backgrounds
during army service.
This paper studies the effect of war service on political attitudes and spillovers
to non-combatants. I investigate the case of Germany after the end of WWI in
1918 and the role of veterans in the spread of right-wing attitudes prior to the
collapse of democracy in 1933.1 Many historians have pointed out the general turn
towards right-wing parties shortly after WWI [Bessel, 1990; Fritzsche, 1990; Momm-
sen, 1996]. The Nazis’ take of power in 1933 was furthermore only made possible by
a coalition with the conservative DNVP, the main right-wing party until the 1930s.
Post-WWI Germany is an interesting historical setting to study the effect of war
service on democratic institutions. Importantly, war was never fought on German
soil and thus permits one to exclude many other effects of war such as the destruc-
tion of physical capital. The second notable feature is that national elections were
taking place before and after the war. As a result, one can easily measure changes
in support for any party between both periods.
I use two identification strategies to estimate the effect of veterans on voting
behaviour: the first is a Differences-in-Differences approach which links changes in
election results after WWI across areas to the population share of veterans. For this
study, I constructed the first disaggregated estimates of GermanWWI veterans since
official army records were destroyed in WWII. I combine this data with a unique
panel of voting results from 1881 to 1933. The panel data allows me to track voting
behaviour in 266 homogeneous geographic units (precincts) covering 2/3 of Weimar
Germany over a period of more than 50 years and 17 parliamentary elections before
and after the war. My baseline estimates show that after WWI, precincts with
1% more veterans increase in support for right-wing parties by slightly more than
1 This implicitly addresses also war’s impact on recovery since the Nazi party soon started a
new war with devastating consequences for Germany’s economy.
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1%. These effects are significant in magnitude: a one standard deviation increase
in veterans per capita, lifts right-wing votes by 2%, about 5% of the post-WWI
average. The main losing party by far are socialist parties from the very left of the
political spectrum. My results are robust to the inclusion of many determinants of
war participation as well as precinct-linear time trends and other specifications.
My second identification strategy exploits exemptions for employees of war-
related industries as an instrument for war participation. This addresses in partic-
ular remaining worries about endogeneity but also potential measurement error in
the veteran estimate. Threats to the exclusion restriction may arise from natural
support among industrial workers for democratic parties. I shut this channel down
by controlling for the overall share of workers in manufacturing. The IV therefore
relies on variation in the war-related employment share in areas with a given size
of the working class. Another concern is that workers in war-related industries may
have a natural tendency to vote for right-wing parties because of their revanchist
policy aiming for another war. I was not able to find any evidence on such a mecha-
nism during the Weimar Republic. Yet, if this actually was the case, my IV results
should be biased towards zero. This is because I hypothesise a negative reduced-
form relationship between war-related employment and right-wing votes. The IV
results suggest that the effect of veteran inflow on right-wing votes might be twice
as large as the OLS results. The weak first-stage relationship of 7.72 is supported
by LIML estimates which deliver the same results.
To put these results in context, it is important to know that at the outbreak
of WWI, Germany was a fast-growing federal monarchy with a large support for
democracy. Even though national elections were not significant, votes for democratic
parties reached about 77% in 1912. Upon facing defeat in 1918, army mutinies ended
the war by turning Germany into a democracy. After the transition, coup attempts
and economic crises quickly led to a dramatic fall in support for democracy. This
development continued when the Great Depression hit Germany in 1930. Three
years later, the anti-semitic Nazi party formed a coalition government with the
conservative, anti-democratic German National People’s Party (DNVP) which ended
democracy and the Weimar Republic. Disaggregating the Diff-in-Diff estimates by
years and parties, shows that veterans’ impact resembles these patterns only to some
extent. The positive impact of veterans on right-wing parties is mainly favouring
the conservative DNVP rather than the Nazi party. Interestingly, the effect also
only shows up in May 1924 – more than 5 years after WWI. Losses by the socialist
parties are of similar magnitude but can be observed already in 1920. Both effects
are highly persistent and last until the final Weimar election in 1933. Without any
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prior assumption, the timing suggests that the effect on socialists was related to war
service while the second one originated from the post-war period.
The paper investigates several channels through which war participation may
have affected voting behaviour. Using data from two different sources on veteran
benefit recipients in 1924 and 1929, I can rule out that impoverishment and exposure
to higher levels of violence are driving the results. Rather, my findings are in line
with the spread of an anti-communist conspiracy theory, the stab-in-the-back myth,
which soldiers from the working class could have picked up during their army service.
This conspiracy theory was spread by reactionary, right-wing circles and conveyed
the message that democratic parties had betrayed the German population and were
planning to surrender Germany to Bolshevism. I find that the effect was highest in
precincts with a large share of the working class which narrows down the attention
to this part of the society. Pre-WWI militarism, religion, and age composition of
WWI eligible cohorts do not have any explanatory power.
Two events between 1920 and 1924 could explain the observed timing of the
swing to the right: politicisation of veteran associations and the radicalisation of the
German communists. In order to assess the first channel, I hand-collected, digitised,
and geo-coded archival data on members of the three main political veteran associ-
ations in the Weimar Republic. Using this data, I can show that organised veterans
do not explain my findings. Anti-communism, on the other hand, is supported by
two different results. First, I demonstrate that veterans’ effect on voting is mainly
originating from areas with a comparatively high share of communist votes after
their radicalisation as opposed to before when moderate members had not with-
drawn yet. The second test uses the establishment of anti-communist paramilitary
volunteer units (Freikorps) between 1918 and 1923. I digitised and geo-coded a com-
prehensive list of Freikorps paramilitaries which allows calculating each precinct’s
proximity to the nearest unit. My findings suggest that areas located closer to
anti-communist volunteer units show a significant effect of veterans on voting.
Having narrowed down the attention to the spread of anti-communist mes-
sages among the working class, I continue by exploring the transmission to veterans
and from them to others. In my analysis, I provide evidence that the effect was
not only larger in working class areas but also restricted to those where exposure to
ideologies different from socialism was particularly low. This is compatible with the
idea that interaction of soldiers from different social backgrounds during wartime
were particularly helpful at injecting new political ideas into a formerly secluded
part of society – anti-communist in this case. In order to restrict the focus further
to interaction among soldiers rather than soldiers and their superiors, I digitised
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a military census from 1906 which gives me data on the recruiting patterns of the
German officers corps. Using this data, I do not find any proof for a specific role
of sergeants and other high-rank militaries. Finally, I explore settings under which
veterans could have passed their thoughts on to others. I provide evidence which
makes a transmission through the family network and to spouses appear unlikely.
Rather, transmission seems to be conditional on high political competition in May
1924.
This paper contributes to the literature on the consequences of combat ex-
perience – positive and negative. Blattman [2009] shows that child combatants in
Uganda displayed higher political activity in peacetime. In general, war experi-
ence seems to help overcoming collective action problems. This is also reflected in
Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott [2015] who provide evidence that sons of former
U.S. soldiers are more likely to volunteer in future wars. Jha and Wilkinson [2012]
document that war experience of Indian soldiers in WWII facilitated thorough and
peaceful ethnic cleansing during India’s partition. My study addresses the open the
question of how political attitudes rather than activity are influenced by war service.
Grossman, Manekin, and Miodownik [2015] provide one of the few investigations into
this crucial topic and highlight also the negative consequences of combat. Looking
at Israeli recruits’ exposure to violence during the Second Intifada, the authors find
that battle lowers combatants’ willingness for reconciliation and increases support
for parties of the political right. I also argue for a negative impact of war partici-
pation but cannot find any specific effect coming from combat exposure. Rather, I
argue that it is the interaction with different individuals which may drive changes
in attitudes after military service.
My findings also speak to the study of war’s long-run impacts. Researchers
until now have mostly looked at physical and human capital destruction. Regarding
political outcomes, Bellows and Miguel [2009] show that war violence led to higher
political activity in affected households. Institutional aspects are only addressed
by Acemoglu, Hassan, and Robinson [2011] who find that the systematic murder
of middle-class Jews during the Holocaust in WWII had persistent negative effects
on economic and political progress in Russian cities. I add to this literature in two
ways. On the one hand, this is one of few investigations into the still open question
of war’s effects on political attitudes [Blattman and Miguel, 2010]. Secondly, my
results suggest that, even if fought abroad, war can have negative consequences in
the belligerent country through the transmission of detrimental political ideas. The
persistent shift of votes from democratic to anti-democratic parties relates my work
to the study of democratic capital, people’s intrinsic valuation of democracy. Pio-
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neered by Persson and Tabellini [2009], the determinants of democratic capital have
also been evaluated empirically in a number of recent empirical studies [Giuliano
and Nunn, 2013; Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya, 2015]. While most of these are looking
at long-run institutional determinants, my study is – to the best of my knowledge
– one of the first to document short-run changes in democratic capital. I also find
evidence for the transmission of democratic values to others which has recently been
conceptualised theoretically by Ticchi, Verdier, and Vindigni [2013].
Finally, this paper also contributes to the growing quantitative literature
on the rise of the Nazi party in economic history and political economy. King
et al. [2008] and Bromhead, Eichengreen, and O’Rourke [2013] relate the Great
Depression to the rise of authoritarianism during the 1920s and 1930s in Germany
and other countries. My paper focusses on the role of the post-war period and
societal factors behind this development. Voigtla¨nder and Voth [2012] demonstrate
how anti-semitic attitudes from past centuries sparked up again after WWI and
supported the rise of the Nazi party. Satyanath, Voigtla¨nder, and Voth [2013], on
the other hand, investigate the role of civic associations as tool for the Nazi party
to infiltrate society. Crucially for my study, the authors also compare the effects
of military vs non-military associations but do not find evidence for a particular
role of veterans’ associations in recruiting members for the Nazi party. I confirm
these findings by showing that membership strengths of military associations cannot
explain the positive effect of veterans on right-wing parties. To the best of my
knowledge, my paper is the first one to empirically investigate the role of WWI
veterans as well as the general success of anti-democratic, right-wing parties during
the Weimar Republic. Rather than the Nazi party itself, I find that veterans were
benefiting the like-minded but less prominent DNVP which played a crucial role in
making Adolf Hitler Germany’s Chancellor in 1933. I am also the first to empirically
link the activity of German communists in the 1920s to the rise of right-wing support.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 1.2 provides the reader
with important historical background on Weimar democracy, the role of the former
WWI soldiers therein, and the stab-in-the-back myth. In section 1.3 I give a de-
tailed description of how the veteran estimate as well as the election panel dataset
are constructed. Section 1.4 outlines the empirical strategies applied in this paper.
Next, section 3.6 presents the main empirical results and and a number of robust-
ness checks. Section 1.6 investigates the mechanisms underlying the baseline effect.
Finally, section 1.7 concludes.
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1.2 Historical background
1.2.1 World War I, the stab-in-the-back myth and the democrati-
sation of Germany
Germany’s path towards democracy reaches back as far as 1848 when a provisional
national assembly was gathered in order to design a constitution for a still to be
unified Germany. This democratic experiment was crushed soon afterwards leading
to a period of restoration until Prussia’s victory over France in 1871 resulted in
the proclamation of the German Empire. It was a constitutional monarchy under
Prussia’s leadership that for the first time introduced a publicly elected parliament
on German territory. Even though its competencies were limited at first, the Re-
ichstag ’s role increased as it had to approve the Empire’s budget which became
particularly important during WWI and the preceding arms build-up. Under Em-
peror Wilhelm II, the German Empire had started a period of unpredictable and
provocative foreign policy which isolated it from most of its former European allies,
most notably Russia and the United Kingdom. As a result, it took only a spark in
form of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria to start the First
World War on 28th of July 1914.
Even though the German Empire was quite successful at the beginning of the
campaign, the progress at the western front came to a halt at the end of 1914 and
was followed by four-year war of attrition with the highest death toll experienced
until that point. By the end of September 1918, the situation of the German Army
had deteriorated to such an extent that the Supreme Army Command (Oberste
Heeresleitung) admitted defeat to the Emperor. A new grand government includ-
ing members of the social democratic party was formed subsequently and few days
later, US President Woodrow Wilson was officially asked for an armistice. When the
Supreme Army Command rejected the conditions set by the Allied Forces in late
October 1918, Chancellor von Baden sacked the leadership of the Supreme Army
Command and issued political reforms which turned Germany into a parliamentary
monarchy. The war, however, continued until the end of October when a mutiny by
the German Navy in Kiel sparked a rebellion and the formation of socialist work-
ers’ and soldiers’ councils. This rebellion quickly spread across the whole German
Empire and eventually led to the proclamation of the German Republic and the
abdication of Emperor Wilhelm II on the 9th of November [Bu¨ttner, 2008]. World
War I officially ended two days later with the signing of an armistice.2
2 One may question whether this transition can in fact be regarded as a democratisation. While
Imperial Germany was not a full-blown autocracy, its constitution did not put any constraints
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One of the key reasons for Weimar democracy’s failure 15 years later was that
the German Army was still fighting when the armistice was signed. This soon gave
rise to the stab-in-the-back myth, a conspiracy theory according to which Germany
had not lost World War I but was stabbed in the back by socialist and Jewish
politicians and their supporters. The fact that social-democrats inherited power as
the strongest parliamentary group and its ally, the left-liberal DDP, was traditionally
popular among the Jewish population provided the material to fabricate a lie which
many – especially militarists, monarchists as well as followers of the anti-semitic
Vo¨lkisch movement – “wanted to believe” [Bessel, 1988]. The new state was therefore
discredited from its very beginning as a project of unpatriotic cowards which made
it very hard for large parts of the society to identify with the new democratic
republic. This was further facilitated by a number of socialist rebellions which spread
fear among the population of a violent October Revolution-style coup – allegedly
tolerated or encouraged by the parties of the centre and left [Merz, 1995].
The stab-in-the-back myth can be regarded as the key mechanism for trans-
mitting anti-democratic thought and eroding democratic capital during the Weimar
Republic [Barth, 2003]. While being spread through various social groups such
as paramilitaries or universities, there were only two main parties of the Weimar
Republic who were more or less openly propagating its content and spreading right-
wing anti-democratic sentiments. These were the extremely anti-semitic Nazi party
NSDAP, including its predecessors, and the national-conservative German National
People’s Party DNVP [Mommsen, 1996].
1.2.2 WWI veterans’ role during Weimar democracy
As highlighted by several authors, not all veterans were anti-democratic or right-
wing. Those who became politically active and claimed to represent the front gener-
ation, however, were in great majority on the extreme right of the political spectrum
[Diehl, 1975; Bessel, 1995]. Paramilitary units founded in the war’s aftermath were
officially disbanded in 1923, but continued to exist in non-military cover organisa-
tions or within right-wing veteran associations like the Stahlhelm [Bu¨ttner, 2008].
Membership in organisations could thus be an important mode of veterans inter-
acting with the society and through which voting behaviour could be influenced.
on the executive and is therefore placed in the grey zone between democracy and dictatorship
in 1914 on the POLITY scale (-10 to +10) with a value of 2 [Jaggers and Marshall, 2014].
This ambivalence also been noted by other scholars [Jesse, 2013]. After 1918, the power of the
executive is bounded and the POLITY indicator jumps to a value of 6 where it remains until
1933. One can thus safely say that the revolution of 1918 resulted in a higher degree of democ-
racy despite the unclear point of departure. Further arguments why 1918 can be regarded as
a democratisation are reflected in the opinions voiced by its opponents in section1.A.1
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As highlighted by Anheier [2003] for the Munich chapter of the Nazi party, anti-
democratic activists tended to hold co-memberships in several paramilitary units,
racist clubs, and political parties. While it is not possible to investigate each of
them, my analysis of the channel focusses on ex-servicemen clubs since they had a
clear political distinction and are one the few types of such organisations for which
membership data has survived in archives.3
Joining one of many veteran associations was not only popular among anti-
democratic veterans as membership numbers of the rightist Stahlhelm (500,000), the
(social) democratic Reichsbanner (1,000,000) and the communist Rotfront (150,000)
show [Ziemann, 1998]. Officially, those associations were not very political but
rather meeting places for former soldiers of a specific social background to relive
and commemorate their front experiences. Some members of these associations were
also running as candidates in elections and veteran associations were very active in
supporting the campaign of their favourite parties [Ziemann, 2013]. The Stahlhelm
was initially loosely aligned with the conservative liberal, yet democratic, DVP
and the authoritarian DNVP. However, the strong aversion against liberalism and
socialism made it embrace soon also members of the anti-democratic paramilitary as
well as anti-semitic extremists. In December 1924, the Stahlhelm started to openly
support the nationalist parties in helping to organise rallies and organise marches
[Klotzbu¨cher, 1965]. Shortly afterwards, the Stahlhelm had turned into a political
combat league and strongly involved in the increasing political violence between left
and right [Berghahn, 1966]. The increasing political role of the veteran associations,
was also recognized by politicians:
“Since 1924 a change has been noticeable. (...) The organizations no
longer – or no longer exclusively – limit themselves to the field of soldierly
activity, but increasingly are becoming engaged in the political struggle
and are seeking to obtain political influence and political power (...).”
Albert Grzezinski (Prussian Minister of the Interior), quoted in Diehl
[1975, p.173]
As the preceding sections have shown, veterans started to get politicised during the
transition period especially where the new state was weak, threatened by uprisings
and the need to rely on right-wing paramilitary was high. Anecdotal evidence
has also highlighted the elevated role of soldiers within German society and the
increasing political power of ex-servicemen clubs as potential mechanisms through
3 Anheier [2003], for instance, provides an informative quick overview of the main types of
organisations joined by radicalised veterans.
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which soldiers could have influenced right-wing attitudes. The following section
describes the construction and collection of the data used to analyse veterans’ effect
on political attitudes.
1.3 Data
1.3.1 Estimating Germany’s World War I veterans
The data section starts by describing how I estimated the amount of German WWI
veterans. Collecting data on German WWI soldiers is a challenging task since
almost all primary material from the German Army Archive has been destroyed in
an air raid during Second World War. This makes statistical data the only source
to recover reliable information on WWI participation in the German Empire. The
starting point is the exact number of soldiers having served in the German Imperial
Army during 1914 and 1918 and not dying, Veterans. This number is transformed
into a treatment intensity Veterans per cap.. The base population is taken from the
1910 census which gives the last reliable counts unaffected by WWI.4 In order to
save on notation, the term per cap. is omitted in the remainder of this section:
Veterans = Soldiers1913 +
1918∑
t=1914
SoldiersJoint −
1918∑
t=1914
SoldiersDeadt (1.1)
Unfortunately, the components of this ideal measure are not readily available at a
disaggregated level and veterans as such were also never subject of any statistical
publication.5 However, I will show that they can be estimated quite accurately
with census data and are congruent with aggregate numbers from official sources.6
The main data used in this study are two mid-war censuses conducted by the Of-
fice of War Nourishment’s Economic Department (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung des
Kriegserna¨hrungsamtes) in December 1916 and 1917 as well as the first post-war cen-
sus in October 1919.7 The December 1917 census contains county level numbers on
4 An alternative way of doing this, would be using the population from the first post-war census
carried out in October 1919, about a year after the armistice of 11th November 1918. However,
since the latter may be endogenous due to post-WWI migration, pre-war population seems a
somewhat safer choice.
5 An exception is the statistic of recipients of war-related benefits on 1929 which however covers
less than 60,000 of the 11 million surviving German WWI participants and to which also widows
and orphans were entitled. A per capita measure of benefit recipients is weakly negatively
correlated with my measure of veterans at −0.08.
6 See section 1.D.3 for details.
7 According to Bessel [1993], a large amount of the 800,000 German prisoners of war had returned
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the amount of military persons present at the time of the census, SoldiersHome1917.
The main problem is that soldiers serving in December 1917 were omitted from the
census.8 The way I resolve this issue is exploiting the fact that only men served in
the army. This shows up as a notable gender gap in the mid-war censuses but cru-
cially also in a considerably different population growth between women and men
from 1917 to 1919.9 Taking the gender-difference in population growth gives an
estimate of men absent between 1917 and 1919, henceforth MissingMen1917−1919:
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This measure is, however, also driven by gender-specific differences in births, civil-
ian deaths and migration. The first two can be estimated and are discussed in
section 1.D.1 in the appendix. Differences in migration cannot be estimated and
deducted and have to be accounted for by controlling for gender-specific migration
1910–1919.
Apart from gender-differences the sum of SoldiersHome1917 andMissingMen1917−1919
does also not account for fluctuations in and out of the army before and after De-
cember 1917. Dead soldiers are not problematic since neither those who die before
or after 1917 are counted. However, a considerable number of soldiers had left the
army before December 1917 for other reasons than death while others were still to
join until the end of the war. Since age and desertion can be deemed negligible,
those leaving the army alive should be roughly equivalent to the amount of severely
wounded soldiers.11 I thus also make use of a preliminary, unofficial version of the
December 1916 census. This provides me with county-level data on war-disabled
members of the German army. Disaggregated numbers on the 700,000 men who had
left the army due to injury between 1916 and 1917 or were still to join the army in
1918 could not be retrieved [Statistisches Reichsamt, 1926]. These will be part of the
composite measurement error discussed in section 1.4.1. AddingWarDisabled1916 to
the sum of SoldiersHome1917 and a gender-corrected version of MissingMen1917−1919
by late 1919.
8 The equivalent census at the front did not collect data on soldiers’ residence and could thus not
be matched with the county level data. This practice was severely criticised among Germany’s
statisticians [Bayerisches Statistisches Landesamt, 1919].
9 Prisoners of war were also counted as local population in mid-war censuses and have been
removed from Male1917.
10 Further details on this calculation are provided in the appendix.
11 The study by Jahr [1998] estimates that no more than 50,000 out of almost 13 million German
soldiers deserted. The rule of dropping out for leaving the conscripted age group between 17
and 45 was suspended in the German army during the First World War [Nash, 1977].
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Figure 1.1: Density of veteran inflow per capita
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completes the veteran estimate used in this study:
˜Veterans =SoldiersHome1917 +MissingMen1917−1919
− (Male Births1917−1919 − Female Births1917−1919)
+ (Male CivilDeaths1917−1919 − Female Deaths1917−1919)
+WarDisabled1916
(1.2)
The density of the normalised estimate ˜Veterans is depicted in figure 1.1. One
can see that it is almost bell-shaped and ranging between 4 and 19% with a mean
and median of 14% and 13.7%, respectively. Remaining issues about the veteran
estimate such as measurement error and endogeneity will be discussed in further
detail in section 1.4.1.
1.3.2 Panel data of Reichstag elections 1881−1933
In order to track changes in precincts’ voting behaviour over time, I compiled a
panel dataset covering 17 parliamentary elections held between 1881 and Hitler
coming to power in 1933. The panel is based on two existing datasets on elections
in Imperial and Weimar Germany from ICPSR [1991] and Falter and Ha¨nisch [1990],
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respectively. All voting data were initially taken from original publications by the
German (Imperial) Statistical Office. A dataset comparing election results over
almost 60 years, however, raises important issues regarding the units of analysis as
well as the changes in Germany’s party system.
While the issue of area redistricting is discussed in section 1.3.3, the second
major concern is the comparability of parties across time. A brief look into the
history of the NSDAP illustrates this very well: during the German Empire there was
no anti-semitic party of mass support but only various like-minded splinter parties
such as the Deutsch Reformpartei (German Reform Party) or the Wirtschaftliche
Vereinigung (Economic Union). The Nazi party was eventually founded under the
name of the Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (DAP, German Workers’ Party) in 1918 and
changed its name into NSDAP (National-Socialist German Workers’ Party) in 1920.
After Hitler’s first coup attempt in 1923 the party was banned and leading members
of the NSDAP joined forces with the Deutsch-Vo¨lkische Freiheitspartei (German
Vo¨lkisch Freedom Party, DVFP). From 1924 onwards, when it became re-allowed,
the NSDAP became quickly the largest anti-semitic party.
This development is exemplary for almost any part of Germany’s political
spectrum and highlights the need for a more stable categorisation which accounts for
the various name changes, mergers and splits in order to analyse long-term trends.
I am relying on an established classification used in the study of historical German
parties augmented by a separate category for anti-semitic groupings [Jesse, 2013]: 1)
Anti-semitic; 2) (Protestant) Conservative; 3) Right-Liberals; 4) (Catholic) Centre;
5) Left-Liberals; 6) Socialist; 7) Agrarian/Particularist (Others).12 The individual
parties’ votes are aggregated to their closest fit in the political spectrum and treated
as quasi parties existing over the whole period of interest. The aggregates are
then divided by the amount of total ballots cast in order to obtain vote shares.
In the Weimar Republic, the main protagonists actively opposing democracy were
Antisemitic, Conservative, and Right-Liberals.13 My main outcome is the combined
vote share of these three parties which I call Right-wing. The socialist party split
12 An alternative classification is the one by Sperber [1997] who treats Anti-semitic and Conserva-
tive as a single conservative bloc and assigns the Centre party to the Agrarians/Particularists.
13 Counting the right-liberals as right-wing is not straightforward. The main reasons are twofold:
first, they were involved in many pre-election agreements with the conservatives during the
German Empire which makes their vote shares difficult to separate. Second, despite partic-
ipating in many governments the DVP opposed the draft of the post-war constitution and
had many links to right-wing organisations such as the Stahlhelm. The DNVP also joined
government during 1925 and 1927/1928, but research shows that this did not alter the party’s
general anti-democratic position. In fact, the party chairman Count Westarp was removed
from office in 1928 because he refused to exclude a member urging for the acceptance of the
Republic [Bu¨ttner, 2008; Gasteiger, 2014].
13
Figure 1.2: Long-term evolution of election results 1881-1933 (WWI start/end, solid lines; pre/post-WWI elections, dashed lines)
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during WWI into social democrats and communists. I continue to use their sum as
socialist votes after WWI to ensure comparability. In one specification I also add
communist votes to the Right-wing which gives Non-democratic votes.
Figure 1.2 shows the aggregate voting data by political party over the used
sample. What is remarkable is the stability of right-wing votes until the end of WWI
and the sudden steep rise shortly after. While the centre parties remained very stable
throughout this sixty years period, the results of liberals and social democrats show
where the right-wing shares were coming from. Liberal votes had stabilised at about
20% until the war and then started to fall gradually to significantly below 10% in
1933. Socialist votes did not experience such a downturn but saw their clear upward
trend during the German Empire come to a sudden halt during the 1920s and 1930s.
1.3.3 Construction of panel and control variables
This section describes the construction of the dataset and remaining control vari-
ables. The core of my dataset is a unique panel covering 17 parliamentary elections
held between 1881 and Hitler coming to power in 1933. A panel over more than 60
years, however, requires stable units of analysis not only for the electoral results but
also all other data to be merged to it. While most current work on Weimar Germany
uses data at the city or county level, voting results during the German Empire were
only published for each precinct. This unit was solely used for electoral purposes
and only few exceptions followed political boundaries, e.g. for very small states and
administrative districts. Each precinct typically consisted of a cluster of 2-4 coun-
ties with occasional but usually negligible overlaps. An attractive feature of those
precincts is also that for political reasons they were never adjusted for the consider-
able population changes and remained stable from 1871 to 1912 [Jesse, 2013]. After
World War I, Germany was divided into 35 new electoral precincts of larger but
roughly equal size, but at the same time election data became published at much
finer levels of aggregation such as counties and sometimes even larger municipalities.
The smallest units of analysis with data available for pre- and post-WWI are thus
the 397 former Imperial precincts. 14
The counties they consisted of, however, were subject to frequent changes
such as mergers, partial incorporations and splits. Hence, in a first step I coded
all county reforms during the respective time period and constructed a set of stable
counties. These are counties that existed at one point in time but where district
reforms happened in such a way that numbers for the stable county can be recon-
structed from adding up data of past or future sets of counties. If I was also able to
14 For the remainder of this paper, precincts is referring to those of Imperial Germany.
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re-construct the area of a whole precinct by adding up stable counties or if they co-
incided, this precinct was included in my dataset. In doing so, I was able to recover
266 out of the 397 Imperial precincts. About a quarter of the missing areas were
from Alsace-Lorraine and Posen/West Prussia ceded to France and Poland after
World War I. Another third is from densely populated – and often re-districted –
agglomerations such as the Ruhrgebiet and very large cities with several precincts
such as Berlin or Munich.
For this study I collected and digitised a number of additional data. One
exception is the digitised Prussian version of the 1910 census which was taken from
Galloway [2007]. To start with I digitised the German census of 1910 which provides
me with data on religion and population size. I include population share of catholics
and protestants and log(population) as controls variables. The 1910 census also
provides me with the last pre-WWI data on cohort size by gender. Unfortunately,
the latter are only reported in very large groups and does not allow to infer male
cohorts born between 1869 to 1901 and thus eligible for WWI. I therefore use the far
more detailed publication of the census results for Prussian population provided in
[Galloway, 2007]. Together with data from the 1916 census this gives me the size of
the male cohorts born 1869–1901 for about half my sample. In a two-step procedure
I use this data to predict the cohort size 1869–1901 for the whole sample.15 I also
collected vital statistics for the German Empire for the time period 1910 to 1919
at the level of counties and administrative districts. I use this data to correct for
gender-differences inMissingMen1917−1919 and to calculate gender-specific migration
between 1910–1919 and infant mortality in 1912.16
I also digitised the occupational census of 1882 which provides me with de-
tailed county information on peoples’ profession. From this I can calculate the share
of the population working in manufacturing and in war-related industries. The lat-
ter forms my instrumental variable for war participation and is described in more
detail in section 1.4.3. Finally, I control for turnout by dividing the amount of total
votes by the size of the electorate. All control variables are at the cross-sectional
level and included in the regression by interacting them with election fixed-effects.
For the sake of brevity, I do not introduce them at this point but in the respective
subsections of 1.6. I use a number of other variables in my mechanism analysis in
section 1.6. Summary statistics for all variables relevant to the baseline specifica-
tions are reported in table 3.2.
15 First, I run a simple regression of the actual cohort size 1869/1901 on the limited set of variables
available from the all-German results. I then use these estimated coefficients to predict cohort
size 1869/1901 for the rest of the sample
16 I add perinatal births in 1912 to deaths within first-year of 1913 and divide by births in 1912.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics
Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Veteran-related
Veterans per cap. 266 0.14 0.02 0.05 0.19
Population 1910 in 1,000 266 152.50 106.90 24.16 937.38
Socio-economic
% Protestants 1910 266 0.64 0.36 0.00 1.00
% Catholics 1910 266 0.34 0.36 0.00 1.00
% Infant mortality 1912 266 0.17 0.04 0.09 0.31
% Working in manufacturing 1882 266 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.31
% Working in war industries 1882 266 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.17
% WWI eligible men (born 1969-1901) 266 0.29 0.01 0.24 0.35
% ∆Male migration 1910-1919 266 −0.03 0.01 −0.09 0.02
Voting
% Turnout 4, 522 0.75 0.12 0.20 0.95
% Vote Anti-semitic 4, 522 0.10 0.17 0.00 0.79
% Vote Conservative 4, 522 0.19 0.21 0.00 0.99
% Vote Right-Liberal 4, 522 0.11 0.16 0.00 0.97
% Vote Centre 4, 522 0.23 0.29 0.00 1.00
% Vote Left-Liberal 4, 522 0.10 0.15 0.00 0.91
% Vote Socialist 4, 522 0.23 0.17 0.00 0.71
% Vote Communist (post-WWI) 2, 128 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.33
% Vote Others 4, 522 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.75
Notes: The unit of observation is one of the 266 precincts in the sample at election t. Variables
provided at the cross-sectional level only are reported accordingly and used in the analysis by
interacting them with either a post-WWI dummy or election fixed effects.
1.4 Identification strategy
1.4.1 Determinants of veteran inflow
In this subsection, I investigate the main drivers of war participation in Germany
and I ensure that the treatment assignment is plausibly random conditional on
observables. The main drivers of war participation across the German Empire were
originating from the WWI conscription system. According to the law, all men aged
17 to 45 were liable to serve in the army and the share of male cohorts 1869 to
1901 is thus expected to be one of the main factors [Nash, 1977]. I include an
estimate of this cohort relative to the 1910 population interacted with a post-WWI
dummy into my set of control variables. Not all men in the relevant age groups,
however, actually had to serve and a considerable amount was exempted. Being
judged permanently unfit to fight was one main reason for exemption and at least
at the beginning of the 20th century this decision was not entirely impartial but
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Table 1.2: Determinants of veteran inflow
Veterans p.c.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆Male migration1910−1919 −0.035 0.080 0.091 0.144
∗
(0.073) (0.084) (0.077) (0.074)
1910 share of male cohorts 1869-1901 0.283∗∗ 0.318∗∗ 0.192 0.358∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.134) (0.135) (0.120)
1882 share manufacturing −0.034 −0.032 −0.085∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.028)
1882 share war-industries −0.332∗∗∗
(0.117)
Infant mortality rate 1912 −0.002 −0.001
(0.032) (0.029)
Controls N N N Y Y
Observations 266 266 266 266 266
R2 0.001 0.046 0.050 0.185 0.271
Notes: Robust standard errors in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Controls:
Log(population) 1910; % Protestants 1910; % Catholics 1910; % New male voters post-WWI
allegedly also by factors such as parents’ occupation and living location.17 Data
on conscription in the German Empire is only available before the war but does
not corroborate such claims. The percentage of permanently unfit within the 1913
class, for example, ranged only between 4.3 and 5.9% across Germany’s 25 military
districts. During the war, these numbers were presumably even lower and more equal
since a law from September 1915 allowed re-examining everyone judged unfit before.
The intense battle for manpower [Feldman, 1966] during WWI in Germany makes
it unlikely that political concerns of the commissions could have been a systematic
driver of war participation.
The second part of exemptions was related to workers needed in war or war-
related production. By the year 1918, about 1.3 million men – a sixth of the actual
army size – was absorbed in such a way from the front to work in the factories
and mines. War participation is thus expected to be significantly lower in areas
employing a large share of men in the following industries: mining; iron and metal
processing; production of iron, metal, and steel; construction of machines, tools, and
vehicles; electrical, precision, and optical engineering.18 This share is a confounder
since it is highly correlated with the size of the working class which was at the
17 The reason behind this was the army’s general suspicion against the working class of supporting
social democracy and being politically illoyal. See Brentano and Kuczynski [1900] and May
[1917] for further discussions of this topic.
18 This classification is taken from Kocka [1978].
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same time also the main stronghold of the social democrats. Male employment in
war industries is therefore expected to negatively affect both war participation and
right-wing votes. The IV strategy presented in section 1.4.3 exploits the fact that
war industries should have a direct effect on political attitudes only through the
size of the working class. My main specifications rules this channel out by including
interactions of time dummies with the employment share in manufacturing 1882.
The final determinant of the veteran estimate is mismeasurement as discussed in
section 1.3.1. I control for parts of this by controlling for ∆Male migration1910−1919 .
Table 1.2 shows how the main drivers of war participation are related with
my veteran estimate. In order to casually investigate what the remaining variation
may be driven by, I construct the residuals from the specification in column (4) and
plot their spatial distribution by quartile in figure 1.3. Unexplained variation seems
to be slightly higher in north and south-west Germany. Reassuringly, figure 1.4
shows that the correlation of the residual with pre-WWI right-wing vote shares as
of 1912 is only very weak and negative.
1.4.2 Differences-in-Differences
The panel structure of the data allows using unit and time fixed effects which identi-
fies off the within-precinct variation after accounting for time-specific trends. In do-
ing so, I can account for election-specific voting patterns due to candidates’ abilities,
for instance, and any time-constant omitted variable. Also confounders related to
historical heritage are taken care of, given that their effect is constant over time. My
first identification strategy exploits these features and uses a difference-in-differences
methodology to investigate the level effect of veteran inflow across German precincts
on right-wing voting. The estimated equation reads as follows:
yit = α+ γi + λt + βt(veteransi × postWWIt) + µX it + ǫit (1.3)
In the baseline model, I regress vote shares yit one the election and precinct fixed
effects γi and λt as well as a set of control variables Xit which is identical to the
full set of variables in column 4 of table 1.2. The main variable of interest is the
interaction of the one-time treatment intensity veteransi with a dummy variable
taking on value 1 for each election after WWI (starting with the one in June 1920)
and 0 otherwise. The estimated effect should thus be interpreted as an average shift
in voting patterns across all elections after the end of the war proportionate to the
estimated population share of veterans. Whether this effect is causal depends on
two assumptions: the first is that areas of high and low treatment intensity follow
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Figure 1.3: Residuals from table 1.2, column 4 across Imperial Germany’s precincts,
post-WWI borders in green
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Figure 1.5: Average rightwing vote share before/after WWI depending on veteran
inflow residual (median)
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similar voting patterns before WWI and that the observed change is not part of a
trend starting before WWI.
I tackle this concern in several ways: the most simple one is presented in
figure 1.5 which plots the average right-wing vote share over time for precincts with
above and below median values of the residual plotted in figure 1.3. As can be seen,
the two lines are diverging before the war with less-treated districts exceeding the
other ones by about 4%. After WWI, this trend reverses and by May 1924 the aver-
age votes in both groups are almost equal. The second test uses a non-linear version
of the effect by interacting the treatment veteransi with 20 election fixed effects
leaving out 1912 as the reference election. While being more demanding on the
data, this allows exploring anticipating behaviour and explicitly test the common
trends assumption. This would not be satisfied if precincts with higher treatment
intensity started to show increasingly higher voting results for anti-democratic par-
ties already before the war. A third alternative is the inclusion of area-specific
election fixed effects and precinct-specific time trends. Both tests are presented as
a robustness check in section 3.6.2.
The second necessary assumption is the absence of confounding events corre-
lated with both the arrival of veterans and support for the extreme right. The vector
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of control variables Xit features several factors deemed to fulfil these criteria. Apart
from the determinants of (estimated) veteran inflow, I also include further data.
The first of these is the natural log of the population and serves as a proxy for the
precinct’s size. Unlike the percentage of new female voters, the amount of new male
voters is correlated with the treatment and thus included in the regression. New
male voters are those born between 1896 and 1900 who would have not been allowed
to vote in 1920 under the old law. I proxy this with the cohorts from 1895 to 1900
taken from the censuses 1910 and 1916 and create a new variable NewMaleV otersit
which is zero before WWI and afterwards equal to the size of the newly enfranchised
cohorts divided by the 1910 total population.
Furthermore, I include socio-economic characteristics of each precinct. In
addition to the size of the working class and infant mortality, I also control for the
religious composition of precincts using the shares of Protestants and Catholics in
1910. Including religion into the specification is necessary since Protestants were
more supportive of the German Empire especially after the extremely polarising
Kulturkampf secularisation period and it is possible that war volunteering was also
higher among them. If the (predominantly Protestant) conservative parties had
started to actively fight democratisation only after the war, this would be a source
of bias. In order to include the time-invariant control variables into the fixed effect
regression, each of them is interacted with a set of election dummies. Finally, the
standard errors of the regression are clustered at the precinct level to account for
correlation of unobservable characteristics over time.
1.4.3 Instrumenting veteran inflow
Even though the diff-in-diff specification already controls for a range of unobserve-
ables, one should refrain from interpreting these estimates in a causal way. Many
important factors are likely to have been omitted from the specification which could
bias the estimated effect of veteran inflow. For example, economic activity and
the treatment may be mis-measured in a systematic way and historical treats may
change their effect over time and thus would not be captured by the precinct fixed
effects. In order to tackle these concerns, I use a driver of war participation which is
uncorrelated with unobserved determinants of right-wing voting: draft exemptions
for male workers in war industries conditional on the size of the working class.19 The
first and second stage regressions of the corresponding 2SLS estimation are stated
19 Similarly, Acemoglu, Autor, and Lyle [2004] are using discrimination in the conscription pro-
cess as an instrument for war participation to estimate the effect of female labour supply during
WWII on wages in the United States.
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below:
veteransi×postWWIt = κ+θi+ψt+δt(WarIndustryi×postWWIt)+ηXit+υit (1.4)
yit = α+ γi + λt + βt ̂(veteransi × postWWIt) + µXit + ǫit (1.5)
The identification strategy rests on the conditional exogeneity assumption that em-
ployment in war-industries 1882 affects right-wing votes in a precinct with a given
size of working class only through its (negative) effect on veteran inflow. Another
way of stating the exclusion restriction is that there is nothing else that makes areas
with a high share of workers in war industries, given those of total manufacturing,
more pro-democratic than its effect on war participation. One concern with the
instrumental variable may be that workers producing goods needed by the army
have an economic interest in continuing warfare which then translates into support
for specific parties. In this case, however, areas producing weapons would be espe-
cially inclined towards belligerent parties which is the opposite of the reduced form
relationship hypothesised above. Throughout Germany’s history from 1881 to 1933
right-wing parties were – at least comparatively – the more fervent supporters of
military action. While the self-interest of weapon-producers in military action can-
not be entirely ruled out, it would make it only harder to find a significant effect of
war-related employment on votes for the extreme right. The next section discusses
the empirical results of these two identification strategies.
1.5 The effect of veterans on right-wing voting
1.5.1 Difference-in-Differences results
The results from the differences-in-differences in equation 3.1 for right-wing votes
and its components are reported in table 3.3. The plain linear regression in column
1 yields already a strongly significant coefficient indicating that a one percentage
higher veteran inflow after WWI is associated with an increase in right-wing votes
of 0.17 percent. While the inclusion of precinct effects does not alter the results,
specification (3) and (4) show that the effect was strongly distorted by the exclusion
of election fixed effects and the control variables. According to the baseline spec-
ification in column (4), a unit percent increase of veteran inflow yields an almost
double increase in votes for the extreme right of about 1.1%. Two out of the three
constituting quasi parties are gaining from veteran inflow after WWI but estimates
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are clearly driven by the conservatives rather than the anti-semitic parties. The vet-
eran effect is thus independent of the success of the Nazi party and rather directed
towards general authoritarianism and conservatism than anti-semitism. Taking into
account the treatment variable’s distribution, a 2% increase in veterans per capita
– the equivalent a one standard deviation increase – translates into an increase of
2%. This is about 5% of the mean vote share of right-wing parties after WWI.
The positive link between the share of veterans and success of right-wing
parties raises the question where those votes came from and which part of the
politcal spectrum lost due to veteran inflow. Another crucial question is whether
the effect of veteran inflow is benefiting anti-democratic parties of any political
direction or whether it is restricted to the right-wing only. Table 3.4 sheds light
on these questions and reports the estimates of the baseline specification for the
combined votes of right-wing and communists (Anti-democratic) and all other quasi
parties. Column (2) shows that adding communist to right-wing votes leaves the
coefficient significant but decreases its size by about a quarter. The effect of veterans
must therefore be negative on communist votes and benefits only the anti-democratic
parties of the political right. Specifications (3) to (7) show that the right-wing was
gaining from war participation at the expense of the socialists and other parties.
The only exceptions were the Catholic Centre party is gaining insignificantly and
the progressive left liberals have an effect near zero.20 Reasons for this could be
that there was far higher cohesion within those parties since they were particularly
popular among adherents of particular faiths (Catholics for the Centre, Jews for
the left-liberal DDP). The socialists experienced the most severe losses but also
particularistic parties saw their votes decrease depending on the amount of veterans
per capita. Even though table 3.1 showed that only one quasi-party gained, the fact
that the losing counterparts are only two parties points in the direction that the
turn towards the right as a response to war participation was restricted to specific
parts of Weimar Germany’s society.
1.5.2 Robustness of the baseline estimates
In the following section I investigate the reliability of the baseline results. Even
though figure 1.5 does not show any divergence in voting patterns which would
benefit my findings, it does not provide a rigorous check for the validity of the
common trends assumption. I use two ways of testing the robustness of the results:
20 It may seem at first that veterans are even significantly benefiting the Centre party. In table 1.8
I show that this effect originates from the 1907 election and does not seem to be related to
WWI.
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Table 1.3: Differences-in-Differences estimates (Baseline results)
Rightwing Anti-
semitic
Conser-
vative
Right-
Liberal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Veterans p.c. 0.174∗∗∗ 0.117∗ 0.256 1.080∗∗ 0.109 1.685∗∗∗ −0.714
(0.065) (0.065) (0.511) (0.467) (0.212) (0.483) (0.500)
Precinct FE N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE N N Y Y Y Y Y
Controls N N N Y Y Y Y
Precincts 266 266 266 266 266 266 266
Observations 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522
R2 0.003 0.640 0.740 0.784 0.872 0.735 0.524
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Controls: % Working in manufacturing 1882; Log(population) 1910; % Protestants 1910; %
Catholics 1910; Infant mortality 1912 (all interacted with Election FE); ∆Male Migration1910−1919 ;
% Male cohort 1869/1901 (1910); % New male voters post-WWI (all interacted with post-WWI
dummy)
inclusion of region-specific time effects as well as precinct-specific linear-trends and
allowing for a non-linear treatment effect. Table 3.5 reports the results of column
(4) in table 3.3 for different combinations of province and district-specific election
fixed effects as well as precinct-specific linear time trends. The first two absorb the
effect of any unobservable varying at the province or district level independent of its
functional form. Precinct-specific trends, on the other hand, prevent the treatment
variable from picking up any linear change in voting behaviour over time in a given
precinct. Reassuringly, the coefficient on the treatment variable does not change
strongly and remains significant many specifications. Allowing for flexible area fixed-
effects in column (2) and (3) slightly increases the treatment effect. The inclusion of
precinct-linear trends in column (4) saturates the model and inflates the standard
error but has not impact on the point estimate. Adding area-specific election fixed-
effects only slightly decrease the treatment effect in the final specification (6). The
fact that the inclusion of various linear- and non-linear trends does not wipe out the
veteran effect lends further support to the common trends assumption.
The weakness of the precinct-specific trends is that they can only account
for a linear pre-treatment patterns in each precinct. Testing for non-linear trends
can be done by interacting veteran inflow with time FE instead of a post-WWI
dummy and allowing for a time-varying treatment effect. The reference category
in this case is the last pre-WWI election in 1912 and is therefore not interacted
with the treatment. Figure 1.6 plots the 20 coefficients and the respective 10%
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Table 1.4: The effect of veteran inflow on other parties
Rightwing RW+Com-
munist
Centre Left-Lib. Socialist Others
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Veterans p.c. 1.080∗∗ 0.752 0.433 0.065 −0.962∗∗∗ −0.604∗
(0.467) (0.487) (0.265) (0.421) (0.275) (0.326)
Precinct FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Precincts 266 266 266 266 266 266
Observations 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522
R2 0.784 0.798 0.947 0.658 0.910 0.468
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Controls: % Working in manufacturing 1882; Log(population) 1910; % Protestants 1910; %
Catholics 1910; Infant mortality 1912 (all interacted with Election FE); ∆Male Migration1910−1919 ;
% Male cohort 1869/1901 (1910); % New male voters post-WWI (all interacted with post-WWI
dummy)
confidence intervals over time. The observed coefficients are reassuring and confirm
that veteran inflow only had a positive effect on right-wing voting after WWI. This
graph also highlights the persistence of the treatment effect until the end of the
sample period in 1933. Crucially, the effect only really strikes in May 1924 rather
than immediately after WWI.
Disaggregating the treatment effect on right-wing voting additionally also
by parties, reveals an interesting pattern. A comparison between the coefficients
in columns (3) and (4) before the war shows negative pre-trends of the conserva-
tive party mirrored by positive estimates of the right-liberals. At this point, it is
important to know that pre-election agreements among Conservatives and Right-
Liberals as their closest political ally were very frequent during the German Empire
[Ku¨hne, 2005]. In those agreements, parties would agree in advance that only one
of their candidates would run in a specific districts, while the other party’s candi-
date in a different precinct would face no competition from the second party. Such
arrangements were common but also rational given the coexistence of majoritarian
voting in a multi-party system. While official cooperation between Conservatives
and Right-Liberals only occurred in the so-called Kartellparteien (cartel parties) in
1887 and 1890 and the Bu¨low-Block in 1907, the coefficients in specification (3) and
(4) insinuate that pre-election agreements were probably starting from about 1878
onwards. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that conservative abstentions
were far more frequent in areas of high veteran inflow than others.
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Table 1.5: Baseline results and different FE specifications
Rightwing vote share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Veterans p.c. 1.080∗∗ 1.180∗∗∗ 1.526∗∗∗ 1.021 1.077 0.746
(0.467) (0.430) (0.419) (0.747) (0.784) (0.821)
Precinct FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election×Province FE N Y N N Y N
Election×District FE N N Y N N Y
Precinct FE×t N N N Y Y Y
Precincts 266 266 266 266 266 266
Observations 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522
R2 0.784 0.855 0.877 0.852 0.896 0.911
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Controls: % Working in manufacturing 1882; Log(population) 1910; % Protestants 1910; %
Catholics 1910; Infant mortality 1912 (all interacted with Election FE); ∆Male Migration1910−1919 ;
% Male cohort 1869/1901 (1910); % New male voters post-WWI (all interacted with post-WWI
dummy)
1.5.3 Instrumental variable results
As the previous section has shown, there is strong support for the validity of the
common trends assumption. The premise that could not be tested formally in the
preceding section, however, is the absence of confounding events related to veteran
inflow in magnitude and timing. Even though many potential confounders have
already been included into the set on control variables, one cannot rule out all
factors that might have driven the process of conscription or survival at the front.
I tackle this problem by instrumenting veteran inflow with the employment share
of war-related industries as of 1882 as described in section 1.4.3. A fundamental
worry already arises the first-stage relationship between the potentially endogenous
veteransi × postWWIt and the instrument WarIndustryi × postWWIt in column (1)
of table 1.7. While the relation is significant and goes in the hypothesised direction,
the rather low F statistic of 7.72 is not strong enough to rule out concerns about
a weak instrument. This is also reflected in the insignificant reduced form and IV
estimates. However, even though the instrumented effect on conservative vote share
is insignificant as a result of the high standard errors, its magnitude remains similar
to that of the Diff-in-Diff estimate. In order to back this up, I also re-estimated the
model using a LIML which yielded near-identical point estimates for columns (4),
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Table 1.6: Differences-in-Differences estimates with time-varying treatment effect
Rightwing Antisemitic Conservative Right-Liberal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Veterans p.c.×1881 −0.316 0.255 −1.462∗∗∗ 0.891
(0.716) (0.256) (0.563) (0.768)
1884 0.304 0.255 −1.361∗∗ 1.411∗∗
(0.652) (0.256) (0.647) (0.689)
1887 0.079 0.255 −1.932∗∗ 1.757∗∗
(0.603) (0.256) (0.950) (0.893)
1890 0.669 0.298 −0.502 0.873
(0.709) (0.242) (0.616) (0.682)
1893 0.430 0.582∗∗ −0.918 0.767
(0.597) (0.254) (0.685) (0.639)
1898 −0.209 0.313 −1.480∗∗ 0.958
(0.503) (0.355) (0.617) (0.583)
1903 0.475 0.126 −1.021∗∗ 1.370∗∗∗
(0.446) (0.261) (0.488) (0.501)
1907 0.168 0.047 −0.745 0.866∗
(0.499) (0.317) (0.507) (0.465)
1920 0.667 0.138 0.173 0.356
(0.636) (0.267) (0.524) (0.572)
May 1924 1.564∗∗ 0.899∗∗ 0.476 0.189
(0.645) (0.387) (0.514) (0.568)
Dec 1924 1.134∗ 0.367 0.661 0.107
(0.652) (0.312) (0.544) (0.557)
1928 1.341∗∗ 0.467 0.523 0.351
(0.673) (0.331) (0.496) (0.569)
1930 1.442∗∗ 0.420 0.745 0.277
(0.650) (0.343) (0.465) (0.556)
July 1932 1.313∗∗ 0.244 0.775 0.294
(0.594) (0.347) (0.490) (0.532)
Nov 1932 1.303∗∗ 0.096 0.879∗ 0.328
(0.593) (0.344) (0.484) (0.537)
1933 1.297∗∗ 0.133 0.870∗ 0.293
(0.596) (0.323) (0.495) (0.535)
Precinct FE Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Precincts 266 266 266 266
Observations 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522
R2 0.785 0.872 0.736 0.525
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Controls: % Working in manufacturing 1882; Log(population) 1910; % Protestants 1910; %
Catholics 1910; Infant mortality 1912 (all interacted with Election FE); ∆Male Migration1910−1919 ;
% Male cohort 1869/1901 (1910); % New male voters post-WWI (all interacted with post-WWI
dummy)
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Figure 1.6: Time-varying treatment effect estimates and 90% CI: Rightwing votes
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(7), (10) and (13).21
The IV results are confirming the Diff-in-Diff estimates by returning treat-
ment effects of similar or higher size. The effect on right-wing votes in specification
(4) increases to 1.96 but loses statistical significance. Column (10) shows that most
of this increase is due to a notably higher treatment effect of 2.80 on the conservative
party which is also significant at the 10% level. The IV estimate for anti-semitic
parties is still insignificant but now negative at -0.18. The effect on right-liberal
parties remains negative and insignificant. Overall, the IV estimates underline the
findings in table 3.3 that veteran inflow is exclusively benefiting the conservative
DNVP. This should be born in mind when moving on to analysing the mechanisms
behind the baseline findings. Given the weak first-stage, I will proceed with the
differences-in-differences results as my preferred specification.
1.6 Mechanisms
1.6.1 A two-stage mechanism: Evidence from timing and parties
As figure 1.6 showed, veterans’ effect on right-wing votes did not fully materialise
right after the war but only in 1924. This raises doubts about whether it was
21 Results are reported in table 1.22.
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Table 1.7: Instrumental Variable estimates
Dep. var. Vet. p.c. Rightwing Antisemitic Conservative Right-Liberal
OLS Red.Form OLS IV Red.Form OLS IV Red.Form OLS IV Red.Form OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
1882 % war-ind. −0.332∗∗∗ −0.652 0.059 −0.932 0.221
(0.120) (0.461) (0.238) (0.642) (0.588)
Veterans p.c. 1.080∗∗ 1.963 0.109 −0.178 1.685∗∗∗ 2.805∗ −0.714 −0.665
(0.467) (1.458) (0.212) (0.723) (0.483) (1.615) (0.500) (1.659)
Precinct FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Precincts 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266
Observations 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522
R2 0.989 0.783 0.784 0.783 0.872 0.872 0.872 0.732 0.735 0.733 0.522 0.524 0.524
IV F-stat. 7.72
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Controls: % Working in manufacturing 1882;
Log(population) 1910; % Protestants 1910; % Catholics 1910; Infant mortality 1912 (all interacted with Election FE); ∆Male Migration1910−1919 ; %
Male cohort 1869/1901 (1910); % New male voters post-WWI (all interacted with post-WWI dummy)
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actually WWI that turned veterans towards the right. In order to provide a better
understanding about the timing of the effect, I investigate the yearly effects of
veteran inflow also for the losing parties. The results in table 1.8 also revise some
of the findings about other parties’ reaction to veteran inflow in table 3.4. To start
with, the perceived gain of the centre party in areas with higher war participation
after WWI actually took place between 1903 and 1907. Virtually all post-WWI
coefficients are identical to that of 1907. This insinuates that 1912 and 1920 may be
regarded as outliers for the relation between veterans per capita and vote share of the
centre party. A similar scenario can also explain the losses of Other parties. Again,
the 1907 coefficient is very similar to all post-WWI coefficients. The identified drop
of particularists’ votes is therefore higher in areas with high war participation in the
future but unrelated to war itself.
The most important result of table 1.8, however, is that losses of the socialist
parties from veteran inflow already took place already in the first post-WWI Re-
ichstag election 1920. A one unit increase in the population share of veterans leads
to a drop of 0.8 in the socialist vote share in 1920 compared to 1912. The winners
of this drop, however, were not only the rightwing parties but also the left-liberals
and the centre. The main effect on right-wing votes observed in the baseline results,
in fact, does not take place before May 1924. In this election the veteran effect
drops or turns negative for all parties apart from the far-right. The negative effect
on socialist votes, however, remains unchanged. The main findings in tables 3.3
and 3.4 therefore seem to be part of a two-stage mechanism: 1) a drop of socialist
votes immediately after WWI in 1920 and 2) an increase in right-wing votes in May
1924 – both depending on war participation.
The timing of these mechanisms suggests that 1) is actually related to the
war while 2) is a result of the post-war period. This also guides the remainder
of this section. I start by extrapolating the war-related and social factors which
determined veterans’ negative effect on socialist votes. Then I explore the impact
of political socialisation between 1920 and 1924 on the distinct swing to the right
in areas with high war participation. Finally, I look at the channels through which
political attitudes were transmitted to veterans and from them to others.
1.6.2 Direct effects of war participation
According to official statistics, the Imperial Army recorded about 4.2 million cases
of non-fatal injuries Statistisches Reichsamt [1926].22 However, due to the success-
22 Unfortunately, this statistic did not differentiate between cases of injuries and ever injured
soldiers in WWI.
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Table 1.8: DID estimates with time-varying treatment effect for other parties
Vote share Rightwing Centre Left-Liberal Socialist Others
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Veterans p.c.×1881 −0.316 −1.161∗∗∗ 1.260∗ −0.277 0.510
(0.716) (0.338) (0.724) (0.370) (0.409)
1884 0.304 −0.825∗ 0.006 0.039 0.486
(0.652) (0.453) (0.554) (0.365) (0.388)
1887 0.079 −0.674∗ 0.022 0.202 0.414
(0.603) (0.365) (0.571) (0.334) (0.343)
1890 0.669 −0.810∗∗ −0.597 0.532 0.216
(0.709) (0.386) (0.576) (0.332) (0.488)
1893 0.430 −1.023∗∗ −0.302 0.690∗∗ 0.221
(0.597) (0.417) (0.456) (0.274) (0.361)
1898 −0.209 −1.079∗∗∗ −0.143 0.732∗∗ 0.805∗
(0.503) (0.351) (0.442) (0.345) (0.469)
1903 0.475 −0.727∗∗ −0.280 0.023 0.522
(0.446) (0.339) (0.379) (0.166) (0.333)
1907 0.168 −0.298 0.427 0.040 −0.328
(0.499) (0.254) (0.320) (0.113) (0.290)
1920 0.667 0.019 0.411 −0.829∗∗∗ −0.226
(0.636) (0.342) (0.480) (0.271) (0.329)
May 1924 1.564∗∗ −0.351 0.088 −0.886∗∗∗ −0.316
(0.645) (0.385) (0.473) (0.254) (0.339)
Dec 1924 1.134∗ −0.212 0.119 −0.729∗∗∗ −0.268
(0.652) (0.378) (0.473) (0.249) (0.330)
1928 1.341∗∗ −0.351 0.130 −0.715∗∗∗ −0.357
(0.673) (0.343) (0.480) (0.264) (0.433)
1930 1.442∗∗ −0.340 0.168 −0.663∗∗∗ −0.594
(0.650) (0.326) (0.488) (0.255) (0.409)
July 1932 1.313∗∗ −0.358 −0.014 −0.754∗∗∗ −0.182
(0.594) (0.315) (0.484) (0.271) (0.360)
Nov 1932 1.303∗∗ −0.371 −0.010 −0.766∗∗∗ −0.152
(0.593) (0.314) (0.483) (0.270) (0.365)
1933 1.297∗∗ −0.437 −0.023 −0.598∗∗ −0.211
(0.596) (0.337) (0.484) (0.250) (0.368)
Precinct FE Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Precincts 266 266 266 266 266
Observations 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522
R2 0.785 0.947 0.660 0.911 0.470
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Controls: % Working in manufacturing 1882; Log(population) 1910; % Protestants 1910; %
Catholics 1910; Infant mortality 1912 (all interacted with Election FE); ∆Male Migration1910−1919 ;
% Male cohort 1869/1901 (1910); % New male voters post-WWI (all interacted with post-WWI
dummy)
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ful re-integration of veterans into the labour market only a small fraction became
dependent on state benefits. Bessel [1988], for instance, notes that many compa-
nies were trying very hard to find employment for their former workers even if they
were actually not in need of additional labour. The amount of soldiers whose injury
entitled them to state benefits was about 660,000 according to a survey of veteran
benefit recipients in 1924. More than 25% of these had an earnings reduction above
50% [Statistisches Reichsamt, 1925]. Even though the German veteran benefit law
was generous compared to other countries, the state did not manage to win veter-
ans’ support. Especially the bureaucratic pension system and the lack of special
recognition of war-injuries bred discontent among former soldiers [Diehl, 1993]. As
a consequence, ex-soldiers depending on state benefits may have developed a par-
ticular hatred against the state which would give an explanation for my findings
above. I expect this effect to be even higher for those with substantial disabilities
and little chances on the labour market. An alternative link between combat ex-
perience and extremist voting is provided in Grossman, Manekin, and Miodownik
[2015] who show that war exposure increases prejudices and support for military
conflict among Israeli recruits.
As a result, benefit receiving veterans and particularly those with more se-
vere injuries could be driving the baseline effect. I exploit two sources of data to
investigate the effect of war’s direct consequences for veterans on right-wing sup-
port. The first one are numbers on recipients of veteran benefits in 1929 provided in
Statistisches Reichsamt [1933]. This data is provided at the county level and has al-
ready been used by Adena et al. [2015] and Satyanath, Voigtla¨nder, and Voth [2013]
as a measure of war participation. Two downsides of this source of information
are that it does not differentiate between veterans and their dependants and was
collected 10 years after the end of the war when many veterans might have already
passed away. In my heterogeneity analysis I investigate whether the veteran effect
was significantly different in precincts above the median of veteran benefit recipients
per capita. The second source comes from the aforementioned survey by the Statis-
tisches Reichsamt [1925] of all benefit receiving individuals in 1924. Crucially, this
publication lists the average reductions in earnings potential of benefit recipients
for given larger areas (provinces). This data furthermore allows to explicitly focus
on 1) former soldiers rather than dependants and 2) those who fought in WWI as
opposed to other wars. From this I calculate the average earnings reduction among
all benefit-receiving WWI veterans as a proxy for combat exposure. I interact veter-
ans per capita with a linear measure of combat exposure rather than a median split
dummy since the high level of aggregation may result in picking up other differences
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across provinces.
Table 1.9 presents results of the baseline specification after adding the proxies
discussed above (interacted with a post-WWI dummy) as well as their interaction
with veteran inflow. The median split by recipients of veteran benefits in column 2
does not lead to a significant change in the baseline coefficient for the conservatives.
The right-liberals seem to be losing more from veteran inflow in precincts with
many benefit recipients but this difference is not significant. Also the effect of
veterans on socialists is not affected. Combat exposure, on the other hand, seems
play an important role in determining veterans’ effect on socialist votes. However,
since this effect is linear, one can only draw conclusions about veterans’ actual
impact by looking at the marginal effects which I have plotted in figure 1.7. The
figures show the marginal effect of veteran inflow in dependence of the interacted
variable, combat exposure in this case. The background shows a histogram of the
interacted variable and thus gives information at which points the marginal effect
actually matters. This analysis reveals that the marginal effect on socialist votes
increases with combat exposure but does not depend on it. Only at the far left of
the distribution, the treatment effect becomes insignificant.
Taken together, I find only mixed support for the widespread image of the
war-disabled, impoverished veteran who becomes embittered by the Weimar society
and radicalises. Using the precise numbers on veteran benefit recipients in 1929,
the main results are left virtually unchanged. A channel working through impov-
erishment from war participation can therefore be ruled out. Combat exposure, on
the other hand, seems to have some power in explaining the size of the effect on
socialist but not its existence. These results are in line with those of Grossman,
Manekin, and Miodownik [2015] cited above but should be interpreted with caution
given the high level of aggregation and the presumably non-random selection into
combat exposure in this empirical setup.
1.6.3 Effect heterogeneity across social groups
During a war, men from very different parts of the social strata are often serving
in the same unit. The German army during WWI was no different in that respect.
Even though Ziemann’s analysis (2007) of German war letters suggests that soldiers
tended to bond with others from nearby places and similar social background, one
cannot entirely rule out such a mechanism. I continue by exploring in which parts
of the society a transition of socialist to right-wing support in relation to war service
was most likely. In order to do this, I look at the religion and social class as the two
most important lines of social division in modern Germany.
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Table 1.9: Veteran inflow and the social consequences of WWI
Rightwing Socialist
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Veterans p.c. 1.080∗∗ 1.406∗ 21.937 −0.962∗∗∗ −1.065∗∗ 37.469∗∗
(0.467) (0.718) (37.136) (0.275) (0.435) (18.735)
Poor veterans>Median 0.035 −0.020
(0.134) (0.078)
Vet.×Poor vet. −0.460 0.162
(0.975) (0.555)
Combat exposure (linear) 0.010 0.120∗∗
(0.109) (0.057)
Vet.×Combat expos. (lin.) −0.451 −0.827∗∗
(0.801) (0.403)
Precinct FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Precincts 266 266 266 266 266 266
Observations 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522
R2 0.784 0.785 0.788 0.910 0.910 0.911
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Controls: % Working in manufacturing 1882; Log(population) 1910; % Protestants 1910; %
Catholics 1910; Infant mortality 1912 (all interacted with Election FE); ∆Male Migration1910−1919 ;
% Male cohort 1869/1901 (1910); % New male voters post-WWI (all interacted with post-WWI
dummy)
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Figure 1.7: Marginal effect of veterans depending on share of highly disabled WWI
soldiers
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Table 1.10: Veteran inflow and social composition
Rightwing Socialist
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Veterans per cap. 1.080∗∗ −0.123 0.439 −0.962∗∗∗ −0.008 −0.826∗∗∗
(0.467) (0.820) (0.521) (0.275) (0.357) (0.316)
Working class 1882>Median −0.245∗ 0.226∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.069)
Vet.×% Working class 1882 1.799∗ −1.452∗∗∗
(0.972) (0.497)
Protestants 1910>Median −0.178 0.054
(0.146) (0.089)
Vet.×% Protestants 1910 1.692 −0.376
(1.044) (0.610)
Precinct FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Precincts 266 266 266 266 266 266
Observations 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522
R2 0.784 0.785 0.786 0.910 0.912 0.910
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Controls: % Working in manufacturing 1882; Log(population) 1910; % Protestants 1910; %
Catholics 1910; Infant mortality 1912 (all interacted with Election FE); ∆Male Migration1910−1919 ;
% Male cohort 1869/1901 (1910); % New male voters post-WWI (all interacted with post-WWI
dummy)
For my analysis, I investigate treatment effects in precincts with above me-
dian share of protestants in 1910 or share of population in manufacturing in 1882.
Results for the corresponding regressions are displayed in table 1.10. The findings
in columns (2) and (5) are important because they rule out that socialists were los-
ing votes in non-working class areas. In precincts with a low share of the working
class, the coefficients are close to zero. The veteran effect is therefore a distinct
working-class phenomenon. Concerning the role of religion, columns (3) and (6)
show that the gains of the right-wing from veteran inflow are only significant in
precincts with an above median share of protestants. However, these appear to
have been mostly at the expense of parties other than socialist ones. The interac-
tion with Protestants 1910 > Median is negative for socialists but not significant.
The plain treatment effect, on the other hand, remains highly significant and only
marginally changes magnitude.
One explanation for the large effects in working class areas is that veterans
could have picked up political attitudes during their service. If this was the case, the
effect should also be higher in areas where socialists had an ideological monopoly
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Table 1.11: Veteran inflow and political diversity
Rightwing Socialist
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Veterans per cap. 1.080∗∗ −0.309 −0.296 −0.962∗∗∗−0.211 −0.208
(0.467) (0.753) (0.731) (0.275) (0.345) (0.361)
Socialist monopoly 1912>Median −0.260∗∗ 0.154∗∗
(0.128) (0.067)
Vet.×Soc. monopoly 1912>Median 2.296∗∗ −1.252∗∗∗
(0.942) (0.475)
Socialist monopoly 1907>Median −0.241∗ 0.150∗∗
(0.128) (0.072)
Vet.×Soc. monopoly 1907>Median 2.179∗∗ −1.206∗∗
(0.924) (0.504)
Precinct FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Precincts 266 266 266 266 266 266
Observations 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522
R2 0.784 0.788 0.788 0.910 0.911 0.911
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Controls: % Working in manufacturing 1882; Log(population) 1910; % Protestants 1910; %
Catholics 1910; Infant mortality 1912 (all interacted with Election FE); ∆Male Migration1910−1919 ;
% Male cohort 1869/1901 (1910); % New male voters post-WWI (all interacted with post-WWI
dummy)
before the war and new political ideas were presumably most efficient. In order to
measure left ideological monopoly, I use a Herfindahl index for the elections imme-
diately preceding WWI in 1912. Since high values could capture lack of diversity of
the left and the right, I weight the index by the socialist vote share. The new vari-
able is therefore highest in areas with low competition and high support for socialist
parties and lowest in those with elevated competition and support for non-socialist
parties. In order to make the analysis robust, table 1.11 uses median splits and
reports also corresponding estimates using the 1907 elections for constructing the
index. The estimates in column (2) show that the positive effect of veterans on
right-wing votes is entirely driven by areas with a left monopoly before WWI. The
same is also true for the loss in socialist votes in column (5). Specification (3) and
(6) rule out that this finding might be driven by the peculiarly strong results of the
socialist parties in the 1912 election.
Putting the above findings together, I find that social class is a powerful
socio-economic predictor of the veteran effect. The treatment effect on right-wing
votes is restricted to precincts with an above median share of protestants and men
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between 25 and 49 years. This factor, however, cannot explain the losses of the
socialists and is therefore mainly informative about where the right gained but not
where those votes were coming from. The share of the working class, on the other
hand, highlights a direct link between war participation and the diversion of socialist
votes to the right-wing in areas with a higher population share of veterans. This is
particularly striking given the low treatment effect on the anti-semitic parties and
the fact the predecessors of the DNVP and the DVP were representing the upper
middle class and aristocracy. War participation was therefore crucial for the right to
overcome class divisions and attract votes from the left during the Weimar Republic.
Religious division, on the other hand, could not be overcome and treatment effects
were highest in protestant areas which were already supporting the conservatives
before the war. The results are consistent with a transmission of political thoughts
and ideas. The strength of the effect in areas where the socialist party had a political
monopoly suggests that veterans are associated with the inflow of new political ideas
into an environment where such thoughts could not take place before. Section 1.B.2
in the appendix shows that informal social ties with former officers cannot explain
this pattern. Rather, transmission seems to have taken place during the war among
lower-ranked soldiers. One possible channel of spreading anti-communist thoughts
in the working class milieu could be the conspiracy theory of the stab-in-the-back
mentioned in section 1.2.
1.6.4 Socialisation: Veteran associations
One way in which the rightwing could have gained support from war participation
between 1920 and 1924 is through socialisation in the ex-servicemen’s clubs and
combat leagues mentioned in section 1.2. Diehl [1975] highlights that the conserva-
tive Stahlhelm association started to get politically active around 1921/1922 which
would coincide with the timing in table 1.8. Its two main competitors, the social-
democratic Reichsbanner and the communist Rotfront, were each founded in the
first half of 1924. In the following analysis I investigate whether higher popularity
of the Stahlhelm can explain the veteran effect. A straightforward way to quantify
the strength of associations is membership numbers relative to the local population.
Apart from the NSDAP, where an impressive research project on party members
has been carried out by Brustein and Falter [see Schneider-Haase, 1991, for details],
obtaining data on followers of political organisations during the Weimar Republic is
usually very difficult. Many organisations were too small to systematically collect
information or their records were destroyed due to political or war-related reasons.
Luckily, the Stahlhelm was not only a rather big association but also heavily influ-
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Figure 1.8: Stahlhelm dominance based on veteran associations’ membership data
Stahlhelm dominance
1st quartile
2nd
3rd
4th
No data
enced by the proverbial Prussian passion for data collection. It therefore regularly
demanded from its regional chapters not only reports on membership numbers but
also on competing organisations such as the social-democratic Reichsbanner (RB)
and the communist Rotfront (RF). Not all of these found their way into archives
but I managed to collect and digitise almost completely the original sheets of the 6th
Stahlhelm census (6. Sta¨rkemeldung) in late 1929/early 1930 and reports on enemy
organisation of early 1928.23
While being unique and extremely valuable for the study of veteran life, this
data also has important drawbacks. Many areas only provided aggregates at a higher
level and some areas are not covered at all. More generally, misreporting in any
direction could be the case even though it does not appear too likely given the strong
belief of the Stahlhelm in obedience. If no data was available for a given area, zero
was assigned. Since this is particularly problematic for larger areas, time-varying
district fixed effects are introduced into each regression. A more fundamental issue is
that this information only provides a one-time snapshot of organisations’ strengths
and may not completely reflect its that of the past and near future. Both points
are not negligible and should be born in mind when analysing the results. From the
23 I collected this data entirely from the stocks of the German Federal Archive (see appendix for
further details).
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Table 1.12: Veteran inflow and measures of veterans’ politicisation
Rightwing Socialist
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Veterans per cap. 1.526∗∗∗ 0.761 2.455 −0.735∗∗ −0.542 −2.215
(0.419) (0.599) (1.923) (0.353) (0.449) (1.396)
Stahlhelm p.c.>Median −0.083 −0.192∗
(0.163) (0.105)
Vet.×Stahlhelm >Med. 0.121 0.068
(0.162) (0.110)
Reichsbanner p.c.>Median −0.221∗ 0.116
(0.130) (0.098)
Vet.×Reichsbanner >Med. 0.566 1.252∗
(1.087) (0.716)
Rotfront p.c.>Median −0.260 −0.530
(1.164) (0.819)
Vet.×Rotfront >Med. 1.393 −0.745
(0.916) (0.713)
Stahlhelm rule −0.750 −0.341
(0.688) (0.384)
Vet.×Stahlhelm rule −1.776 2.829
(3.379) (2.505)
Precinct FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Precincts 266 266 266 266 266 266
Observations 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522
R2 0.877 0.880 0.877 0.943 0.944 0.943
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Controls: Migration1910−1919 ; % Men aged 9-41 1910; % Working in manufacturing 1882;
Log(population) 1910; % Protestants 1910; % Catholics 1910; Infant mortality 1912 (all interacted
with Election FE)
membership data, I calculated two different measures: Stahlhelm/RB/RF per cap.
divides an area’s members by the corresponding population from the 1919 census.24
StahlhelmDominancei is the share of Stahlhelm members over the sum of RB, RF
and Stahlhelm members.25 Finally, the distribution of veteran associations is not
predetermined and potentially endogenous.
24 Since Stahlhelm area borders do not precisely follow 1910 district or precinct borders, the
matching is initially carried out at the district level with reported areas being treated as
aggregates of several political districts. Precinct data is then formed as a population weighted
average of each district’s Stahlhelm/RB/RF per cap. measure. The 1919 census is used instead
of 1910 because it allows a more accurate match with the Stahlhelm data of the late 1920s.
25 In the base of zero membership numbers, the following procedure was applied: if only Stahlhelm
or summed RB and RF members had value zero, StahlhelmDominancei was replaced with the
highest/lowest value possible, i.e. 0 or 1. If both values were zero, a tie was imputed and value
0.5 assigned.
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The spatial distribution of Stahlhelm dominance is shown in figure 1.8 and
suggests that veterans were far more right-wing in the south and north-east of Ger-
many. As mentioned above, in order to account for this strong spatial clustering,
all regressions using the combat league membership data are using election-specific
district fixed effects. The far bigger issue when including veteran membership data
is its endogeneity. In order to alleviate this problem, I first regress each bad control
on my baseline set of predetermined control variables. My analysis then uses the
predicted value from these regressions as an exogenised version of the original vari-
able. The analysis proceeds as follows. Regression (2) and (5) interact veteran inflow
with dummies for having an above median members of Stahlhelm, Reichsbanner,
and Rotfront. I use the median splits for of all three associations since competition
among them might induce correlation in membership strengths. Second, specifica-
tion (3) and (6) interact with a linear measure of StahlhelmRule. I use a linear term
since the assignment of the value of 0.5 to any side is crucial and because the map in
figure 1.8 revealed strong spatial clustering which might be picked up by a median
dummy. The corresponding results are shown in table 1.12.
Looking at the coefficient of Veterans×(Stahlhelm>Median) in columns (2)
and (5) shows that Stahlhelm strength does not explain the baseline effect. In fact,
the coefficient is negative and for right-wing votes even significant at the 10% level.
For socialist votes, the coefficient is also negative but tiny compared to the inter-
actions with memberships of the left-wing combat leagues. The significant positive
effect of Veterans×(Reichsbanner>Median) could be reflecting the findings in sec-
tion 1.6.3 that the right-wing was particularly gaining from veteran inflow in working
class areas. This is corroborated by the negative coefficient of the same variable in
specification (5). The inclusion and interaction of StahlhelmDominance does not
have strong explanatory power either. The plain treatment effect in regression (3)
is almost unchanged compared to (1) which is also reflected in the marginal effect
plot in figure 1.12. The marginal effect plot, however, also shows that the Stahlhelm
had a significant negative effect on socialist votes only in areas where the Stahlhelm
outnumbered its counterparts on the left. Keeping all caveats of the data in mind,
this seems to suggest that combat leagues might have played a role in spreading
anti-socialist propaganda to veterans. However, my results show no evidence to
believe that the Stahlhelm turned veterans towards the political right.
1.6.5 Socialisation: Anti-communism
In this section I investigate the role of anti-communism in explaining the veteran
effect on right-wing and socialist votes. Probably the most severe experience for
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Figure 1.9: Marginal effect of veterans depending on Stahlhelm dominance
Table 1.13: Veteran inflow and support for communists 1920/1924
Rightwing Socialist
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Veterans per cap. 1.080∗∗ 0.134 −0.222 −0.962∗∗∗−0.443 −0.224
(0.467) (0.711) (0.947) (0.275) (0.296) (0.360)
Communist vote 1920>Median −0.230∗ 0.130∗
(0.129) (0.069)
Vet.×Comm. 1920>Med. 1.963∗∗ −1.054∗∗
(0.948) (0.486)
Communist vote May 1924>Median −0.257∗ 0.198∗∗∗
(0.149) (0.074)
Vet.×Comm. May 1924>Med. 1.977∗ −1.293∗∗
(1.073) (0.512)
Precinct FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Precincts 266 266 266 266 266 266
Observations 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522
R2 0.784 0.786 0.786 0.910 0.911 0.911
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Controls: Migration1910−1919 ; % Men aged 9-41 1910; % Working in manufacturing 1882;
Log(population) 1910; % Protestants 1910; % Catholics 1910; Infant mortality 1912 (all interacted
with Election FE)
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Figure 1.10: Freikorps locations and unexplained veteran variation across precincts
(units outside the borders of Imperial Germany not shown)
Veteran inflow
(residual)
1st quartile
2nd
3rd
4th
No data
many veterans was the return to a country ruled by soldiers’ and workers’ councils.
The communist coup attempts in 1919 spread fears of a violent Bolshevik revolution
and led to a radicalisation among the middle class [Fritzsche, 1990]. The uprisings
also corroborated beliefs in the stab-in-the back myth, namely that the state was
secretly working against the middle and upper class in order to establish a com-
munist dictatorship. These fears were unjustified given that in the elections for
the National Assembly 1919, only 7.6% went to communist parties. This changed
dramatically in 1920 after a failed coup attempt by the far-right. Even though the
vote share for socialist parties remained almost the same, communists now received
17.9% which was mainly at the cost of the more moderate social democrats. Over
the following years, the German communists started to get heavily influenced by the
Communist International and engaged in coup attempts in Central Germany (1921)
and Hamburg (1923). This coincides with the strong increase of veterans’ effect
for right-wing votes who were also the most fervent and credible anti-communist
parties.
I investigate the importance of anti-communism in two ways: my first test
looks at whether the treatment effect is stronger in areas where a fear of commu-
nism was justified and communist parties received a vote share above the median.
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To avoid endogeneity issues, I use again predicted values from a regression on pre-
determined covariates rather than the actual values. Since the radical phase of the
communist party started after 1920, I interact veterans with a median dummy of
communist votes in 1920 and 1924 as a cross-check. Table 1.13 reveals that this
distinction does not make any difference. Specifications (2) and (3) show that the
veteran effect on right-wing votes was higher in areas with above median communist
support in both the 1920 and May 1924 elections. The effect on socialist parties in
columns (5) and (6) mirrors this effect. The support for communists in May 1924,
however, has a slightly more negative effect. This could be because many moderate
communists had returned to the social democrats by that time, so that the vote in
May 1924 is a more accurate measure of radical communist support.
My second test is related to paramilitary Freikorps units set up after 1919 in
order to fight communist insurgencies in Germany and the Baltic states [Bu¨ttner,
2008]. Led by former officers, they consisted to a large part of former soldiers but
also included many volunteers who were too young to fight in WWI. The peak
membership of the Freikorps was between 100,000 and 400,000 and therefore repre-
sented at most 4% of all former WWI soldiers. Nevertheless, the existence of such
volunteer units can be linked to deep anti-communism in a specific area. In order
to construct a measure of Freikorps exposure, I digitised a comprehensive lists of
Freikorps units by Tessin [1974] and geocoded these according to their origin town. I
proxy precincts’ exposure to anti-communism by calculating the inverse distance to
the nearest Freikorps unit. Figure 1.10 depicts the spatial distribution of Freikorps
over areas with different extents of unexplained variation in veteran inflow. Units’
locations are scattered over the whole country which but show also slight concen-
trations. Some of these concentrations are around large cities which experienced
communist uprisings such as Berlin, Magdeburg and the Ruhr area. Silesia in the
South-East has more Freikorps units since they were also used to fight Polish sep-
aratist movements. The rural areas of Bavarian in the South and Pomerania in
Central North have also a lower concentration. The correlation with veteran inflow,
however, is only 0.15 (0.11 for the median split dummy). This is also reflected in fig-
ure which shows Freikorps units in areas of high and low unexplainable variation in
veterans. In order to entirely rule out endogeneity issues, I use again an exogenised
version as was done for the communist votes above.
The regressions in table 1.14 interact the treatment veteran inflow with a
linear measure of ProxFreikorpsi and a dummy closer to the nearest unit than the
median. I report both measures because of the moderate spatial concentration which
could result in picking up other factors. The results for the median split in columns
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Table 1.14: Veteran inflow and exposure to anti-communist paramilitary
Rightwing Socialist
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Veterans per cap. 1.080∗∗ 0.349 2.533 −0.962∗∗∗ −0.175 −3.137∗∗∗
(0.467) (0.759) (1.777) (0.275) (0.326) (0.888)
Prox. Freikorps>Median −0.224∗ 0.206∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.071)
Vet.×Prox. Freikorps>Med. 1.306 −1.344∗∗∗
(0.938) (0.499)
Prox. Freikorps (linear) 3.003 1.568
(4.821) (2.046)
Vet.×Prox. Freikorps (lin.) 8.795 −13.160∗∗∗
(10.542) (4.915)
Precinct FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Precincts 266 266 266 266 266 266
Observations 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522
R2 0.784 0.786 0.784 0.910 0.911 0.911
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Controls: % Working in manufacturing 1882; Log(population) 1910; % Protestants 1910; %
Catholics 1910; Infant mortality 1912 (all interacted with Election FE); ∆Male Migration1910−1919 ;
% Male cohort 1869/1901 (1910); % New male voters post-WWI (all interacted with post-WWI
dummy)
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Figure 1.11: Marginal effect of veterans on on right-wing vote share
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(2) show that areas close to the nearest Freikorps are also those who are driving the
veteran effect on right-wing votes. Yet, the difference between both groups is not
statistically significant. For communist votes, being this effect is highly significant.
Precincts above the median of ProxFreikorpsi are also those who are driving the
negative veteran effect on socialist votes. The results in columns (3) and (6), on the
other hand, show that the treatment effect is strong and significant only in precincts
who are very close to the nearest Freikorps. Figure 1.11 illustrates that the veteran
effect on each party is not significantly different from zero in areas in the lower
half of the proximity distribution. Taken together, there is considerable support
for a role of anti-communism in explaining veterans’ effect on voting in the Weimar
Republic.
1.6.6 Transmission mechanisms
The preceding sections have shown that the effect seems to be driven by anti-
communist sentiments within the working class. One of the main questions which is
still open concerns the mechanism how veterans spread anti-communist thoughts to
others. The treatment effect of 1.08 cannot be solely attributed to former soldiers
even if all of them had turned towards the right-wing. The higher membership num-
bers of Reichsbanner and Rotfront compared to the Stahlhelm point in the direction
even such an extreme scenario was very unlikely. The following section looks at two
transmission channels: first, I look at personal contacts within the family network
through parents and spouses and second, I investigate impersonal contacts through
election campaigning.
The first transmission channel explores the role of family networks and
spouses. Galloway’s data on Prussia provides me with the percentage of families
among all households and the population share of women above the age of 20 in
1910. The first variable proxies how important families were with respect to single-
person households while the second one measures the amount of new female voters,
i.e. women above the age of 20 in 1920. Both variables proxy for different oppor-
tunities for veterans to influence the political thoughts of those in their immediate
surroundings. Table 1.15 allows the treatment effect to vary in areas with an above
median value of the above mentioned interaction terms. I do not find support that
transmission within the family or couple is responsible for the baseline effect. Apart
from specification (2), all interaction terms are insignificant and small in magnitude.
Rather than being a stepping stone, column (2) suggests that areas with a higher
share of family households had a significantly lower effect of veterans on right-wing
votes. If anything, families therefore seem to have dampened political radicalisation
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Table 1.15: Veteran inflow and transmission (Prussia only)
Rightwing Socialist
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Veterans per cap. 1.985∗∗∗ 2.219∗∗∗ 2.089∗∗∗ −1.842∗∗∗ −1.901∗∗∗ −1.641∗∗∗
(0.542) (0.509) (0.645) (0.352) (0.344) (0.373)
% Family HHs>Median 0.488∗∗∗ 0.015
(0.040) (0.019)
Vet.×% Family HHs>Med. −0.418∗∗ 0.106
(0.199) (0.103)
% New female voters>Median −0.449∗∗∗ −0.017
(0.043) (0.020)
Vet.×% New fem. voters>Med. −0.066 −0.128
(0.186) (0.096)
Precinct FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Precincts 144 144 144 144 144 144
Observations 2,448 2,448 2,448 2,448 2,448 2,448
R2 0.833 0.835 0.833 0.922 0.922 0.922
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Controls: % Working in manufacturing 1882; Log(population) 1910; % Protestants 1910; %
Catholics 1910; Infant mortality 1912 (all interacted with Election FE); ∆Male Migration1910−1919 ;
% Male cohort 1869/1901 (1910); % New male voters post-WWI (all interacted with post-WWI
dummy)
among veterans. The amount of new female voters, on the other hand, does not
change veterans’ impact on voting behaviour.
The second set of tests looks at the specific role of campaigning. This factor
is important because it measures how much parties were interacting with potential
voters and how strong the need was to polarise and stand out among the competitors.
In order to infer campaigning effort, I use the victory margin in a specific election.26
This variable is constructed as the difference between the strongest party bloc and
the runner-up and multiplied by −1. VictoryMargin therefore increases with the
extent of (inferred) political contest and campaigning. I use again a median split
of this new variable during the 1920 and May 1924 elections to investigate if and
when campaigning mattered for the veteran effect. Concerns about the exogeneity
of political contest with respect to veteran inflow are addressed by the use of two
different election for the median split and by using predicted values rather than the
original numbers. For both right-wing and socialist, the veteran effect is statistically
different from zero only in areas with above median competition in May 1924 as
26 See Ziblatt [2009] for a similar application to election in Imperial Germany.
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Table 1.16: Veteran inflow and victory margin 1920/1924
Rightwing Socialist
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Veterans per cap. 1.080∗∗ 0.500 0.204 −0.962∗∗∗ −0.904∗∗∗ −0.324
(0.467) (0.526) (0.677) (0.275) (0.351) (0.317)
Victory margin 1920>Median −0.229 0.030
(0.150) (0.078)
Vet.×Vic. margin 1920>Med. 1.563 −0.164
(1.052) (0.541)
Victory margin 1924>Median −0.091 0.139∗∗
(0.125) (0.069)
Vet.×Vic. margin 1924>Med. 1.595∗ −1.162∗∗
(0.917) (0.476)
Precinct FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Precincts 266 266 266 266 266 266
Observations 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522
R2 0.784 0.785 0.791 0.910 0.910 0.911
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Controls: % Working in manufacturing 1882; Log(population) 1910; % Protestants 1910; %
Catholics 1910; Infant mortality 1912 (all interacted with Election FE); ∆Male Migration1910−1919 ;
% Male cohort 1869/1901 (1910); % New male voters post-WWI (all interacted with post-WWI
dummy)
shown in columns (3) and (6). Specification (2) and (5) highlight that the victory
margin of 1920 did not have a similar predictive power for the socialist party votes.
Overall, my results point in the direction that political attitudes were passed
on through campaigning rather than the family network. The timing of the effects
suggests that characteristics of the May 1924 election were more important than
those of 1920. This is in line with the hypothesis that anti-communism became
particularly salient in May 1924 after the communist party had radicalised. My
results are congruent with such a mechanism but cannot provide a complete proof
of the stab-in-the-back myth and its transfer to and from veterans. Knowing that the
effect on socialists materialised already in 1920, the result could also be interpreted
such that areas where socialists lost from veteran inflow were also those which would
more fierce electoral competition in May 1924.
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1.7 Conclusion
How does war service affect political attitudes? In this paper I provide empirical
evidence on the role WWI veterans in shifting voting patterns in Weimar Germany
from socialist parties to those of the right-wing after 1918. I show that the effect
initially only harms socialists and only benefits the far-right few years later. This
coincides with a radicalisation within the communist part of the socialist parties.
I provide evidence that the effect primarily hits working class areas. The main
beneficiary was the conservative DNVP, a party deeply rooted in the aristocracy
and the wealthy upper class and thus ex-ante unlikely to receive votes from this
part of society. This evidence points in the direction that veterans picked up a
popular conspiracy theory – the stab-in-the-back myth. According to this theory,
Germany had not lost the war but was betrayed by socialists and democrats who
were trying to turn Germany into a Bolshevik country. The myth was especially
used by the right-wing parties such as the Nazis and the DNVP. A possible channel
is that the myth compromised socialist parties immediately but only benefited the
right once the Bolshevik threat described in it turned real.
In line with this hypothesis is that the effect is strongest where support for
radical communists was comparatively high. In other words, areas with a larger
inflow of veterans reacted stronger to communist threat but did so in turning to-
wards the extreme right of the political spectrum. I also find that areas with low
exposure to alternative ideologies prior to WWI are reacting much stronger which
corresponds to the relative power of this new political idea. Additional evidence
suggests that high levels of political mobilisation in 1920 and political competition
in May 1924 were also conducive for shifting votes to the right in areas with higher
war participation.
The main lessons to be drawn from my results is that war can have substantial
long-run effects through factors unrelated to physical damage. The fate of Weimar
Germany who had not even fought WWI on its own soil is an illustrative example
of war’s indirect effect through political institutions. My case study focusses on the
interaction between soldiers from various backgrounds as one potential mechanism
through which such an indirect effect of war could materialise. I find persistent
spill-over effects from war service on political attitudes and democratic capital in
veterans’ environment. From a policy perspective, my findings suggest that not
only exposure to violence but also war service itself can have important effects
on soldiers’ attitudes. A diligent policy-maker should thus be very alert about the
spread of extremist thoughts within the army since this might easily spread to wider
49
parts of the population and perpetuate the damaging effects of war.
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1.A Background information
1.A.1 The German National People’s Party (DNVP) and
Weimar democracy
In light of my main results, this historical description will only focus on the DNVP. A
more detailed description of the NSDAP’s political views can be found in Voigtla¨nder
and Voth [2012]. The DNVP represented the monarchist, strongly nationalist spirit
common in late Imperial Germany’s middle and upper class. It was formed as a
merger of the conservative parties of Imperial Germany as well as of liberal and anti-
semitic elements. Unlike its predecessors who represented mainly the large agrarian
estate holders and the urban upper class, the DNVP had a much wider audience
and received support across all social strata and parts of the Weimar Republic. Also
labelled as the “reservoir of the discontent”, the unifying element of its heterogenous
following was the rejection of democracy and extreme nationalism [Ohnezeit, 2011].27
The party manifesto of 1920, which was never changed throughout, expresses little
sympathy for the democratisation and parliamentary government:
“[R]evolution became the big criminal who shattered morality, state sys-
tem and economy (...). [T]he monarchic form of government conforms
to Germany’s character and historical development”
Deutschnationale Volkspartei [1920, p.2-5]
Also the use of the stab-in-the-back myth was a prominent tool in the DNVP’s pro-
paganda. A campaign poster for the December 1924 election, for instance, displays
the murder of a fighting soldier by a masked thug and exploits this image to prevent
people from voting for any democratic parties:
“Who supported social democracy in this [the stab-in-the-back]? Democrats
and Erzberger’s people [the centre party]. Now on the 7th of Decem-
ber, Germany is supposed to receive the second stab-in-the-back. Social
democrats together with the democrats want to turn us into slaves of the
Entente [the Allied Forces] and ruin us forever.”
Deutschnationale Volkspartei, reprinted in Barth [2003, p.299]
Even though the DNVP joined the first Hitler government and therefore played
a crucial role in the Nazi party’s rise to power, its stance on democracy appears
27 Anti-semitism was also an important element of the DNVP. It was, however, not as defining
as for the NSDAP. This is also exemplified by the secession of the racist Vo¨lkisch wing of the
DNVP in 1922 to form its own party (DVFP) which was later absorbed by the Nazi party.
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somewhat ambivalent given its participation in five other Weimar governments.28
While this insinuates an acceptance of democratic governance, historians regard
this as a result of the more pragmatic and moderate forces within the party arguing
for a legal ascend to power [Liebe, 1956; Ohnezeit, 2011]. When the party entered
government for the first time, in January 1925, party leader von Westarp commented
this as follows:
“[The DNVP’s] opposition was above all of a fundamental character
since it was directed (...) against the republican-parliamentary system
as such (...).”
Kuno von Westarp, quoted in [Mahlke, 1972, p.219]
This period of superficial cooperation only lasted until Oktober 1928 when Alfred
Hugenberg of the party’s radical wing took the leadership from von Westarp. While
the DNVP was initially trying to cooperate and change the system from within, it
now followed an entirely destructive and aggressively anti-democratic course [Mergel,
2003]. This is also exemplified in a comment by the member of parliament Reinhold
Quaatz on the government crisis of 1930:
“General feeling: a thrust into the heart of parliamentarianism”
Reinhold Quaatz quoted in Lau [2008, p.394]
In sum, there is strong evidence for the anti-democratic character of the DNVP and
the rejection of the Weimar constitution. Together with the NSDAP, it was the
only right-wing party which consistently opposed parliamentary rule after democra-
tisation. While it was very clear what the DNVP did not want, it remained vague
about what system it wanted instead. Even a restoration of the monarchy was not
undisputed within the party and later on abandoned in favour of leader cult around
the new party leader Hugenberg [Lau, 2008; Ohnezeit, 2011].
1.A.2 WWI veterans’ role during democratisation
Historic research has shown that by the end of WWI, the majority of German com-
batants had lost its morale and that the army was experiencing voluntary surrender
and desertion and was in the process of disintegrating [Ulrich and Ziemann, 1997].
Being already regarded as an important pressure group, both social democratic and
conservative veteran associations started to court soldiers and veterans in order to
28 These were taking place in 1925 (Chancellor Luther), 1927/1928 (Chancellor Marx), 1930
(Chancellor Bru¨ning), 1932 (Chancellor Papen) and 1932/1933 (Chancellor Schleicher).
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increase their own post-WWI base of support. After democratisation and the in-
troduction of generous pension laws for war-disabled, veterans stopped being at the
focus of pro-democratic parties. At this time, the attitude towards the revolution
was not clear at all as shown by excerpts from field post around the end of the war:
“We have lost the war so badly, since we will have to relinquish so much,
that it is a shame. Hopefully those responsible for luring the poor popu-
lation into destruction will not evade their deserved punishment.”
“How are we going to do under this mob of bandits and criminals? Now
people are expecting salvation from Erzberger [signer of the armistice]
and Scheidemann [leader of the provisional government]. It was them
who were undermining the inner resistance of the fatherland for years
(...).”
German army field post, quoted in Ulrich and Ziemann [1997, p.31-32]
Upon their return, most soldiers were heartily welcomed at home. Towns were
decorated and cleaned before their arrival, banners with welcoming messages were
prepared and sometimes even small gifts for all combatants were handed out. Yet,
many soldiers did not come to appreciate this gratitude – either because they did
not return home with their army or because they had become estranged from society
[Bessel, 1988, 1993]. In addition, a return to civilian life also seemed unappealing
because of its lower prestige:
“The man in uniform was a representative of the great national cause on
which his self-esteem and recognition within society was based. As soon
as he has to put back on civilian clothes, he becomes an unknown soldier
of the industrial army”
Ernst Simmel, quoted in Ulrich and Ziemann [1997, p.13]
For a number of veterans, the alienation from post-war society resulted in a desire
to somehow continue the war. At the very beginning of the Republic, this desire
could be accommodated since separatist movements in Germany’s eastern provinces
and especially the communist uprisings led to the foundation of numerous home-
guards and Freikorps paramilitary. These were a popular opportunity for nationalist
soldiers and militarist youths to organise themselves [Diehl, 1993]. The excitement
about continuing the war among volunteers is exemplified by the quote below:
“[I] never want to return home. For my whole life, I would like to walk
these country roads, search the sky, measure the world in grid squares
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and divisional sections and guess the time of the day from the strength
of the artillery fire.”
Friedrich Sieburg, quoted in Ulrich and Ziemann [1997, p.54]
The founding of these volunteer units and their fight against communists and sep-
aratists marked the beginning of veterans’ politicisation. Despite being strongly
reactionary and anti-democratic, they were useful for the democratic state in or-
der to maintain its power and territorial integrity. For instance, in January 1919,
when radical left Spartacists tried to stage a coup, the government had to call for
paramilitary Freikorps units in order to ward off the rebellion. This unholy alliance,
however, came to an abrupt end with the signing of the Versailles Treaty in June
1919. Not only was the extreme right infuriated by the reparations and territorial
losses, but the reduction of the German army to 100,000 men and the forced dis-
solution of all paramilitary units also ended the military career of numerous young
officers and dreams of volunteers for continuing life as a soldier after WWI. The
resulting economic shock was particularly hard for those of the middle-class without
alternative career options [Diehl, 1993]. A former Free Corps member depicts the
disappointment within the units very well:
“Everything was thus ready to take up the Great War anew. The morale
of the troops was glowing. (...) Then one day from Ko¨nigsberg came the
report that the [politicians] considered the entire undertaking unfeasible.
(...) Cold fury mixed with despair gripped officers and men of all the
Free Corps. Once again, as at the end of the previous year [the signing
of the armistice], they had been confronted with betrayal.”
Friedrich Wilhelm von Oertzen, quoted in Waite [1952, p.143]
The Versailles Treaty thus led to a further radicalisation and some volunteer units
now openly turned against the state. It was therefore no surprise that in 1920
Freikorps units tried to stage an – unsuccessful – coup themselves and were involved
in the murder of several democratic politicians.
60
1.B Further results
1.B.1 Further heterogeneity across social groups
High esteem for the military could not greatly affect veteran inflow because of uni-
versal conscription but might have a played a crucial role after WWI. Accepting
the severe cuts in army size demanded in the Versailles Treaty could have, however,
turned the social democrats into an enemy especially in the pro-military parts of
society. I proxy pre-WWI militarism using two variables provided in the Prussian
version of the 1910 census digitised by Galloway [2007]: members of the military
per cap. and members of the military below 17 per cap.. While the first one mea-
sures general participation in the military, the second one focusses particularly on
militarism among the young. In the regressions displayed in table 1.17 I investigate
whether the treatment effect was different in areas with an above median value of
the interaction term. Given the data source, this analysis can only be carried out
for the state of Prussia which accounts for more than 50% of my sample. The re-
sults do not lend support to an important role of pre-WWI militarism. None of the
interaction terms are significant and the coefficients in (1) and (4) do not strongly
change in the other specifications. The interaction terms in (2) and (5) have the
opposite predicted signs, those of (3) and (6) both have a positive coefficient.
Another dimension I can explore is the age structure of the WWI eligible
population. This analysis addresses the fact that the major share of men exposed
to WWI were in the impressionable years of 18 and 25. Psychological research has
shown that experiences during these years are crucial for a human’s development of
beliefs and attitudes [Krosnick and Alwin, 1989; Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014].
This could be a possible explanation for the persistent change in voting behaviour
after WWI. I therefore interact veteran inflow with the population share of WWI
eligible men in their formative years and those older than 25. As mentioned in
section 1.4.1, data on precise cohort sizes is only available for the state of Prussia.
Given this drawback, the findings are very informative and reveal that the share of
eligible men during their impressionable years played no role in the veteran effect.
Following specification (3), precincts below the median share of men between 25
and 49 show virtually no treatment effect on rightwing votes. If anything, having
an above median share of draftable youths decreases the treatment effect marginally
and not significantly by 0.242. The veteran effect on socialist votes is left completely
unaffected by the age structure of the war eligible population.
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Table 1.17: Veteran inflow and pre-WWI militarism (Prussia only)
Rightwing Socialist
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Veterans per cap. 1.985∗∗∗ 1.691∗∗ 1.528∗∗ −1.842∗∗∗ −2.155∗∗∗ −2.055∗∗∗
(0.542) (0.831) (0.771) (0.352) (0.498) (0.436)
% in military 1910>Median 0.037 −0.078
(0.153) (0.093)
Vet.×% in mil. 1910>Med. 0.012 0.564
(1.107) (0.686)
% under 17 in mil. 1910>Median −0.094 −0.045
(0.136) (0.085)
Vet.×% u.17 mil. 1910>Med. 0.767 0.365
(0.982) (0.620)
Precinct FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Precincts 144 144 144 144 144 144
Observations 2,448 2,448 2,448 2,448 2,448 2,448
R2 0.833 0.834 0.833 0.922 0.922 0.922
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Controls: % Working in manufacturing 1882; Log(population) 1910; % Protestants 1910; %
Catholics 1910; Infant mortality 1912 (all interacted with Election FE); ∆Male Migration1910−1919 ;
% Male cohort 1869/1901 (1910); % New male voters post-WWI (all interacted with post-WWI
dummy)
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1.B.2 Transmission to veterans through military authority
Apart from comrades, also single individuals in elevated positions such as officers
could play an important role in socialisation and the spread of political attitudes.
The German officer corps was predominantly recruited from the upper middle-class
and aristocracy and therefore naturally hostile towards communism. Social ties de-
veloped during wartime are important because they might last much longer than the
actual army service and would not be captured by the analysis of veteran associa-
tions in section 1.6.4. My investigation of the transmission mechanism continues by
looking at heterogeneous effects in areas with a comparatively larger share of high-
rank military people and where it was more likely to remain under the influence of
former superiors.
For testing the influence of high-rank military, I digitized data from the
German military census of 1906. This gives me province-level information on the
amount of sergeants (Unteroffiziere) and one-year volunteers (Einja¨hrig-Freiwillige).
While the elevated rank of the first group is straightforward, the second group is
important because the German army used them as a backup-group during WWI
to replace killed sergeants and officers [Diehl, 1975; Nash, 1977].29 To obtain my
interaction variables I divide each of the two groups by the amount of total military
people in the respective provinces. This gives me a probability that veterans were
still exposed to their former superiors. The reliability of this proxy is corroborated by
the closeness of the military census to the outbreak of WWI and the high persistence
in Germany’s recruitment patterns for the higher ranks [Brentano and Kuczynski,
1900; Demeter, 1965]. A major drawback is that the data is at the province level
and both variables have only 32 different values each. I therefore evaluate their
impact on the baseline effects through a linear measure rather than a median split.
The results in table 1.19 highlight that the presence of former officers and
sergeants only increase veterans’ effect on the right. Looking at the marginal effect
plot for specifications (2) and (3), for instance, shows that the treatment effect on
socialist votes was significantly negative over almost the entire support of sergeants
per soldiers in 1906. The same pattern also holds for one-year volunteers per soldiers
in 1906. For the right-wing, however, the veteran effect is only significant in the
upper half of the distribution. The amount of higher rank military people therefore
cannot explain the transition of votes from left to right depending on the share of
29 One-year volunteers were only doing two years of service rather than the usual minimum re-
quirement of two but had to provide their own equipment and was thus a popular choice among
young men of the wealthy middle class. In peacetime, one-year volunteers often became re-
serve sergeants and officers associated with a slightly lower social status than their professional
military counterparts.
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Table 1.18: Veteran inflow and age of WWI-eligible (Prussia only)
Rightwing Socialist
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Veterans per cap. 1.985∗∗∗ 2.152∗∗∗ 0.397 −1.842∗∗∗ −1.722∗∗∗ −1.707∗
(0.542) (0.718) (1.322) (0.352) (0.514) (0.882)
% eligible (young) 1910>Median 0.138 0.086 −0.003 −0.006
(0.119) (0.107) (0.086) (0.084)
Vet.×% eligible (young)>Med. −1.547∗ −0.188 0.276 −0.011
(0.862) (0.156) (0.614) (0.106)
% eligible (old) 1910>Median −1.192 0.293
(0.767) (0.603)
Vet.×% eligible (old)>Med. 1.662 0.033
(1.167) (0.769)
Precinct FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Precincts 144 144 144 144 144 144
Observations 2,448 2,448 2,448 2,448 2,448 2,448
R2 0.833 0.836 0.837 0.922 0.923 0.923
Notes: identical to table 1.17
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Figure 1.12: Marginal effect of veterans depending on main recruiting areas of
sergeants
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Table 1.19: Veteran inflow and military rank
Rightwing Socialist
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Veterans per cap. 1.080∗∗ −2.115∗ −2.237 −0.962∗∗∗ −0.482 −1.578∗∗
(0.467) (1.201) (1.657) (0.275) (0.721) (0.702)
% Sergeants 1906 −0.023∗∗ 0.006
(0.010) (0.006)
Vet.×% Sergeants 1906 0.215∗∗∗ −0.033
(0.074) (0.045)
% 1-year volunteers 1906 −0.265∗∗ −0.067
(0.113) (0.050)
Vet.×% 1-year vol. 1906 1.643∗∗ 0.318
(0.767) (0.313)
Precinct FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Precincts 266 266 266 266 266 266
Observations 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522
R2 0.784 0.790 0.786 0.910 0.911 0.911
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Controls: % Working in manufacturing 1882; Log(population) 1910; % Protestants 1910; %
Catholics 1910; Infant mortality 1912 (all interacted with Election FE); ∆Male Migration1910−1919 ;
% Male cohort 1869/1901 (1910); % New male voters post-WWI (all interacted with post-WWI
dummy)
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Table 1.20: Veteran inflow and turnout 1920/1924
Rightwing Socialist
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Veterans per cap. 1.086∗∗ 0.057 −0.452 −0.967∗∗∗ −0.503 −0.571
(0.467) (0.803) (0.796) (0.277) (0.371) (0.369)
Turnout 1920>Median −0.165 0.126∗
(0.142) (0.072)
Vet.×Turnout 1920>Med. 1.673 −0.765
(1.023) (0.511)
Turnout 1924>Median −0.345∗∗ 0.103
(0.140) (0.074)
Vet.×Turnout 1924>Med. 2.675∗∗∗ −0.663
(0.994) (0.526)
Precinct FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Precincts 266 266 266 266 266 266
Observations 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522
R2 0.785 0.788 0.787 0.910 0.911 0.911
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Controls: % Working in manufacturing 1882; Log(population) 1910; % Protestants 1910; %
Catholics 1910; Infant mortality 1912 (all interacted with Election FE); ∆Male Migration1910−1919 ;
% Male cohort 1869/1901 (1910); % New male voters post-WWI (all interacted with post-WWI
dummy)
veterans. One way to rationalise the findings for the right-wing would be that the
conservative DNVP was hiring predominantly former officers as leaders of their local
party chapters [Liebe, 1956].
1.B.3 Transmission in high-turnout elections
This section investigates whether a specific electoral setup was most helpful for
veterans to shift votes from the socialists to the extreme right. In order to do this,
I look at turnout in the 1920 and May 1924 elections during which the switch of
votes seems to have occurred. High turnout proxies for politicisation of a specific
election and in particular the activation of the a-political part of the population. If
information was passed on during elections, one would expect the treatment effect
to be strongest in areas which had a higher-than-usual turnout. A transmission to
uninformed voters would yield the same results. To explore the role of turnout and
political mobilisation, I look at areas with an above median turnout in the 1920
and May 1924 elections. To avoid picking up other variables associated with high
turnout such as civic capital, I also control for above median turnout in the last pre-
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WWI in 1912 interacted with election fixed effects. The effect is therefore identified
off precincts who became comparatively more or less politically active after the
war. In addition, I also use values predicted from predetermined covariates rather
than the actual one. The results in table 3.9 columns (2) and (5) show that the
veteran effect was stronger in precincts with high turnout in 1920. These effects
are, however, not statistically significant at the 10% level are larger in magnitude
for the right-wing than for the socialist party. Turnout in May 1924, on the other
hand, has strong predictive power for the positive effect on right-wing parties but
not socialist ones. Taken together, there is weak evidence that mobilisation or the
share of uninformed voters plays a role in shifting votes from left to right in areas
with higher war participation.
67
1.C Tables
Table 1.21: Differences-in-Differences estimates with dummy treatment
Rightwing Anti-
semitic
Conser-
vative
Right-
Liberal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Veterans p.c.>Median 0.021 0.023∗ 0.015 0.022 −0.002 0.030∗ −0.005
(0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.016) (0.008) (0.016) (0.016)
Precinct FE N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE N N Y Y Y Y Y
Controls N N N Y Y Y Y
Precincts 266 266 266 266 266 266 266
Observations 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522 4,522
R2 0.002 0.640 0.740 0.783 0.872 0.732 0.522
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Controls: % Working in manufacturing 1882; Log(population) 1910; % Protestants 1910; %
Catholics 1910; Infant mortality 1912 (all interacted with Election FE); ∆Male Migration1910−1919 ;
% Male cohort 1869/1901 (1910); % New male voters post-WWI (all interacted with post-WWI
dummy)
Table 1.22: LIML estimates
Rightwing Antisemitic Conservative Right-Liberal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Veterans p.c. 1.963∗∗∗ −0.178 2.805∗∗∗ −0.665
(0.589) (0.35) (0.721) (0.691)
Precinct FE Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Precincts 266 266 266 266
Observations 4522 4522 4522 4522
Notes: Heteroscedastic-robust standard errors in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Controls: % Working in manufacturing 1882; Log(population) 1910; % Protestants 1910; %
Catholics 1910; Infant mortality 1912 (all interacted with Election FE); ∆Male Migration1910−1919 ;
% Male cohort 1869/1901 (1910); % New male voters post-WWI (all interacted with post-WWI
dummy)
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1.D Data
1.D.1 Further details on the estimation of German WWI veterans
Additional formulae used for calculating the estimate of German WWI veterans:
SoldiersHome1917 = Soldiers1913 +
1917∑
t=1914
SoldiersJoint −
1917∑
t=1914
SoldiersDeadt
−
1917∑
t=1914
SoldiersQuitt − SoldiersFront1917
(1.6)
Male PopGrowth1917−1919 =Male Pop1919 −Male Pop1917
=Male Births1917−1919 −Male CivilDeaths1917−1919
+Male Migration1917−1919 + SoldiersFront1917
− SoldiersDead1917−1919
Female PopGrowth1917−1919 =Female Pop1919 − Female Pop1917
=Female Births1917−1919 − Female Deaths1917−1919
+ Female Migration1917−1919
(1.7)
MissingMen1917−1919 =Male PopGrowth1917−1919 − Female PopGrowth1917−1919
=SoldiersFront1917 − SoldiersDead1917−1919
+ (Male Births1917−1919 − Female Births1917−1919)
− (Male CivilDeaths1917−1919 − Female Deaths1917−1919)
+
(
Male Migration1917−1919 − Female Migration1917−1919
)
(1.8)
In the style of equation 1.9, one can then construct gender-specific numbers for
births and deaths. For the latter, however, one needs to recall that one needs to
account for the difference in deaths between women and male non-combatants and
split the district aggregates on male deaths into soldiers and non-soldiers. I infer
dead soldiers by comparing the sudden increase in the ratio of dead men to women
69
from 1913 to each of the war years:
Female Birthsi ≈ Birthsi ∗
Female Birthsd
Birthsd
(1.9)
DeadSoldiersdt ≈
(
Male Deathsdt
Deathsdt
−
Male Deathsd1913
Deathsd1913
)
∗Male Deathsdt
DeadSoldiersit ≈ Deathsit ∗
DeadSoldiersdt
Deathsdt
Male CivilDeathsit ≈ Male Deathsit −DeadSoldiersit
(1.10)
Even though each of the components is not readily available from the statistical
publications, it can also be approximated. Data on births and deaths can be con-
structed for each precinct but not differentiated by gender. This information can,
however, be retrieved for Germany’s districts, which are the next higher adminis-
trative level. Numbers of female births, for instance, can therefore be constructed
as follows: The approximation’s validity rests on the assumption that absent deaths
from battle, men and women would have experienced the same changes in mortality
between 1914 and 1918.
SoldiersHome1917 +Missing men1917−1919
=Soldiers1913 +
1917∑
t=1914
SoldiersJoint −
1918∑
t=1914
SoldiersDeadt −
1917∑
t=1914
SoldiersQuitt + u
(1.11)
1.D.2 Measurement error in the veteran estimate
The veteran estimate is not perfectly measured. While this could result in simple
attenuation bias, it could also systematically distort the estimates if it is also cor-
related with the outcome, political attitudes in this case. For our veteran estimate,
the remaining measurement error can be obtained by taking the difference between
˜Veterans and equation 1.1:
˜Veterans− Veterans
=− (SoldiersJoin1918 + SoldiersQuit1917)
+
(
Male Migration1917−1919 − Female Migration1917−1919
) (1.12)
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While SoldiersJoin1918 and SoldiersQuit1917 cannot be estimated, they must be
disproportional to ˜Veterans and correlated with an omitted variable in order to
pose a threat to the estimates’ validity. Gender-specific migration between 1917
and 1919 can also not be estimated since the 1917 male totals are incomplete as
highlighted above. However, I can construct a measure of gender-specific migration
between 1910 and 1919 which should be a reasonable proxy for that between 1917
and 1919. Even though this does not allow directly subtracting gender-specific mi-
gration from the treatment variable, it can still be included as a control in order
to purge the respective endogenous part from ˜Veterans and reduce the chances of
biased estimates.
1.D.3 Robustness and distribution of veteran measure
In order to give at least a rough idea how far the proposed variable is away from
what it is supposed to measure, I compare my measure to potential alternatives and
official aggregate figures on war participants (see table 1.23). von Altrock [1922]
provides aggregates of war participants for the four German armies as well as the
corresponding estimates of dead soldiers. As can be seen from the first panel in
table 1.23, the difference between von Altrock’s numbers (vA) gives an estimate of
almost 11 million war participants. As panel two shows, using official numbers of
dead soldiers published by the Imperial Department of Health (Reichsgesundheit-
samt, RGA) does not change these totals as well as their distribution across armies
considerably.
Panel three reports figures on recipients of veteran benefits in 1929 published
by the German Statistical Office in 1933 which have been used in few recent studies
as a measure ofWWI participation or war veteran density [see e.g. Adena et al., 2013;
Voigtla¨nder and Voth, 2014, respectively]. This measure of veterans appears already
somewhat problematic since it explicitly includes surviving dependants which did
not have any war experience. A comparison of the aggregates with the official figures
from panel one and two additionally calls into question the numerical accuracy of
this proxy for veterans: not only are the aggregates about 0.5% of the official figures
in panel one and two but also the distribution across armies differs strongly from
that of all other estimates. The veteran estimate presented here could thus provide
a good alternative to existing measures of WWI participation.30
29 Numbers on Prussia include all remaining German states.
30 In fact, the correlation between recipients of veterans benefits in 1929 and the veteran estimates
– normalised by the 1910 population and aggregated to the precinct level – is −0.08.
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Table 1.23: Comparison of veteran estimates with official aggregates
Prussia Bavaria Saxony Wurtemb. Total
(1) Participating soldiers (vA) 9,957,000 1,360,000 913,400 479,000 12,709,400
(2) Dead soldiers (vA) 1,417,449 190,015 126,180 74,911 1,808,555
(1)-(2) Veterans (vA) 8,539,551 1,169,985 787,220 404,089 10,900,845
as % of total 78.34% 10.73% 7.22% 3.71% 100.00%
(1) Participating soldiers (vA) 9,957,000 1,360,000 913,400 479,000 12,709,400
(3) Dead soldiers (RGA) 1,306,484 167,840 121,524 73,339 1,669,187
(1)-(3) Veterans (vA/RGA) 8,650,516 1,192,160 791,876 405,661 11,040,213
as % of total 78.35% 10.80% 7.17% 3.67% 100.00%
(4) Recipients of veteran benefits 1929 42,726 4,287 5,545 5,211 57,769
as % of total 73.96% 7.42% 9.60% 9.02% 100.00%
(5) Soldiers 1917 2,156,282 365,423 219,574 129,239 2,870,518
(6) Missing men 1917 4,307,110 546,482 446,300 191,882 5,491,774
(7) War disabled 1916 1,216,894 87,498 34,517 35,765 1,374,674
(5)+(6)+(7) Veterans (this study) 7,680,286 999,403 700,391 356,886 9,736,966
as % of total 78.88% 10.26% 7.19% 3.67% 100.00%
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Chapter 2
Competence vs. Loyalty:
Political Survival and Electoral
Fraud in Russia’s Regions
2000–2012
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I think you need to pay attention to
those areas where our people have
denied United Russia serious trust.
Not because it is a tragedy, but
because it is a signal for the
authorities.
Dimitri Medvedev, 2011
2.1 Introduction
One common explanation for the poor economic performance of autocracies is the
failure to hold leaders accountable for bad policy. While democracies use free and
fair elections in order to punish or reward politicians, the voting process under
dictatorship is often manipulated and seen as a meaningless political ritual. Recent
literature has called this view into question arguing that authoritarian elections are
actually used by the ruling circle to hold officials accountable. Similar to the role
of education in the labour market, elections may be used by subordinates to cast
signals about their loyalty or competence to their superiors [Gandhi and Lust-Okar,
2009]. For instance, high results may be rewarded by directing additional resources
under the control of the respective official or by advancing his party career chances
through promotion [Martinez-Bravo, 2014]. With legal barriers largely absent, this
creates strong incentives for public officials to artificially change results and engage
in electoral fraud. The extent to which such concerns are driving ballot rigging in
autocracies has, however, remained a largely understudied topic since institutional
setups under dictatorship tend to be rigid, and reliable data on the intensity of fraud
is scarce.
This paper uses detailed data on Federal elections in Russia and a novel
tool for detecting suspicious results to study the effect of a radical policy change in
accountability to the central government. After the 2004 Beslan hostage crisis, which
exposed severe inefficiencies in the local administration, president Putin signed a
law which abolished governor elections in the country’s 89 regions. From December
2004 onwards, regional leaders thus had to be appointed by the president in order
to stay in office after their term but could also be dismissed without any legal
barriers [Hill, 2012]. While this gave the central government an important stick to
punish notoriously under-performing and corrupt leaders, it also severely altered
their motivation to please their superiors by delivering the right results in federal
elections which they can organise in their territory at large discretion. The reality of
this threat can be seen from the low election results of United Russia in December
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2011 which resulted in the dismissal or voluntary resignation of 6 governors over the
following 4 months [Chaykovskaya, 2011; Moraski and Reisinger, 2013].
The legal change, however, also started a transition period from 2005 on-
wards during which handpicked and elected governors coexisted and organised 4
national ballots. This allows me to study the differential effect of abolishing gover-
nor elections on two types of leaders: one whose loyalty is assured but uncertainty
about competence may still exist, and another one where neither of these is known
[see also Egorov and Sonin, 2011]. In my conceptual framework I argue that, for
given levels competence, appointments may induce lower levels of election fraud
since officials do not need to use rigging as a means to signal their loyalty to the
centre. In a recent paper, Martinez-Bravo [2014] studied the effect of local officials
on election fraud in Indonesia where a democracy inherits a set of potentially not
trustworthy officials from an autocracy. The author demonstrates empirically that
appointed village heads have a higher need to convince their supervisors of their
suitability than elected ones. The mechanism I propose is dealing with the opposite
problem faced by an authoritarian government: until all positions are filled with
loyal party cadres, officials chosen under the previous regime are particularly suspi-
cious of disloyalty and may therefore try to over-compensate. Moreover, my model
claims that, when facing a bad economic performance, also leaders selected by the
central government may engage in fraud to send a signal about their competence
and keep their position.
In order to empirically test my predictions and study the effect of this policy
change on election fraud, I use unique highly disaggregated data at the voting station
level for all 7 national elections – parliamentary and presidential – held in the
Russian Federation from 2000 to 2012. For each region I calculate the percentage
of votes cast in districts with highly suspicious results. A district’s result is deemed
suspicious if the turnout and vote share regression coefficient (TVSC) takes values
greater or equal to one. The TVSC has been widely used in the study of electoral
fraud in the Russian context and is appropriate for detecting ballot stuffing and
other turnout-inflating types of manipulation [Myagkov et al., 2009]. Legitimate
doubts about its reliability and shortcomings are met by a number of tests. First,
I show that my measure is significantly correlated with reported incidents of fraud
during the 2011 and 2012 elections and decreases with the introduction of electronic
vote scanners across Russian regions. Second, I benchmark the TVSC against other
indicators using first- and second digit distributions of incumbent vote and valid
ballot totals which do not seem to have similar power in detecting rigging in Russian
elections.
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I quantify the treatment effect of governor selection using a differences-in-
differences estimation which controls for region-specific and election-specific deter-
minants of rigging and the time-varying effect of pre-2000 democratic institutions.
Competence of a governor is measured by an index of regions’ changes in unem-
ployment and GDP per capita growth over the last legislature of either president
of parliament. Both variables are then aggregated to a single index of economic
performance over the last 4 years. The regression specification includes this index
as well as its interaction with the treatment in order to study the differential re-
sponse to economic fluctuations across both handpicked and elected governors. The
baseline results show that regions with a handpicked governor obtain on average
more than 10% less votes from districts with highly suspicious results. Second, the
negative effect of a handpicked governor on fraud is even stronger during times of
good economic development. Only under extremely bad conditions does the nega-
tive marginal effect of a handpicked governor disappear completely. I use various
checks to address concerns about the endogeneity of governor replacement such as
placebo tests for different time periods and outcome variables. The coefficients are
robust to the inclusion of region-specific time trends and election fixed effects for
each Federal district as well as different definitions of economic performance. Fur-
thermore, placebo experiments show no effect if treatment is moved one or two
elections forward and no response on unrelated election outcomes such as votes for
other parties.
Several empirical studies have investigated the fate of Russia’s governors
after 2005 but mainly focussed on the selection mechanism [Reuter and Robertson,
2012; Moraski and Reisinger, 2013] or outcomes other than election fraud [Moraski
and Reisinger, 2009; Rochlitz, 2013]1. Kalinin and Mebane [2011] are studying how
federal transfers affected election fraud in the 1990s and 2000s using a number based
approach and aggregated data. I contribute to this literature by linking the incentive
structures of governors after December 2004 to changes in election fraud over time.
The TVSC method for detecting fraud used in this study has furthermore been used
in various papers on the Russian context [Filippov and Ordeshook, 1997; Myagkov
et al., 2009; Lukinova et al., 2011; Enikolopov et al., 2013], yet so far without a
systematic application over all regions and several elections. My paper adds to this
work by providing further evidence on the TVSC’s ability to capture fraud and by
making it usable for cross-regional comparison over time. Studies of fraud have been
carried out for other countries using different indicators of ballot rigging. Examples
of these are Ziblatt [2009] for Imperial Germany, Ichino and Schu¨ndeln [2012] for
1 See Rochlitz [2013] for further references on this topic.
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Ghana, and Cantu and Saiegh [2011] for Argentina. With the exception of Ziblatt
[2009], my work is one of few papers studying the evolution of electoral fraud over
time. In terms of the studied mechanism, the closest piece of work is the previously
mentioned study by Martinez-Bravo [2014] who looks at the topic from the side of a
democracy and proxies election fraud through high votes for the dominating party
instead of a direct indicator of rigging.
The paper starts with description of important institutional details and the
conceptual framework used to analyse the changing incentive structures of election
fraud in Russia. After briefly describing the data used, I present the main fraud
indicator with a special emphasis on its reliability and comparison with other poten-
tial alternatives. Next, I outline the differences-in-differences approach used in the
empirical analysis and discuss the validity of its assumptions in the studied context.
The baseline results are presented in the subsequent section which is followed by
robustness checks and placebo tests. The last section concludes.
2.2 Institutional and theoretical background
2.2.1 Relevant aspects of Russia’s political system
As in any presidential system, the president is paramount in Russia’s constitution.
He appoints the government as well as the members of the constitutional court and
the supreme court. In addition, he has the right to veto laws passed by the legislative
and can also initiate laws himself [Chaisty, 2012]. Moreover, he can dissolve the
State Duma under extreme circumstances, rule by decrees without consent of the
parliament and call for an emergency state which gives him the power to even
ignore civil freedoms. The president is chosen in national elections and the length of
term has recently been extended from four to six years from 2012 onwards [Sakwa,
2008]. The legislature of the Russian Federation consists of two chambers - the
State Duma and the Federal Council. The main task of the Federal Council is to
represent the Russian regions. It has 178 members, with two representatives for
each administrative unit. Representatives are appointed by the regional executive
and the regional parliament and can be withdrawn by these institutions. The State
Duma’s 450 members, in turn, are elected through a national ballot. Until 2007, half
of the deputies were elected by majority in single-member districts and the other
half proportionally through party lists. This system was, however, abandoned in
favour of a purely proportional representation. Like the president, both chambers
have the power to initiate new laws [Sakwa, 2008].
As in most federal states, each subdivision has its own legislative and exec-
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utive. Each Russian region is headed by a governor.2 The members of the regional
assemblies are chosen in local elections. Similar to the national level, these assem-
blies are dominated by the executive making governors the most important political
institution in the regions. From 1996 until December 2004 they were chosen in lo-
cal elections. However, in 2004 the constitution was changed in favour of a direct
appointment of governors by the president [Slider, 2012]. This drastic constitu-
tional change was decided in the aftermath of the Beslan Massacre. On the 1st of
September 2004, a multinational terror squad took over 1000 hostages in a school
in Beslan, a town in the Republic North Ossetia-Alania close to Chechnya. When
security forces attempted to free the hostages, more than 300 people were killed.
This national tragedy demonstrated the increased power of Chechen insur-
gents and their allies but also showed the lack of coordination between federal and
regional authorities.3 Very soon after the attacks, president Vladimir Putin initi-
ated a law which re-introduced the appointment of governors. The draft passed
both chambers of the Federal Assembly and came into effect in December 2004.
What may seem puzzling is that the new law was accepted by both the population
and the governors without any major opposition. Goode [2007], who analysed the
parliamentary debates in late 2004, concludes that a combination of rally-around-
the-flag effects and an appeal to Soviet legacies made it impossible to reject the new
law. Additionally, being independent of the local electorate and depending only on
the central executive was in the interest of many governors.
2.2.2 Conceptual framework
Election fraud in this paper is perceived as the result of an interaction between the
president P and a governor. The latter can be of two types, either elected (GE) or
handpicked (GH). Governors organise national elections in which P runs for office
and can exert fraud in order to influence the results in P ’s favour. P ’s stay in power
is assumed not to depend on the election outcome but he cares about the governor’s
competence C and loyalty L.4 Competence is appreciated by P for reasons un-
correlated with election outcomes such as international reputation or development
assistance. In line with Egorov and Sonin [2011] I assume, however, that L matters
far more than C for P . While L is known by P , he uses election results to infer the
2 Many regions use different titles such as President, Head of the Republic, or Head of the
administration. For the sake of simplicity, I refer to all these in this paper simply as governors.
3 This was apparent even though a lot of information about the Beslan hostage crisis was actually
withheld from the Russian public [Haraszti, 2004].
4 One could imagine, for instance, that centralised state propaganda ensures high levels of po-
litical support for the incumbent.
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competence Cˆ. The interaction between P and G can be separated into two phases.
In the first one, GE is elected by popular vote and therefore L is unknown. For
simplicity, I assume that LE is 0. Since fraud is a costly action and P cannot hold
GE accountable, there is no fraud in this phase.
In the second phase, P is now equipped with the power to remove an elected
governor GE . P ’s decision is based on whether it is more beneficial to select a
new governor GH from his cadres who is loyal with probability 1 but of uncertain
competence. This decision is based on evaluating the last election results. For sim-
plification, I make the strong assumption that P is not well informed about voters’
decision making process. In fact, he interprets his vote share as a linearly increasing
function of Cˆ. Governors can, however, exert fraud in order to artificially increase
the result and influence P ’s conclusion about Cˆ. P ’s decision about keeping or dis-
missing governors depends on how their loyalty and competence compares with that
of a handpicked new governor. If Cˆ is below of the minimum required competence
Cˆmin, he will be removed. As a result, minimum competence levels will vary by
type such that Cˆmin
E
> Cˆmin
S
. Hence, the only way for GE to compensate his lack
of loyalty and stay in office is through artificially increasing Cˆ by means of electoral
fraud which motivates the first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: For given levels of competence, handpicked governors will
engage in less rigging than elected ones.
The second difference between the two types of governors is the way they
are evaluated by the electorate. Unlike his elected counterpart, GH knows that his
own economic performance has an influence on votes for P . The reason for this is,
that voters may want to punish or reward P for his choice of governor.5 Assuming
that economic performance is stochastic and independent of C to some degree, it
follows that if a handpicked governor does a bad job, he is more likely to be fired.
This is because P will infer a lower quality, unless GH compensates this through
rigging. Vice versa, a good performance allows him to reduce the amount of fraud
even further. The second hypothesis therefore goes as follows:
Hypothesis 2: Handpicked governors will engage in less rigging if they per-
formed well during the last election period.
5 That such behaviour is actually at work is well exemplified in the study by Szakonyi [2012]
who investigates the political reactions to the wildfires in Russia in 2010.
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Having presented the main hypotheses to be tested in this paper, I now
proceed to discuss my measure of election fraud used in the empirical analysis.
2.3 Measuring election fraud
2.3.1 The turnout/vote share correlation
The turnout/vote share indicator was first applied by Sobyanin for the 1993 consti-
tutional referendum and is probably the most widely used tool for detecting election
rigging in Russia. It is most suited for turnout-inflating cases of fraud and relies
on the assumption that within a given entity and absent manipulation there should
be no correlation between how many people vote and their choice across lower-tier
areas. Figure 2.1 illustrates this with a brief example similar to Myagkov et al.
[2009]: there are 24 voting stations in an area with a given homogenous support of
75% for candidate i. Half of the stations are in high-turnout areas where 60% of
the electorate casts their ballot, whereas the remaining ones only have a turnout of
40%. Absent fraud, a 1% higher turnout T is associated with an increase of 0.75%
in votes for i out of the total electorate, V/E. A simple OLS regression thus yields
a turnout/vote-share coefficient (henceforth TVSC ) equal to the average support
of the candidate. This relation, however, would not hold in the case of ballot stuff-
ing or other turnout inflating methods of manipulating the outcome as can be seen
from the right panel in figure 2.1. In this scenario eight of the formerly low-turnout
stations see their turnout artificially increased with all additional votes going to
candidate i. The TVSC thus changes from 0.75 to 1.07 which cannot be equal to
i’s natural support in that area anymore.6
Following Myagkov et al. [2009], one can distinguish between the cases when
1) the TVSC exceeds the candidates vote share in the respective area but is smaller
than one and 2) the TVSC is bigger or equal to one. In the first scenario, the
conclusion is ambiguous and will only be a safe detector if one can rule out that the
favoured candidate – absent fraud – would have fared particularly well in lower-tier
areas of high turnout – a premise which is quite difficult to check. TVSC≥ 1 appears
to be a stronger indicator of manipulative turnout inflation, but it is also prone to
fallacies as depicted in figure 2.2. One may think of a region with uniform support
of 75% for candidate i across its three districts with 4, 12, and 8 voting stations
respectively. The voting stations, however, are not homogeneous since districts differ
6 One could imagine a scenario in which fraud is conducted in such a way that turnout and vote
share are identical in each voting station. In this case there would be no variation and a TVSC
could not be calculated. While this is theoretically possible, it is very difficult to implement
in reality. I did not encounter such a case during the construction of my fraud data.
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Figure 2.1: Example of TVSC absent fraud (left) and present (right)
substantially in their average turnout level. A regression of V/E on T across the
whole region will thus suffer from aggregation bias and yield a TVSC larger than
one even though fraud did not take place. While this error cannot be ruled out
entirely, it can be mitigated by using highly disaggregated data and calculating the
TVSC for reasonably homogeneous areas. Enikolopov et al. [2013], for instance,
have shown that the random allocation of election observers across voting stations
in the city of Moscow during the 2011 Duma election significantly decreased the
TVSC calculated for the United Russia party.
Further estimates of election fraud in Russia’s regions using the TVSC have
been scarce so far and mostly relied on district aggregates [e.g. Myagkov et al., 2009].
In these cases the assumption of homogeneity is difficult to defend and the amount
of districts/observations may be very low.7 The availability of election results at
the voting stations level since 2000 allow me to calculate TVSCs in each district of
a given region [e.g. Lukinova et al., 2011] and to construct new and more robust
estimates of election rigging across Russia’s regions. As a new measure of regional
fraud intensity, I propose the share of votes from districts with a TVSC ≥ 1. This
indicator has the main advantage of using data from comparatively small areas such
as districts but simultaneously provides a regional aggregate from this information.
It is supposed to capture the intensity of rigging rather than its mere existence
which has been observed in virtually every region across the country and therefore
7 The city of Moscow, for instance, has 130 TIKs while the Nenets Autonomous Okrug has only
three.
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Figure 2.2: Example of biased TVSC in the case of non-homogeneous areas
does not provide much information. Another interpretation of the indicator is the
percentage of votes likely to be affected by manipulation or, simply, the suspicious
vote share.
The choice of this indicator appears arbitrary at first and one may think of
several alternatives: the first option could be to deem a district’s votes suspicious
if the TVSC exceeds the candidate’s vote share and calculate the suspicious vote
share based on this rule. Alternatively, one could estimate a single region-specific
TVSC from all voting stations and calculate either a dummy for whether it exceeds
one or obtain the continuous difference from the candidate’s actual vote share. The
following section compares the proposed indicator of fraud to these alternatives in
terms of reliability and provides further checks of its validity.
2.3.2 Reliability and validity checks
Before proceeding with a specific indicator of election fraud, one needs to assure
that it is reliable and valid. Verifying reliability beyond anecdotal evidence is par-
ticularly difficult in the context of election rigging since officials usually try to hide
their actions. I tackle this issue with fraud report data from the NGO GOLOS
(Russian for vote or voice). This provides information on the region where election
irregularities were witnessed. Subsequently, one can form a regional measure and
relate it to various types of election rigging for each subdivision. Table 2.1 presents
the 32 coefficients from regressing the amount of each 8 types of election irregularity
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Table 2.1: Reported irregularities 2011-2012 and fraud indicators based on TVSC
Reports per 100k electorate Effect of TVSC based on
vote share, with TVSC regional aggregate, with TVSC
≥ 1 ≥ Incumbent
vote
≥ 1 ≥ Incumbent
vote
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Improper counting 0.547∗∗∗ 0.224 0.130 −0.028
(0.194) (0.214) (0.112) (0.118)
Exclusion of voters 0.193∗ 0.234 −0.042 −0.076
(0.113) (0.161) (0.134) (0.185)
Illegal campaigning 0.036 0.019 0.102 0.096
(0.084) (0.158) (0.107) (0.101)
Observers excluded 0.567∗∗ 0.453 0.176 0.070
(0.265) (0.333) (0.169) (0.200)
Faulty ballot box 0.056 −0.129 −0.039 −0.108
(0.142) (0.297) (0.124) (0.124)
Secrecy violated 0.169∗∗ 0.104 0.086 0.079
(0.066) (0.092) (0.054) (0.057)
Illegal voting 0.216 0.426 0.050 0.100
(0.228) (0.347) (0.165) (0.191)
Other violations 0.872∗∗ 0.497 0.283 0.249
(0.398) (0.564) (0.319) (0.373)
Election FE Y Y Y Y
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the region level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Controls: % Population with internet access; UR members per cap.
on 4 variants of the TVSC measure presented in the preceding section. In addition
to that, the regressions also control for election specific trends and the incumbent
party’s strength proxied by party members per capita. The latter ensures validity of
the TVSC which could also be driven by a party’s advantages in mobilising voters
and in turn increase the likelihood of reporting irregularities out of revenge. Finally,
since fraud reports are likely to be incomplete and affected by technical impediments
such as the lack of internet access, I also include the percentage of households with
internet access into the regressions.
The results indicate that only the regional vote share of districts with a
TVSC exceeding 1 is reliable. Most notably, it is strongly correlated with reports
on those irregularities associated with fraud such as improper counting and exclu-
sion of observers. Also other violations like exclusion of voters, violation of secrecy,
and other violations seem to be correlated with the first indicator. The measure in
column 2 produces similar but far less precise estimates. Indicators 3 and 4 which
assume a uniform distribution of fraud are only weakly and sometimes even nega-
tively affecting the detection of irregularities. This makes the vote share of districts
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Table 2.2: High TVSC and introduction of electronic ballot boxes, 2000-2012
Vote share with TVSC ≥ 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% Electronic ballot boxes 0.352 −0.685∗∗ −0.365∗∗∗ −0.366∗∗∗
(0.263) (0.296) (0.117) (0.115)
County FE N N Y Y
Election FE N Y Y Y
Controls N N N Y
Counties 71 71 71 71
Observations 497 497 497 497
R2 0.003 0.105 0.762 0.762
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the region level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Controls: log(GDP per capita)
with a TVSC exceeding 1 the prime candidate for detecting election fraud in the
Russian context. The inclusion of United Russia members per capita furthermore
ensures reliability and that the results are not driven by other potential correlates
of the TVSC.
Another desirable property for a good detector of rigging intensity is that it
co-moves with the opportunities for falsifying results. A significant decrease in such
opportunities was marked by the start of electronic vote counting via optical scanners
(KOIB) during the mid-2000s across Russia in about 5% of all voting stations. The
introduction was staggered starting with the 2007 Duma elections which makes it
unlikely to be correlated with other incentives for fraud. From official government
documents I collected information on the numbers of KOIBs in each region across
federal elections and calculated the percentage of voting stations equipped with such
a device. Table 2.2 shows the results from regressing the vote share with TVSC≥ 1
on the share of regions’ voting stations equipped with a KOIB over the time period
2000 to 2012. Once election and region fixed effects are controlled for, one can see
that having 1% more stations with electronic ballot boxes in a region reduces the
share of votes from suspicious districts by 0.3%. The results of this test suggest
again that the indicator is reliable and valid.
Admittedly, the share of suspicious votes based on TVSC≥ 1 is not a per-
fect measure of rigging intensity but the findings above suggest that it is strongly
correlated with what it is supposed to measure and that many potential concerns
can be ruled out. Unfortunately, there is no way to look at fraud reports before
2011 so some warranted doubt may still remain. In the following section I briefly
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present other indicators common in the analysis of rigged elections and check their
explanatory strength in the case of Russia 2000 to 2012.
2.3.3 Alternative indicators
The preceding chapters have solely investigated quantitative tools for detecting
turnout inflating types of rigging and the vast amount of evidence indeed points
in the direction of this being the most widely used technique of manipulating the re-
sults in favour of a specific candidate [Filippov and Ordeshook, 1997; White, 2011;
Enikolopov et al., 2013]. Yet, anecdotal evidence from the Russian republics –
Tatarstan, Ingushetia and Dagestan in particular – suggests that election results in
some areas may not only be manipulated but entirely fabricated [Myagkov et al.,
2009; Lukinova et al., 2011]. In detecting this kind of fraud I follow the methodol-
ogy of Beber and Scacco [2012] who rely on human preferences for specific numbers
and biases in number generation. The main argument is that, under fairly generous
assumptions, the final digit as well as the distance between the last and second-
last digit of the vote count should follow a uniform distribution. In order to create
alternative indicators of the share of suspicious votes, I adapt the methodology of
Beber and Scacco to identify fraud at the district level and then aggregate this to
the regional level using the share of affected votes as for the TVSC. In detail, I
proceeded as follows: first, I calculated for each district the p-values of a Pearson’s
chi-squared test of uniform distribution of the last digit and the distance between
last and second-last digits and repeated this procedure for both the reported valid
votes as well as incumbent votes. In a second step, I obtained the share of votes
in each region from districts where the hypothesis of uniform distribution could be
rejected at a significance level of either 5 or 1%. This procedure has the advantage
of being completely agnostic about the kind of bias, i.e. whether there is a bias
towards fives in one district vs. eights in another, and only assumes whether votes
for the incumbent or the number of valid votes/turnout were affected. The mea-
sures are furthermore also formed as ratios and therefore easily comparable to the
indicators of suspicious votes presented above.
Table 2.3 repeats the analyses of table 2.1 for each of the 8 measures of
fabricated votes. Interestingly, none of them has a significant positive effect on
any reported election irregularity. If anything, some kinds of reports per capita
are negatively affected by the share of votes from districts with numeric anomalies.
Unusual digit distributions in the incumbent votes, for example, are associated with
less reports on illegal campaigning, faulty ballot boxes, and illegal voting. Anomalies
in the distance between the last two digits in the number of valid votes, on the
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Table 2.3: Reported irregularities 2011-2012 and numeric anomalies
Reports per 100k electorate Effect of vote share with numeric anomalies for
Valid votes Incumbent votes
last digit, with p ≤ ∆ last 2 digits, with p ≤ last digit, with p ≤ ∆ last 2 digits, with p ≤
0.05 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Improper counting −0.303 0.379 0.305 0.388 −0.373 −0.489 0.625 −0.071
(0.377) (1.874) (0.642) (0.899) (0.373) (1.035) (0.937) (0.902)
Exclusion of voters −0.295 3.647 2.136 −0.619 −0.274 −0.296 1.217 0.526
(0.396) (2.999) (1.903) (0.622) (0.240) (0.873) (0.880) (0.921)
Illegal campaigning 0.608 0.747 1.272 0.484 −0.473∗ −0.147 −0.308 −0.045
(0.525) (1.276) (0.947) (1.140) (0.258) (0.839) (0.403) (0.520)
Observers excluded 0.002 3.157 −0.438 −0.788 −0.709 −0.351 1.570 −1.486
(0.727) (3.529) (0.841) (1.045) (0.766) (2.321) (1.343) (1.267)
Faulty ballot box 1.003 4.475 0.568 −0.890∗ −0.969∗∗ −0.918 −1.157∗ −0.721
(0.748) (4.023) (0.905) (0.539) (0.429) (0.778) (0.643) (0.764)
Secrecy violated −0.152 1.250 0.042 −0.505∗ −0.072 0.053 0.360 0.257
(0.178) (1.252) (0.215) (0.300) (0.145) (0.461) (0.340) (0.423)
Illegal voting 0.653 12.040 0.300 −1.161 −1.254∗ −0.757 0.404 0.055
(1.078) (8.138) (0.922) (0.711) (0.675) (1.249) (1.165) (2.180)
Other violations 2.057 15.814 1.201 −1.218 −0.543 −0.492 0.439 0.610
(1.935) (12.250) (1.748) (1.446) (1.050) (1.837) (1.655) (1.943)
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the region level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Controls: % Population with internet access
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other hand, significantly reduces also reports on faulty ballot boxes as well as the
violation of secrecy. In particular, it does not seem to be correlated with exclusion of
observers. One possible interpretation of these results is that fabricating votes may
be a complement to turnout inflating methods which does apparently not require
actions observable to the public and hence results in lower amounts of reported
fraud. Voters’ inability to detect and report entirely invented results makes it hard
to verify the reliability of any fraud indicator built on numeric anomalies. The
results in table 2.3 should thus also be regarded as a reminder that some fraud may
still not be detected by the fraud indicator used in the remainder of this paper.
Bearing this caveat in mind, I now turn towards the extent of potentially fraudulent
election outcomes and its changes over time.
2.3.4 The evolution of suspicious results 2000–2012
Figure 2.3 plots for each election the share of votes with TVSC≥ 1 in each Russian
region. This helps understanding the variation in the main outcome variable and
at the same time also shows how rigging changed at the extensive margin over
the time period studied. While always present to some degree in few subdivisions,
suspicious results started to take off during the March 2004 Presidential election
from an average of 8 to 20%. During the 2007 Duma election it kept on rising to
about 24-25% and remained roughly stable onwards. The distribution is skewed to
the left resulting in median values below the corresponding means. Since the year
2003, however, also these gaps have been widening from 5 to about 10 percentage
points indicating that intensity has surged disproportionately at the right tail.
Figure 2.4 zooms into the district level measures of rigging for the two elec-
tions before and after 2005. The plotted variable is a dummy whether the TVSC
is exceeding unity in a given district and visualises how fraud evolved at the in-
tensive margin across the Russian Federation. Already in 2003 suspicious districts
are strongly concentrated in particular regions, most notably in the Republics of
Tatarstan and Mordovia in Western Russia. In the March 2004 election suspi-
cious votes start showing up in a number of formerly clean areas and additionally
further regions start showing almost uniformly ballot counts with a TVSC≥ 1 –
Republics of Tuva in South-Central and Bashkortostan in the South-West. Other
areas, particularly in the West and conflict-ridden South-Western Causcasus ter-
ritory, are joining in during the next round of elections 2007/2008. This extreme
concentration suggests that time and region-specific characterstics could indeed be
an important driver of prolific fraudulent election outcomes since 2000.
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2.4 Data
2.4.1 Elections and fraud reports
The organisation of federal elections in Russia is roughly corresponding to its ad-
ministrative divisions, both horizontally and vertically. The highest authority is
the Central Election Commission (CIK), a permanent body whose members are
nominated by the president, the second chamber Council of Regions and the Duma
parliament. The CIK’s main tasks are the coordination of the 83 Regional Election
Commissions (IKS) and the organisation of the Federal elections. The IKS fulfils
the same role as the CIK at the regional level and coordinates the territorial election
commissions (TIKs). Unlike the CIK, its members are appointed by recommenda-
tion of the Federal government. The next administrative level below the region is
the district (rayon). Like regions, the districts can vary considerably in size and
population but unlike the former there may be several TIKs within the same rayon.
This is especially often the case in larger cities or former closed towns. Over the
period studied there were almost 3,000 TIKs. The members of these are permanent
delegates by the regional executive, legislative and parties. The TIKs are therefore
the level of electoral administration where the long arm of the central government
starts to lose its power. At the lowest level, about 95,000 precinct election com-
missions (UIKs) are responsible for the local organisation of all elections and, most
importantly, the vote counting. Unlike the other commissions, they are only formed
one month before the elections and are nominated by the electorate. It remains
unclear to what extent authorities can still exert control over the composition of the
UIKs but their ad-hoc nature makes them unlikely to be the driving force behind
organised large-scale fraud [OSCE, 2000, 2004a,b, 2012a,b].
All voting data used in this project comes from the organisation GOLOS,
an independent Russian NGO concerned with election monitoring. The data covers
each of presidential and parliamentary election since 2000 and reports results in
absolute terms at the UIK level for the entire Russian Federation. The dataset also
features official numbers on the electorate as well as valid and invalid votes required
to calculate turnout in each precinct. I matched the results at the district/TIK level
which is the main unit of observation in calculating the measures of electoral fraud
explained in section 2.3. From GOLOS I also obtained direct indicators of election
rigging. During the 2011 and 2012 elections, the association ran the karta narusheniy
(map of violations) project which provided a platform for citizens to anonymously
report incidents of fraud in federal, regional, and local elections and send detailed
reports of observed electoral law violations via phone, internet, and text message. In
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Figure 2.3: Share of suspicious votes before/after the abolition of governor elec-
tions in December 2004
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Figure 2.4: Suspicious districts before/after the abolition of governor elections in December 2004
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addition to that, the users could also give information whether the action happened
during campaigning or on election day and which type of fraud had taken place. Of
particular interest for this research project are the categories distortion of results
and exclusion of observers, committee members, or media. Lastly, the observers
could also provide information on the location where the action was witnessed. I
used this information to match each violations reports to a specific district which
was possible for about 80% of all 12,800 reports (Duma 2011: 6,200/7,800; President
2012: 4,000/5,000). The analysis also draws on a number of other variables which
are explained in the following.
2.4.2 Socio-economic data, further variables, and sample
According to reports, the main goal of the central government apart from delivering
high vote results and legitimacy is the maintaining of social and economic stabil-
ity. What is far less clear, however, is how such stability is evaluated by Russia’s
leadership. Obvious indicators relate to the economic performance of a region, es-
pecially those also related to the well-being of the population. I therefore obtained
panel data from the Russian Federal State Statistics Service (GKS) on regions’ log
GDP per capita and unemployment rate. Assuming that governors are inferring the
electorate’s support for the incumbent party and presidential candidate based on
their economic performance over the term time, I calculate 4-year changes in both
variables. In order to get a single indicator of economic prosperity, the changes are
then aggregated to a single index using principal component analysis. In order to
assess the index’ validity as a proxy for political support, I use data from the Public
Opinion Foundation compiled in Reuter and Robertson [2012]. This yearly measure
is the % of survey respondents in 68 Russian regions answering positively to the
question whether their governor is doing a good job or not. From figure 2.5 one can
see that the index is positively correlated with approval of a region’s head. A simple
OLS regression with region clustered errors and region fixed effects yields a positive
and significant coefficient with a t-statistic of 5.4. Finally, in section 2.3 I make use
of panel data on regions’ population with internet access which was also obtained
from GKS.
The switch from an elected governor to a handpicked governor is coded in the
main treatment variableHandpickedGovernorit. It has value 1 if the governor ruling
region i at time t started his term after the 12th of December 2004 – and therefore
had to be selected by the Russian president – or 0 otherwise. The precise dates
of when a region’s head entered office were retrieved from the website rulers.org.
Another important piece of information are numbers on the members of the ruling
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Figure 2.5: Economic performance and governor popularity
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party United Russia by region. This information was gathered from reports of
Russian Federal Ministry of Justice for the years 2009 until 2012 and turned into a
per capita measure using yearly population counts at the region level from GKS.
The final panel dataset covers 71 out Russia’s 83 regions over all 7 federal
elections during the period 2000 to 2012. During this time there were 5 mergers
between 2 or 3 regions which reduced the initial amount of 89 subdivisions to 83.
Such mergers are likely to fundamentally change the power structure of a governor
and make it difficult to compare the new units especially since all mergers took
place after the abolishment of governor elections. For this reason I excluded all
10 regions affected by a merger. In addition to that, Chechnya lacked information
on economic outcomes until the early 2000s and the Republic of Sakha didn’t pro-
vide precinct-level voting data in 2000. Both regions were hence dropped from the
dataset. Summary statistics of the final sample are reported in table 3.2.
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Table 2.4: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Share of ballot w/ TVSC≥1 497 0.21 0.24 0.00 1.00
% Incumbent vote 497 0.59 0.16 0.25 0.99
% Turnout 497 0.65 0.11 0.44 0.98
Electorate in 100,000 497 13.60 12.35 0.34 73.10
Reports per 100k electorate on...
Improper counting 142 0.36 0.49 0.00 2.56
Exclusion of voters 142 0.26 0.58 0.00 6.31
Illegal cmapaigning 142 0.12 0.32 0.00 2.92
Observers excluded 142 0.55 0.79 0.00 5.07
Faulty ballot box 142 0.24 0.42 0.00 2.92
Secrecy violated 142 0.12 0.16 0.00 0.93
Illegal voting 142 0.45 0.72 0.00 5.59
Other violations 142 0.87 1.11 0.00 8.86
% Pop. w/ internet 142 0.41 0.14 0.01 0.72
United Russia members p.c. 142 16.47 8.95 5.61 53.45
Handpicked governor 497 0.30 0.46 0 1
Handpicked governor b/w 2004/2007 497 0.34 0.47 0 1
Population in 100,000 497 17.99 17.17 0.51 118.43
4-year ∆ Economy 497 0.02 1.14 −2.56 4.06
log(GDP p.c.) 497 11.37 0.91 8.75 14.06
4-year ∆ log(GDP p.c.) 497 0.86 0.29 0.17 1.67
Unemployment rate 497 0.09 0.06 0.01 0.57
4-year ∆ Unemployment rate 497 −0.02 0.04 −0.18 0.12
Notes: The unit of observation is one of the 71 regions in the sample at election t. Non-voting data
available over several periods is linearly interpolated to the time of the election. Variables provided
at the cross-sectional level only (i.e. with only 71 observations) are reported accordingly and used
in the analysis by interacting them with either a post-2004 dummy or election fixed effects.
2.5 Empirical analysis
2.5.1 Identification
The main predictions of section 2.2.2 are that handpicked governors 1) have in
general less incentives to rig elections since loyalty is assured and 2) they use rigging
to compensate expected lower election results. One would therefore expect that in
regions who had a handpicked governor, overall fraud levels decrease but that social
instability could drive them up again. I model this mechanism in a difference-in-
differences specification analysing the changing effect of economic performance on
the extent of election fraud. The treatment in this setup is the forced change to a
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governor chosen by the central administration:
ShareSuspiciousit = α+ γi + λt + µXit
+ β HandpickedGovernorit + µ∆Economyit
+ θ HandpickedGovernorit ×∆Economyit + ǫit
(2.1)
The addition of election-specific and region fixed effects λt and γi restricts
the focus only to variation in suspicious votes within regions off any election specific
trend. Election FEs account for the strong upward shift in suspicious votes over
time that is by construction correlated with the arrival of handpicked governors af-
ter 2005. Area-specific fixed effects further control for permanently strong political
machines originating from times of the Soviet Union [Hale, 2003]. Further con-
trols Xit are including regions’ aggregate democracy rating between 1991 and 2001
interacted with election fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at the re-
gion level to account for autocorrelation of region-specific unobservables which may
downward bias conventional robust estimates of the residuals’ variance. In order to
consistently estimate the effect of having a handpicked governor and its interaction
with economic performance on the share of suspicious votes, one needs to assure
that treated regions did not systematically differ from non-treated ones and that re-
placement is not correlated with other simultaneous changes in the respective areas.
The first assumption is casually checked in figure 2.6 which displays the mean share
of potentially fraudulent votes over time for regions with and without a replacement
of governor between 2004 and 2008. As can be seen, the two groups follow roughly
similar trends before the new law, even during the first major increase of suspicious
votes in the presidential elections of March 2004. In the following elections, the
patterns start diverging with not replaced regions displaying notably higher levels
of suspicious votes. After an initial peak in 2008 with a difference in averages of
10%, replaced regions remain about 5% below the level of their counterparts.
Unlike the common trends assumption, the absence of confounding events
is not straightforward to check. Replacing a region’s leader may not only mean a
change in loyalty but also in many other factors potentially correlated with rigging
incentives. Two such confounders may be that the central government was targeting
either particularly unpopular governors or particularly unsuccessful ones. Despite
lacking pre-treatment data, figure 2.7 gives the hint that, if anything, handpicked
governors were less popular than elected ones at the beginning but caught up over
time. Given this, one would expect that handpicked governors were to engage in
more fraud than old ones since their popularity does not allow them to turn voters
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Figure 2.6: Average suspicious vote share before/after introduction of governor
appointments
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Figure 2.7: Average popularity of governors
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Figure 2.8: Average incumbent vote share before/after introduction of governor
appointments
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Figure 2.9: Average yearly GDP p.c. growth before/after introduction of governor
appointments
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in favour of the central government. Figure 2.8 also highlights that incumbent votes
in federal elections were at a similar level and that replacement does not appear to
have been a punishment for pre-2005 election results. The fact that incumbent votes
do not respond to replacement after 2005 is striking at first but is not informative
about governors’ popularity given the changing intensity of fraud used to produce
those results. A more reliable check whether success was a selection criterion or a
confounder is provided in figure 2.9 which compares the average yearly growth in
regional GDP per capita across the two subgroups. Again, there is no evidence for
substantial differences across regions before and after the appointment of governors.
It does not appear that a new region’s head spurred economic growth which could
have led to lower need to rig federal elections.
2.5.2 Baseline results
Table 3.3 reports the main results of the difference-in-differences estimation. As can
be seen from the first 2 columns, HandpickedGovernor is positively correlated with
potentially fraudulent elections even when controlling for time-invariant regional
characteristics. This, however, is due to the general rise in replaced governors and
fraud over time which leads to a notable upward bias. Once election fixed effects are
accounted for in column 3 the coefficient flips sign but remains highly significant.
According to the estimates, having a handpicked governor reduces suspicious votes
by 8.5%. This is even larger than the 5% difference observed in the raw data in
figure 2.6 and equivalent to a third of a standard deviation or moving from the
median to the 25th percentile of the distribution. The result tentatively confirms
the theoretical prediction that if the government selects its own candidate, the need
to signal his loyalty by rigging elections is substantially diminished.
The coefficient remains virtually unaffected by the inclusion of control vari-
ables and 4-year economic performance in the next two specifications. Especially
column 5 is reassuring that replacement is not endogenous to a leader’s performance
and that socio-economic development prior to the election has on average no effect on
suspicious votes. The final specification allows this effect to differ for regions with a
handpicked governor and shows that in this case, economic performance significantly
lowers the share of suspicious votes in federal elections. In other words, the negative
correlation between having an appointed governor and potentially fraudulent votes
turns even more negative when the economy has done well over the last four years.
Given that the minimum value of 4-year ∆ Economy is -2.56, handpicked governors
deliver similarly suspicious results only when the region’s economic development
was extremely bad. This finding is consistent with hypothesis 2 in section 2.2.2
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Table 2.5: Difference-in-Differences Results
Share of suspicious votes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Handpicked Governor 0.037 0.064∗∗∗−0.086∗∗∗−0.086∗∗∗−0.086∗∗∗−0.108∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.017) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029)
4-year ∆ Economy 0.005 0.016
(0.013) (0.014)
Handpicked Governor × 4-year ∆ Economy −0.047∗∗
(0.021)
Region FE N Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE N N Y Y Y Y
Controls N N N Y Y Y
Regions 71 71 71 71 71 71
Observations 497 497 497 497 497 497
R2 0.005 0.674 0.770 0.787 0.787 0.790
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the region level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Controls: Democracy1991−2001 × Election FE
that even selected officials may use rigging to signal competence in the absence of
political success.
2.5.3 Sensitivity and robustness checks
As a first test for the stability of the baseline estimates, I re-estimate the orig-
inal model including additional fixed effect specifications. The two setups I am
using are time shifters for each of the 8 Federal Districts and region-specific linear
time trends. Despite looking similar at first, their inclusion serves different pur-
poses. Federal Districts were created in 2000 by President Putin as an intermediary
subdivision between the federal government and the regions and cover between 6
to 18 of these. The corresponding plenipotentiaries are directly appointed by the
president and were used to tighten control over territories’ leaders [Hill, 2012]. A
particularly ambitious district leader could therefore replace corrupt governors and
simultaneously disincentivise ballot rigging or introduce manipulation techniques
that the TVSC cannot capture which would give similar results to the ones in sec-
tion 2.5.2. Region-specific linear time trends, on the other hand, provide a test
whether the effect could be driven by diverging trends in fraud between treated and
non-treated regardless of governor replacements. Table 3.5 depicts the baseline esti-
mates and their sensitivity to including the two additional fixed effect specifications
jointly and by themselves. Reassuringly, the estimates for HandpickedGovernor and
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Table 2.6: Baseline results and different FE specifications
Share of suspicious votes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Handpicked Governor −0.108∗∗∗ −0.096∗∗∗ −0.079∗∗ −0.082∗∗
(0.029) (0.030) (0.035) (0.037)
4-year ∆ Economy 0.016 0.008 0.011 0.004
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018)
Handpicked Governor × 4-year ∆ Economy −0.047∗∗ −0.035 −0.049∗∗ −0.050∗
(0.021) (0.023) (0.025) (0.027)
Region FE Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Election × Fed.Distr. FE N Y N Y
Region FE × t N N Y Y
Regions 71 71 71 71
Observations 497 497 497 497
R2 0.790 0.821 0.853 0.873
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the region level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Controls: Democracy1991−2001 × Election FE
HandpickedGovernor×4-year ∆ Economy are not changing substantially in magni-
tude and remain significant. The level treatment effect increases to about -0.08 in
column 3 and 4, suggesting that the baseline estimate was slightly biased downwards
due to diverging trends. The interaction with economic performance is less precisely
estimated but remains almost identical even in the most flexible fixed effects setup
in the final column. Overall, it seems unlikely that characteristics at the federal
district level or diverging patterns in election fraud are driving the baseline results.
Another important question is the sensitivity of the baseline findings for
HandpickedGovernor × 4-year ∆ Economy to alternative definitions of economic
performance. In order to evaluate this, I investigate in table 3.7 the sensitivity of
the baseline results to varying time-horizons of economic performance as well as the
individual components of the index. Column 2 to 4 show that using the PCA of
changes in unemployment and log GDP per capita over time horizons closer to the
election data does not change the treatment effect. The coefficient on the interaction
effect HandpickedGovernor×4-year ∆ Economy, however, halves in magnitude and
loses its significance. The choice of a 4-year horizon thus seems to be a crucial choice
for finding evidence on the competence mechanism. Finally, specifications 5 and 6
reveal that 4-year changes in unemployment are probably the main driver of the
baseline results, while changes in log GDP per capita over the same time period per
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Table 2.7: Sensitivity of results to definition of economic performance
Outcome variable PCA of ∆ Unemployment rate and log(GDP p.c.) over 4-year ∆ of
4 years (baseline) 3 years 2 years 1 year Unemployment rate log(GDP p.c.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Handpicked Governor −0.108∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.029) (0.028) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.065)
∆ Economy 0.016 0.010 0.017 0.023 −0.380 0.050
(0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.356) (0.061)
Handpicked Governor × ∆ Economy −0.047∗∗ −0.019 −0.028 −0.023 1.287∗∗ −0.120
(0.021) (0.024) (0.019) (0.020) (0.587) (0.085)
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Regions 71 71 71 71 71 71
Observations 497 497 497 497 497 497
R2 0.790 0.787 0.789 0.790 0.790 0.788
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the region level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Controls: Democracy1991−2001 × Election FE
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se do not allow reproducing these findings.
2.5.4 Placebo tests and related outcomes
The plausibility of the common trends assumption can also be tested through a
placebo experiment in which the treatment period is moved forward by several time
periods. In doing so, one can test whether there was a significant level difference
between treatment and control group prior to the selection of a new governor which
may have not been captured by the region-specific time trends in the preceding
section. For instance, a new law in 2001 made it possible to prosecute governors
for criminal activities [Sharafutdinova, 2010]. If under-performing, to-be-removed
governors were decreasing election fraud in response to this law or any other policy
change or if fraud reduction was in fact an anticipatory behaviour, this may still
yield results similar to the baseline. Table 2.8 reports the initial estimates along with
two further specifications looking only at pre-2005 data where the replacement of a
governor is moved either one or two elections forward. As can be seen from column
2 and 3, this manipulation of the treatment variable halves the corresponding point
estimate of HandpickedGovernor and leaves it insignificant. The interaction with
4-year ∆ Economy loses its significance in specification 3 but flips sign and remains
highly significant in the second case. This finding can be explained by the fact that
the 2004 surge in rigging was particularly strong in the Northern Caucasus regions
such as Dagestan and North Ossetia whose governors were among the first ones to
be replaced and at the same time saw their economies recovering after the nearby
Second Chechen War 1999 to 2000. Once the 6 regions of the Northern Caucasian
Federal district are omitted, the coefficient drops and becomes insignificant (see
table A1).
One implicit assumption of this study is that election fraud in Russia between
2000 and 2012 has been mainly turnout increasing. This means that additional votes
for the advantaged candidate are generated through unused ballot sheets or biased
mobilisation of voters rather than stealing votes from other candidates or parties.
Even the vote share of the incumbent may not be affected, given reports on specific
vote targets which could be achieved by legal and non-legal means [White, 2011].
Hence, one would expect turnout but not other parties to respond to having a
handpicked governor which offers another insightful placebo test. I therefore re-
estimate equation 3.1 using turnout and vote shares of the incumbent and other
parties (Communist, Ultranational, and Democratic) as outcomes. The findings
presented in table 2.8 are roughly in line with the assumption of turnout increasing
election rigging. Turnout in column 2 is decreasing by 2% on average in regions with
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Table 2.8: Results from placebo tests on pre-treatment data
Treatment Handpicked
Governort
Handpicked
Governort+1
Handpicked
Governort+2
(1) (2) (3)
Handpicked Governor −0.090∗∗∗ −0.062 −0.059
(0.028) (0.038) (0.049)
4-year ∆ Economy 0.009 −0.009 −0.003
(0.013) (0.017) (0.018)
Handpicked Governor × 4-year ∆ Economy −0.031 0.067∗∗ 0.020
(0.021) (0.030) (0.021)
Region FE Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y
Sample 2000–2012 2000–2004 2000–2004
Regions 69 69 69
Observations 483 207 207
R2 0.790 0.849 0.847
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the region level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Controls: Democracy1991−2001 × Election FE
an appointed governor, significant at the 10% level. The marginal effect turns even
more negative depending on economic performance but is not statistically significant.
The effect on incumbent vote share in specification 3 yields qualitatively similar
but insignificant results. For the remaining parties, both the HandpickedGovernor
and HandpickedGovernor×4-year ∆ Economy coefficients are far smaller and never
significant. The coefficients on 4-year ∆ Economy indicate that, even in the presence
of large-scale fraud, voters may hold the central government accountable to some
extent and give their votes to opposition parties if their economic situation worsens.
An effect of having a handpicked governor on vote shares of the incumbent or any
other party can, however, not be found.
In sum, the results of section 2.5.2 have proven stable throughout a number of
robustness and falsification checks. The interaction with regional economic growth
has, however, turned out slightly less stable and appears to depend strongly on the
time dimension used to construct the principal components.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I study the importance of incentive structures of local officials on the
dynamics of election fraud in Russia. I exploit a radical law change in December 2004
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Table 2.9: Results for different election outcomes
Dependent variable Share
suspicious
votes
% Turnout % Incumbent % Communist % Ultra-
national
(LDPR)
% Democratic
(Yabloko)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Handpicked Governor −0.108∗∗∗ −0.020∗ −0.013 0.006 −0.005 0.004
(0.029) (0.011) (0.013) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002)
4-year ∆ Economy 0.016 0.005 0.022∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.002∗ 0.000
(0.014) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Handpicked Governor × 4-year ∆ Economy −0.047∗∗ −0.012 −0.010 0.004 −0.003 0.000
(0.021) (0.013) (0.012) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Regions 71 71 71 71 71 71
Observations 497 497 497 497 497 497
R2 0.790 0.825 0.894 0.857 0.898 0.860
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the region level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Controls: Democracy1991−2001 × Election FE
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which allowed the central government to remove governors without any constraints
and thus created strong motivation for the latter to use rigging in order to stay
in office. Hypotheses from a simple conceptual framework predict that governors
handpicked by the central government have less need to engage in fraud than elected
(and not yet replaced) ones since their loyalty is assured. Handpicked governors on
the other hand are assumed to respond with rigging in the face a bad economic
performance and lower expected votes. The paper develops and extensively tests a
new indicator of electoral fraud for Russian regions between 2000 and 2012 which
is created from a unique micro-level dataset of election results at the voting station
level.
The effect of having a handpicked governor on the share of suspicious votes
in a region is estimated using a differences-in-differences estimation. The baseline
results support the hypotheses and showed that regions with a handpicked governor
have on average 10% less suspicious votes than those with elected ones. Furthermore,
also the interaction of the treatment variable with economic performance is negative
and indicates that in the case of a very bad economic performance the extent of
fraud by handpicked governors would be equal to that of elected ones. In this
sense, loyalty and competence can be regarded as complementary. Both effects were
highly significant and passes several robustness checks concerning the validity of the
common trends assumption and placebo treatments. While the share of suspicious
votes is affected by the law change and handpicked governors, I also show that
election outcomes of the incumbent as well as other parties did not respond. In
other words, the incentive structures of governors does not change the results of
elections, but only the way they are generated.
Despite focussing only on the case of Russia, the findings provide interesting
insights into the functioning of competitive authoritarian systems in general. Unlike
in a totalitarian system, elections can actually still function as an arena for political
competition, albeit only among lower-tier officials. Contrary to common knowledge,
I show conceptually and empirically that rigging is far less common among the
dictator’s cronies due to their certain loyalty. From a policy perspective, this means
that advocating for the co-optation of non-cadres to government positions in an
authoritarian regime may actually have counter-productive results and lead to higher
levels of election fraud. Also the fact that bad economic performance induces even
higher levels of election fraud should be born in mind when deciding about sanctions.
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2.A Tables
Table A1: Results from placebo tests on pre-treatment data (omitting Northern
Caucasus district)
Treatment Handpicked
Governort
Handpicked
Governort+1
Handpicked
Governort+2
(1) (2) (3)
Handpicked Governor −0.069∗∗ −0.050 −0.044
(0.027) (0.041) (0.048)
4-year ∆ Economy 0.021 −0.002 0.003
(0.014) (0.020) (0.021)
Handpicked Governor × 4-year ∆ Economy −0.013 0.052 0.009
(0.020) (0.036) (0.023)
Region FE Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y
Sample 2000–2012 2000–2004 2000–2004
Regions 65 65 65
Observations 455 195 195
R2 0.801 0.867 0.866
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the region level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Controls: Democracy1991−2001 × Election FE
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Chapter 3
The Political Fallout of
Chernobyl: Evidence from
West-German Elections
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3.1 Introduction
The impact of experience on people’s belief formation has recently received wide
attention in the economics literature. The exposure to unusual, highly traumatic or
joyful events in one’s life has been shown to leave large footprints in people’s minds
and set the path for various future outcomes such as trust, political attitudes, or
marriage decisions. The research until now has also been very diverse in terms
of the analysed event and geography. Madestam and Yanagizawa-Drott [2012], for
instance, look at how patriotic events affect political preferences in the United States
and Chen and Yang [2015] investigate the impact of the Great Famine on political
trust in China. Malmendier and Nagel [2011] and Giuliano and Spilimbergo [2014]
both look at how recessions can shape young individuals’ attitudes towards risk and
redistribution. Nunn and Wantchekon [2011], on the other hand, study the effect
of a long-term event like the slave trade on mistrust in contemporary Africa. What
most studies have in common is the focus on first-hand experiences or events in
people’s immediate surroundings. Evidence on the impact of remote phenomena
with an entirely psychological effect, however, has remained scarce until now.
This paper studies a distant event, the Chernobyl nuclear disaster of April
1986, and its political effects on Western Germany.1 At the time of the accident,
18 nuclear power plants (henceforth NPP) were operating in Germany and 14 more
were at a planning or construction stage. The use of nuclear energy was not a
salient political issue until the disaster and only the recently founded Green party
was openly opposing nuclear energy [Joppke, 1990]. Protest against new NPPs was
either highly localised or coming from radical leftist groups. My empirical analysis
exploits the county variation in distance to the nearest nuclear facility to study the
impact of the disaster on voting behaviour in the short and long-run. Proximity to
the nearest facility is interpreted as the intensity at which the informational shock
about the dangers of nuclear energy was perceived and has been analysed in similar
applications [Abadie and Dermisi, 2008; Pignataro and Prarolo, 2012; Bauer, Braun,
and Kvasnicka, 2014]. I add to this literature by applying the proximity measure to
the first and most important nuclear disaster in Europe.
The dataset features a list of all nuclear facilities in West Germany and
the near abroad as well as results of 11 Federal elections in 301 counties in West
Germany over the time period 1976 to 2013. Results are provided for the four
main German parties including the emerging Green party. My empirical analysis
1 For the sake of simplicity, I refer in the remainder to the Federal Republic of Germany and
post-unification Germany simply as Germany and to the German Democratic Republic as East
Germany.
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exploits this data structure for a differences-in-differences estimation to study the
change in proximity’s impact on voting behaviour after April 1986. Concerns about
the endogeneity of power plants’ locations are met by controlling for a range of
socio-economic factors such as age structure, economic well-being and education.
My baseline results show that counties closer to the nearest NPP experience see a
significant increase in votes for the leftist Green party as well as the centre-right
conservative CDU/CSU at the expense of ideologically less extreme parties. Moving
from the bottom to the top decile in proximity, results in a 0.25% higher vote share
for Greens and a 1.34% increase for the CDU/CSU. My findings are robust to various
robustness checks and are not driven by elections in the immediate aftermath of the
disaster. Rather, polarisation continues through to the latest German Bundestag
election in 2013.
In order to get at the mechanisms driving my results, I investigate three dif-
ferent channels. First, I look at other political outcomes to establish that proximity
did not lead to a punishment of the parties who approved the respective power plant
but on the other hand significantly increased turnout and polarisation of election
results. Second, building on the importance of formative years and the persistence
of political preferences, I also investigate variation in time to the next election and
counties’ age structure. I find that that late post-Chernobyl elections and higher
share of 15-25 year old individuals at the time of the accident are positively increas-
ing the proximity effect of the conservatives but not the Green party. A special role
of this age group is in line with research on the importance of impressionable years
for the formation of political beliefs [Krosnick and Alwin, 1989]. Finally, I demon-
strate that the effect is not depending on differences in economic well-being and
that educational differences in areas of higher NPP-proximity are only benefiting
the conservatives.
Taken together, the results suggest that living closer to a nuclear power
plant during the Chernobyl accident had two separate effects on political attitudes
in Germany. The first one is higher support for the anti-nuclear Green party which
appears to be stemming from areas with lower numbers of adolescents and otherwise
is independent of socio-economic characteristics. This finding is in line with the
general aversion of citizens towards high-risk facilities in their surroundings, also
known as NIMBY (Not In My BackYard) effects. The second effect is a rise in
votes for the pro-nuclear CDU/CSU in areas closer to an NPP among the young
and educated. Despite appearing counter-intuitive at first, this resembles similar
findings on the 1976 California primary elections in which an anti-nuclear initiative
was opposed particularly by the more educated part of society [Kuklinski, Metlay,
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and Kay, 1982]. These authors find that voters with higher knowledge were relying
stronger on a cost-benefit analysis in their decision process rather than ideology or
peers. This provides a link between the level of education and voting conservative
after Chernobyl. In my context, such local benefits could be job opportunities and
positive externalities such as investments in infrastructure. I argue that especially
young and educated individuals may oppose the shut-down of nuclear facilities since
they are more likely to adapt and have a more accurate assessment of the actual
risk of a nuclear disaster [Shaw, 1996].
This paper links to several research areas. Most closely related are the studies
of life-changing experiences and the formation and persistence of beliefs mentioned
above. Furthermore, there exists a good amount of research on the health effects
of the Chernobyl disaster [e.g. Lu¨ning et al., 1989; Almond, Edlund, and Palme,
2009; Danzer and Danzer, 2014]. I add to this work by investigating the political
effects of Chernobyl in West Germany. Also the effect of NPP-proximity has been
investigated in few recent studies. Pignataro and Prarolo [2012] look at how living
closer to a planned power plant affected voting in the 2011 Nuclear referendum in
Italy and find a positive effect on anti-nuclear voting decisions. Schumacher [2014],
on the other hand, looks at how distance to an NPP correlates with votes for the
German Green party between 1998 and 2009. Distance to an NPP can, however,
also affect economic outcomes as Bauer, Braun, and Kvasnicka [2014] show in their
study on the changes in housing prices after the Fukushima accident in 2013. My
paper extends this literature in several ways. First, I relate proximity to an NPP also
to votes of parties other than the Greens. Second, I study the effect of proximity to
NPP at a point when the dangers of nuclear energy were most likely to be perceived
as an informational shock.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, I will give a brief
discussion of the conceptual framework and the predicted effects of the Chernobyl
disaster in Germany according to the current state of research. This is followed by
a description of the political and historical background of nuclear power usage in
Germany in order to provide the reader with the necessary context of this case study.
The next two sections discuss the data and the identification strategy. My empirical
analysis starts by presenting the baseline results and several robustness checks and
then moves on to exploring the mechanisms driving my findings on voting behaviour
in West Germany. The final section concludes.
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3.2 Conceptual framework
The political effects of the Chernobyl disaster can be divided into two categories.
The first one concerns the persistence of the disaster’s political impact. As ex-
emplified in the study by Giuliano and Spilimbergo [2014], one would expect that
Chernobyl as a formative event per se has long-lasting effects particularly on young
people between the age of 18 and 25. Focus on this age group is motivated by
psychological research which has shown that impressionable years are crucial for
shaping beliefs and attitudes of an individual [Krosnick and Alwin, 1989]. A long-
term change in political behaviour could, however, also be rationalised through the
general persistence in people’s voting decisions. Spontaneous, one-time protest votes
in response to the Chernobyl disaster could thus turn into long-term changes in elec-
toral support. An empirical example of this mechanism are Kaplan and Mukand
[2014] who show that party registrations in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks
strongly predict future party support.
The other category addresses differences in voters’ electoral response to Cher-
nobyl. Living closer to an NPP is a typical case in which one would expect NIMBY
and home-voter effects. In essence, both theories predict that voters will opt for
policy choices increasing the value of their home and against those which diminish
it or are expected to be harmful.2 Following these mechanisms would predict an
increase in votes for anti-nuclear parties as a response to the Chernobyl disaster
depending on how close voters live to the nearest NPP. This view is supported also
for the issue of nuclear power plants in the study by Pignataro and Prarolo [2012]
on the 2011 Nuclear Referendum in Italy and Schumacher [2014] in his work on the
determinants of Green votes between 1998 and 2009.
The rejection of nuclear power among voters is, however, ambiguous. Kuk-
linski, Metlay, and Kay [1982], for instance, investigated the 1976 California primary
elections in which the majority of people voted against a phase-out from nuclear
power. Even though this event took place before the disastrous Three Mile Island
accident in March 1979, which boosted the anti-nuclear movement in the United
States, the study offers important insights. The authors find, for example, that
educated people were more likely to object the 1976 proposal and that this may be
based on their different abilities to assess the costs and benefits from abandoning
nuclear power. Following this view, voters of higher education may react differ-
ently to an increased awareness from NPP-proximity and decrease or even offset the
NIMBY effects described above.
2 See [Pignataro and Prarolo, 2012] for a detailed discussion of the two mechanisms and an
application to the issue of NPPs.
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Having described the conceptual framework of the analysis, I will now move
on to give a detailed historical description of nuclear power usage in West Germany,
the anti-nuclear movement and the aftermath of the Chernobyl.
3.3 Historical background
3.3.1 Nuclear energy in West Germany, the new social movements,
and the early years of the West German Greens
Germany’s experience with nuclear energy goes back as far as WWII to the Uranium
Project of the Nazi regime and the construction of several research reactors. After
being banned from nuclear research until 1955, the first research reactor in Garching
near Munich went into operation in October 1957 [Hassel, Koester, and Pabst, 1997].
The civilian usage of nuclear power in West Germany started in November 1960 with
the NPP in Kahl near Frankfurt am Main which was followed by five further plants
during the 1960s. Table 3.1 provides an overview of all NPPs and their operation
and approval. Initially, the arrival of this novel energy source was not politicised in
any way and hailed by all three major German parties CDU/CSU, FDP, and SPD.
This elite consensus was sustained by population and the media alike who showed
little to no interest in the new technology until about the mid 1970s. Another sign
of the low priority of nuclear power issues was the delegation of responsibilities
regarding commissions and NPP sites to state ministries [Joppke, 1993].
The oil crises of the 1970s fundamentally changed the situation for several
reasons: first, it encouraged a massive expansion of nuclear energy as it made West-
ern Germany less dependent on oil-producing countries and secondly, it brought the
limits of economic growth to the attention of the wider public and raised awareness
about the environmental impact of growth [Joppke, 1990]. Citizens’ initiatives in-
spired by the student movement of the 1960s became the first anti-nuclear groups
of West Germany and started to organise local protests against existing or planned
NPPs. Anti-nuclear initiatives themselves differed substantially in respect to their
usage of violent means as well as their social origins. While some were peaceful and
organised with the broad support of the local population, others were dominated by
radical communist and autonomous groupings from larger cities. For these, the op-
position to nuclear energy was just one way of fighting the capitalist state in which
the use of violence was legitimate and even encouraged [Joppke, 1993]. Overall, the
protest movement was thus confined to the urban radical left and the population
living in the immediate surroundings of nuclear power plants.
The roots of the German Green party lie within the new social movements
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Table 3.1: Nuclear power plants in West Germany
Nuclear power plant State Start of operation Approving state government
Kahl Bavaria 01/02/1962 CSU, GB/BHE
MZFR Karlsruhe Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 19/12/1966 CDU, FDP
GundremmingenA Bavaria 12/04/1967 CSU
Lingen Lower Saxony 01/10/1968 SPD, FDP
Obrigheim Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 01/04/1969 CDU, FDP
Juelich Northrhine-Westphalia 19/05/1969 CDU
Grosswelzheim Bavaria 02/08/1970 CSU
Stade Lower Saxony 19/05/1972 SPD, CDU
Niederaichbach Bavaria 01/01/1973 CSU
KNK KarlsruheI Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 21/02/1974 CDU
BiblisA Hesse 26/02/1975 SPD
Wuergassen Northrhine-Westphalia 11/11/1975 SPD
Neckarwestheim1 Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 01/12/1976 CDU, SPD
BiblisB Hesse 31/01/1977 SPD
Brunsbuettel Schleswig-Holstein 09/02/1977 CDU, FDP
KNK KarlsruheII Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 03/03/1979 CDU
Isar/Ohu1 Bavaria 21/03/1979 CSU
Unterweser Lower Saxony 06/09/1979 SPD
Philippsburg1 Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 26/03/1980 CDU, SPD
Grafenrheinfeld Bavaria 17/06/1982 CSU
Kruemmel Schleswig-Holstein 28/03/1984 CDU
GundremmingenB Bavaria 19/07/1984 CSU
GundremmingenC Bavaria 18/01/1985 CSU
Grohnde Lower Saxony 01/02/1985 SPD
Philippsburg2 Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 18/04/1985 CDU
Brokdorf Schleswig-Holstein 22/12/1986 CDU
Hamm-Uentrop Northrhine-Westphalia 01/06/1987 CDU, FDP
Muelheim-Kaerlich Rhineland-Palatinate 01/10/1987 CDU
Isar/Ohu2 Bavaria 09/04/1988 CSU
Emsland Lower Saxony 20/06/1988 CDU
Neckarwestheim2 Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 15/04/1989 CDU
(NSPs) of the 1960s and 1970s from which also the anti-nuclear movements origi-
nated and who distinguished themselves from established parties primarily through
their focus on post-material values. Focal issues included environmental awareness
and opposition to nuclear energy but also emancipation of women, gay rights, peace
and civil rights. Yet, it was especially ecological initiatives which started from 1977
to form electoral alliances and to participate in local elections [Probst, 2013]. After
initial successes in municipal and state elections in northern Germany, the initially
loose alliances in several states started to cooperate and formally registered as par-
ties. Simultaneously, ecological alternatives also participated in the elections to the
European Parliament 1979 as SPV Die Gru¨nen which attained 3.2% in Germany.3
This entitled SPV Die Gru¨nen to 4.5 million Deutsche Mark of campaign funding
3 SPV is short for Sonstige Politische Vereinigung(Other Political Association The Greens).
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and provided a crucial stepping stone for transforming the alliance into the new
party Die Gru¨nen in January 1980 [Falter and Klein, 2003]. In the 1983 election,
Die Gru¨nen received 5.6% of the total votes and for the first time entered the Ger-
man parliament (Bundestag) and was now also represented in 6 out of 11 West
German State parliaments.
3.3.2 Chernobyl and its effect on public opinion
On the 26th of April 1986, an accident in the Chernobyl nuclear power plant (Soviet
Union, now Ukraine) led to a reactor explosion and the release of enormous amounts
of radioactive material. The consequences for the local population and nature were
devastating: areas within a 30km radius of the plant (about 330.000 inhabitants)
were evacuated and are still not inhabitable today due to radiation. Research by
the Chernobyl Forum estimated about 9,000 cancer deaths in highly contaminated
areas directly related to the disaster [Ebermann and Junkert, 2011]. Due to wind
and rain patterns in the immediate aftermath of the accident, also wider parts of Eu-
rope were exposed to radioactive fallout. In Germany, contamination was strongly
concentrated in the very South-East but so far could not be linked to direct health
effects on the local population in scientific studies [Cort, 1998]. The German Ra-
diation Protection Commission (Strahlenschutzkommission) released recommended
maximum radiation values for raw milk and leafy vegetables in May 1986 which
led to the destruction of harvests particularly in Southern Germany [Ebermann and
Junkert, 2011].
The German public had already been aware to some extent about nuclear
energy’s dangers before the accident. Since most of this awareness was coming from
anti-nuclear initiatives rather than the state, there was a deep distrust towards
official information and advice regarding the Chernobyl disaster’s consequences.
Attention-seeking media titles such as “Mass death after Chernobyl” or “Chernobyl
is killing Munich’s children” and the uncoordinated reactions by the official author-
ities turned Germans’ scepticism about nuclear power into outright fear and even
panic [Ebermann and Junkert, 2011]. While the federal government was not taking
any actions and played down the dangers of the disaster, some states started to
introduce measures such as tolerance levels of radiation and bans on the certain
vegetables which further deepened the pre-existing mistrust [Joppke, 1990].
A long-term result of the Chernobyl disaster was the drop in public support
for nuclear energy and new power plants [Boer and Catsburg, 1988]. At the political
level, only the social democrats responded by starting to oppose the usage of nu-
clear energy while conservatives and liberals remained neutral and soon afterwards
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returned to a pro-nuclear stance. At the local level, the disaster led on the one hand
to a radicalisation of the existing anti-nuclear power movement and on the other
hand to the emergence of a more civilised middle-class protest movement. This new
movement consisted mainly of concerned citizens preferring information campaigns
and lobbying of politicians to violent rallies. The wider appeal of this grass-roots
type of protest as opposed to its radical counterpart is exemplified by a petition
against a nuclear power plant in Bavaria which gained almost 900,000 signatures
[Joppke, 1990].
3.3.3 The Green party’s ascend to power and Germany’s exit from
nuclear energy
During the 1987 elections – 10 months after the Chernobyl disaster and despite
severe tensions between the orthodox and moderate party factions – the Greens could
increase their vote share to 8.3%. A major success was the formation of a coalition
with the social democrats in Hesse and the first entry into a state government. The
German reunification in 1989 and the subsequent Bundestag election in December
1990 were an ambivalent experience for the party: on the one hand they started
cooperating with the East German civil rights party Bu¨ndnis 90, on the other hand
it was only for this cooperation and a one-time exception in the electoral law that
the Greens remained in parliament. While the West German branch of Die Gru¨nen
only received 4.8%, its East German counterpart attained 6.1% and thus managed
to cross the 5% hurdle at least in one part of the reunified country. The Greens’
focus on environmental topics and the deliberate neglect of current issues such as
the unification severely backfired in this case [Probst, 2013]. The 1990 alliance was
formally turned into an association in January 1993 and the party changed its name
officially to Bu¨ndnis 90/Die Gru¨nen. Figure 3.1 depicts the evolution of the German
Green party using their vote shares in German Federal elections.
Throughout the 1990s the German Greens continued their trend towards
more moderate policy positions and managed to increase their vote share to 7.3% in
the 1994 Federal parliamentary election and enter state governments in Northrhine-
Westphalia, Schleswig-Holstein, and Hamburg. Importantly, the decline of the more
extreme wing within the party did not mean a more compromising position on the
usage of nuclear power or environmental issues in general. This proved detrimental
when in 1998 they adopted an electoral platform arguing for raising the price of
petrol to 5 Deutsche Mark per liter over time. Political enemies of the Greens ex-
ploited this topic extensively which almost led to a repetition of the 1990 experience
and the Greens received only 6.7% remaining well below their expectations. The
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Figure 3.1: Voting for the German Greens over time
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strong gains of the social democrats, however, still made it possible to form the
first federal government of SPD and Bu¨ndnis/Die Gru¨nen. Apart from the foreign
ministry, which was now headed by party leader Joschka Fischer, the Greens also
took over the ministries of health and environment [Falter and Klein, 2003]. In June
2000 the new government reached a first agreement with energy suppliers about a
complete exit from nuclear power within about 30 years depending on the spread
of a negotiated maximum production cap over the existing NPPs. This agreement
was turned into law in April 2002, only few months before the next parliamentary
election. As a result, two power plants ceased operation in 2003 and 2005 [Ru¨dig,
2000; Jahn and Korolczuk, 2012].
After the 2005 election which led to a Grand Coalition between CDU/CSU
and SPD without the Greens, the new nuclear law was left untouched despite the
conservatives’ strong favour for nuclear energy. This changed in 2009 when a coali-
tion of conservatives and liberals took power and all parties responsible for the
nuclear phase-out had left the government. Already in December 2010, law was
changed anew to substantially extended operation times of existing NPPs. The
Fukushima accident in March 2011 turned this policy into a boomerang for the new
government. Facing three important state elections and an upset electorate, the
CDU/CSU/FDP government hastily abandoned its pro-nuclear policy and decided
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on the immediate shutdown of the 8 oldest power plants and a complete exit from
nuclear energy by 2022. Nevertheless, the CDU lost power after 58 years in the state
of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg which has since been led by a first Green Minister-President
of Germany [Gabriel and Keil, 2012; Jahn and Korolczuk, 2012].
3.4 Data
3.4.1 Distance to Nuclear facilities
In order to construct my treatment variable, I collected data on nuclear facilities in
Germany and the near abroad from several sources. Lists of reactors were taken from
Bredberg et al. [2015] for Germany and from nucleopedia.org for all other European
countries. Both sources also feature key dates of each facility such as start and end
of operation, beginning of construction, and approval. Furthermore, the data allows
me to differentiate between power plants and research reactors. From the website
election.de I also obtained the names of the parties forming the state government
at the time of approval and thus responsible for a specific facility in West Germany.
Finally, I geocoded the location of all reactors using the website OpenStreetMap.org
which is displayed in figure 3.2. This information is paired with a map of West
German counties from the Federal Agency for Cartography and Geodesy [2014] and
raster data on population density from CIESIN [2005].
Combining this information allows me to calculate the distance of each
county’s population centroid from each nuclear facility. In the baseline version
of my treatment variable, I assign to each district the distance from the nearest
nuclear power plant (NPP) in Western Europe only. This is because knowledge
about sites in Eastern Europe might have been less accurate given the tight travel-
ling restrictions to Communist countries in the 1980s. The literature also does not
report any protests in West Germany against NPPs in Communist countries which
could be related to the general leftist orientation of West Germany’s anti-nuclear
movement. In the analysis I also differentiate between active NPPs and those in the
planning/construction stage in April 1986 and later on. In order to obtain prox-
imity rather than distance to the respective facility, values are multiplied by −1.
Figure 3.3 and 3.4 plot the geographic dispersion and density of proximity to the
nearest operating or planned NPP at the time of the Chernobyl accident. The treat-
ment has a mean about -50 and the median of -60 which reflects the distribution’s
skewness to the left.
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Figure 3.2: Locations of facilities: Operating and planned NPPs
3.4.2 Federal and state election data 1980–2013
Election results are the main outcome used in the empirical analysis in section 3.6.
The first type are the Federal parliamentary (Bundestag) elections taking place
every four years or after a dissolution of parliament. The electoral system is a
mixed member proportional representation in which each citizen has two votes: one
is for the nominated party candidates in his precinct, the second one is for a specific
party and its list of candidates. The so-called first vote (Erststimme) follows a
pure majority rule and determines which candidates win a seat in the Bundestag
irrespective of their position in the party list. Votes for minority parties thus face a
high risk of not being counted at all and are often given to a candidate of a different
party with higher chances of winning. Since such incentives lead to heavy distortions
of voters’ actual political preferences, I focus on the second vote (Zweitstimme) which
determines what fraction of total seats are going to be held by the respective party
in general. Seats are allocated by the party lists in each state.
For each Federal election between 1980 and 2013 I obtained results at the
county level from the Federal Statistical Office (FSO) and the State Statistical
Offices (SSOs). Most of the recent data was made available on the FSO’s website
Regionalstatistik.de or the corresponding State equivalents. Older results had to be
collected directly from the State offices. The parties I’m focussing on are Greens
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Figure 3.3: NPP-Proximityi on April, 26
th 1986 across Germany counties (state borders
in blue, non-sample states grey)
Proximity to nearest NPP
1st quartile
2nd
3rd
4th (very close)
Figure 3.4: Histogram of NPP-Proximityi on April, 26
th 1986
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0
Proximity to closest NPP in 100km
D
e
n
s
it
y
121
Figure 3.5: Evolution of election results in Germany (before 1990 only FRG)
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
1
9
7
6
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
7
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
3
Greens
Socialists
Social Democrats
Liberals
Conservatives
(B90/Die Gru¨nen), Social-Democrats (SPD), Liberals (FDP), and Conservatives
(CDU/CSU) whose shares are calculated as ballots cast for the respective party in
each county and election divided by total ballots cast. Figure 3.5 shows the evolution
of aggregate election results of West and post-unification Germany over the studied
period. Results are displayed for the four main parties as well as the socialists who
entered the German party system after the unification.
3.4.3 Control variables and construction of panel dataset
Using the same sources as the voting data, I also acquired extensive information
on each county’s socio-economic characteristics over the time period studied. The
first is the log of the total population in each county which accounts for the notable
differences in urbanisation. Two important determinant of Green votes which could
also be confounders are age and gender which I account for by including the share
of women and the share of 6 specific age groups in the overall population.4 Other
potential confounders are economic well-being and educational attainment: I mea-
sure well-being as the percentage of the total population receiving state benefits.
Unlike average income, this variable has the advantage of being resistant to outliers
4 The included groups are 15–20, 25–30, 30–40, 40–50, 50–65, ≥65. The share of 0–15 year olds
is omitted as the baseline category.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics
Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Vote share Greens 3, 685 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.29
Vote share Conservatives 3, 685 0.45 0.11 0.19 0.77
Vote share Social Democrats 3, 685 0.35 0.11 0.10 0.64
Vote share Liberals 3, 685 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.23
% Turnout 3, 685 0.81 0.07 0.58 0.95
Prox. closest NPP (planned) 3, 685 -0.71 0.39 -1.91 -0.05
Prox. closest NPP (operating) 3, 685 -0.61 0.30 -1.44 -0.06
Prox. closest NPP (op. & plan.) 3, 685 -0.51 0.26 -1.44 -0.05
Prox. closest reactor (op. & plan.) 3, 685 -0.43 0.26 -1.44 -0.01
Population in 1,000 3, 685 182.80 145.89 33.21 1, 330.44
% female 3, 685 0.52 0.01 0.49 0.57
% benefit recipients (−2005) 2, 680 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.12
% benefit recipients (2005−) 1, 005 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.09
% share of pupils in prep school 3, 685 0.18 0.10 0.00 0.88
Notes: The unit of observation is one of the 301 counties in the sample at election t. Non-voting
data available over several periods is linearly interpolated to the time of the election. Variables
provided at the cross-sectional level only are reported accordingly and used in the analysis by
interacting them with either a post-Chernobyl dummy or election fixed effects.
on the top of the distribution and gives a precise estimate of the poor part of the
local population. Education is an important factor given the Green party’s focus on
post-material values and is reflected in particularly good results in university towns
and among people of higher education in general. My final two control variables are
therefore distance to the closest university and the share of 0–15 years olds attending
grammar schools (Gymnasium).5 All control variables are interacted with election
dummies to allow for changing importance in people’s voting decisions over time.6
The states for which all of the information mentioned above could be re-
trieved were Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-
Westphalia, and Rhineland-Palatinate.7 Together, these six regions account for
about 90% of West Germany’s area and population. As mentioned before, the unit
of observation is county i at election t. Since there were almost no boundary changes
during the studied period, I can track 301 counties over the whole period from 1980
to 2013. The values of the control variables are linearly interpolated to the election
5 A list of German-speaking universities in West Germany and Austria along with their geo-
graphic coordinates was kindly provided to me by Fabian Waldinger.
6 Another important reason is the radical change in Germany’s benefit laws in 2005, the so-called
Hartz laws. This reduced the amount of benefit recipients dramatically without significant
changes in poverty.
7 I am currently in the process of digitising information for the city states Berlin, Bremen and
Hamburg and the two smallest states of Schleswig-Holstein and Saarland.
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date since they are usually measured at a statistical reference date.8 Table 3.2 shows
summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis.
3.5 Identification strategy
3.5.1 Differences-in-Differences specification
The panel structure of the data allows the simultaneous use of county and election
fixed-effects. In doing so, one can account for all election- and county- specific
characteristics. This is particularly helpful because the Chernobyl accident led to a
general rise in Green votes as shown in figure 3.5 which is mechanically correlated
with the changing effect of NPP-proximity after April 1986 and could thus result
in a strong upwards bias. But also fixed local characteristics crucial to the location
decision of an NPP such as proximity to navigable rivers and railroads could turn
out to be problematic. Since better infrastructure could be correlated with higher
income and education, this would open up an alternative link between nearby NPPs
and good electoral performance of the Greens. After including both types of fixed
effects, the remaining variation is only within counties and off any country-wide
election-specific trend.
The main variable of interest is the interaction of NPP-proximityi with a
dummy variable for any election after the Chernobyl disaster which measures the
average change in NPPs effect on electoral outcomes after the disaster as opposed
to before. The set and state of nuclear facilities is restricted to that of April, 26th
1986. This has the disadvantage of not being responsive to changes in status and
location of plants but on the other hand is less prone to issues stemming from the
endogeneity of NPP shutdown decisions. Such a scenario could arise, for instance, if
voters were punishing the Greens for a shutdown in their vicinity which would open
up an additional channel between proximity and voting outcomes.9 Adding a set of
control variables completes the baseline regression specification:
yit = α+ γi + λt + βt(NPP-Proximityi × postChernobylt) + µXit + ǫit (3.1)
8 This is usually the 31st of December, apart from school enrolment data which takes mid-
October (15th) as reference date.
9 An alternative would be omitting shutdowns and confining attention only to NPPs starting
to operate over time. I investigate this alternative specification as a robustness check in
section 3.6.2.
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3.5.2 Threats to identification
The identifying assumptions of the differences-in-differences estimation are twofold:
the first is the absence of confounding events which would require any correlate
of NPP location to change its effect on voting around the time of the Chernobyl
disaster. Riester [2010], provides a short list of criteria used in Germany for choosing
the sites of nuclear facilities:
1. Earthquake/flood-proof, suitable building ground
2. Not located in an urban agglomeration
3. Well connected to public road, train, and waterway network
4. Site should be already designated industrial estate
5. Vicinity to river with sufficient flow
6. Located in a region of high and preferably increasing energy consumption and
with link to high-voltage grid
Criteria 2 and 6 together insinuate a quadratic relationship between proxim-
ity and urbanisation/population size. Since inhabitants of cities could systematically
change their political preferences after April 1986, log(population) and log(population)2
seem to be crucial confounders and are therefore included in the regressions. Other
factors such as connection to transportation, rivers, and soil quality are highly un-
likely to change their effect on voting behaviour after Chernobyl and are thus already
accounted for through the use of county fixed effects. Another endogeneity issue
could be systematic selection into treatment. For example, environmental activists
could move closer to NPPs after Chernobyl in order to facilitate protests and raise
awareness of the local population. Alternatively, the Green party could also target
campaigning towards affected areas. The first concern is addressed by the inclusion
of age and education which captures changes in the electorate’s composition towards
those parts of the population most likely to support the Greens. The second one
is met by checking for endogeneity of turnout with respect to NPP-proximity after
Chernobyl which should be another consequence of increased campaign intensity.
The second main assumption is that election outcomes in counties of differ-
ent proximity would follow identical patterns absent treatment and conditional on
control variables. This condition breaks down if areas of different treatment intensi-
ties were already starting to diverge before the actual treatment due to anticipation
or unobserved correlates. One could, for example, imagine that areas closer to an
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Figure 3.6: Average Green vote share before/after Chernobyl depending on NPP-
Proximity (median)
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Figure 3.7: Average Green vote share before/after Chernobyl depending on NPP-
Proximity (quartile)
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NPP were already better informed about the dangers of nuclear energy and would
have increased their Green votes share even in the absence of Chernobyl. In a re-
gression this would mechanically load the widening gap onto the interaction term
NPP-Proximityi×postChernobylt and lead to a large overstatement of the treatment
effect. As a first attempt to investigate this issue, I plot the average vote share for
the Green party over time in areas above and below the median of proximity to the
nearest NPP in figure 3.6. Reassuringly, both groups have fairly similar support
levels before April 1986 and start to diverge in the 1987 election where counties
closer to an NPP have about 1% higher Green vote shares. After a quick drop in
1990, the gaps continue to widen with a peak in 2002 until they are almost back to
their pre-treatment gap in 2009.
However, looking at the more extreme case of counties in the lowest and
highest quartile of the NPP-proximity in figure 3.7, divergence across groups may
have already taken place between 1980 and 1983. This prompts for a more thorough
investigation of the common trends assumptions which I carry out in several ways:
first, I allow for non-linear trends at higher levels of aggregation by including state
and district-specific time fixed-effects. In addition to that, I also include unit-specific
trends which allow each county to exhibit an arbitrary linear pattern over the whole
time period. Both procedures should leave the coefficient of interest unaffected in the
absence of the corresponding pre-trend. Finally, I also interact the treatment with
election fixed effects instead of a post-Chernobyl dummy. This makes it possible
to investigate the changes in the effect of NPP-proximity with respect to a baseline
election and to capture any non-linear relationship with the outcome of interest
before the Chernobyl disaster. Bearing those caveats in mind, I will now proceed to
the baseline results.
3.6 The effect of nuclear facilities on elections in West
Germany
3.6.1 Baseline results
Table 3.3 shows the effect of NPP-Proximity on Green party votes after subsequently
accounting for two-way fixed effects and control variables. Initially, there seems to
be a strong negative correlation between proximity to the nearest NPP and Green
votes which is even increasing in magnitude after the inclusion of fixed effects in
specification 2. The only takeaway from this is that the omitted time-invariant local
characteristics are correlated in the same way with the outcome and the treatment
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Table 3.3: Baseline estimates
Green party vote share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NPP-Proximity −0.043∗∗∗ −0.079∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.004∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
County FE N Y Y Y
Election FE N N Y Y
Controls N N N Y
Counties 301 301 301 301
Observations 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685
R2 0.135 0.574 0.902 0.970
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Notation: all displayed coefficients are interacted with a postChernobyl dummy, which is omitted
from the table for better visualisation; Controls: Log(population); Log(population)2; % Female; %
Population aged 15–25, 25–30, 30–40, 40–50, 50–65, ≥65 by gender; % Recipients of social benefits;
% Pupils of prep school in age cohort 0–15; Proximity to closest university; % Turnout 1983 (all
interacted with election FE)
variable NPP-Proximityi× postChernobylt. Once I also include election fixed effects
in the next column, the negative correlation observed before remains significant but
turns positive. Since the correlation between NPP-Proximityi × postChernobylt and
t is negative by construction and the Green party share is increasing over time,
this does not come as a surprise. The final specification in column 4 controls for
an extensive set of county characteristics. While this decreases the coefficient of
interest further to 0.004 it remains significant at 10%. According to the baseline
estimate, counties located 100km closer to an operating or planned NPP have on
average a 0.4% higher support for the Green party in Bundestag elections after the
Chernobyl disaster, ceteris paribus.
Since the gains of the Greens from NPP-Proximity have to be at the ex-
pense of other parties, I investigate in table 3.4 the treatment effect on the rest of
Germany’s party system. Interestingly, it turns out that proximity to an NPP after
April 1986 did not lead to a general swing to the left but instead lowered votes for the
Social Democrat and the Liberal parties and benefited the Conservative CDU/CSU
even more than the Greens. Also minority parties saw their combined vote share
marginally decline. The large responses of the conservative and social-democratic
parties are, however, mainly due to their overall higher amount of votes: standard-
izing the coefficients reveals that a one standard increase in NPP-Proximity yields
an increase of 0.034 standard deviations in Green vote share as opposed to 0.058
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for the conservatives.10 This means that although the nominal effect on the main
parties is notably higher, the impact of NPP-Proximity on Green and Liberal vote
shares given their scale is not very different. In sum, the baseline results suggest a
polarisation of voting patterns in response to the Chernobyl accident depending on
being located closer or farther away from an NPP where both the most left-wing
and the most right-wing of the main parties gained. The next section evaluates the
validity of the identifying assumptions and the sensitivity of the baseline results.
3.6.2 Robustness checks
The first tests will address the doubts about the validity of the common trends
assumption raised by figure 3.7. To start with, I include area-specific election fixed
effects into the baseline regression. Doing so purges the entire effect of state/district
specific variables from the estimation. If the observed effect of NPP-Proximity was
driven by pre-treatment divergence from state or district unobservables, this should
leave the coefficient of interest insignificant. In the next step, I add county-specific
time trends to take into account arbitrary long-term linear developments in voting
patterns which might be mistakenly identified as a treatment effect. Finally, I also
use combinations of these additional variables. Columns 2 and 3 in table 3.5 show
that the baseline estimate is particularly sensitive to the inclusion of state- and
district-specific election fixed effects. County-specific trends in specification 4, on
the other hand, strengthen the baseline estimate. Also when using both linear trends
and area-specific election dummies, the coefficient for NPP-Proximity drops in size
and is insignificantly different from zero. Taken together, these results caution that
non-linear pre-trends stemming from differences at the district or state level could
be driving the results.
Another way to assess the prevalence of diverging patterns before the Cher-
nobyl accident is allowing for a time-varying treatment effect. This can be imple-
mented by interacting NPP-proximity with election fixed effects instead of a post-
Chernobyl dummy and normalising the effect to zero at the last election before the
disaster. Doing so provides a placebo test and makes it possible to check whether
proximity to a nuclear plant already had an effect on voting outcome prior to April
1986 and whether this effect was already increasing over time beforehand. Figure 3.8
plots the estimated time-varying effect of NPP-proximity on the vote share of the
Green party from 1976 up to 2013. Reassuringly, the results suggest that the effect
of living closer to an NPP in 1983 was not significantly different from that of the
two elections before. After 1983, the coefficient rises from around 0 to almost 0.005
10 The standardized coefficients are reported in table 3.13 in the appendix.
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Table 3.4: The effect of NPP-proximity on other parties
Vote share Greens Social-
Democrats
Liberals Conserva-
tives
Others
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NPP-Proximity 0.004∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.004 0.020∗∗∗ −0.002
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
County FE Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Counties 301 301 301 301 301
Observations 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685
R2 0.970 0.979 0.936 0.969 0.961
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Notation: all displayed coefficients are interacted with a postChernobyl dummy, which is omitted
from the table for better visualisation; Controls: Log(population); Log(population)2; % Female; %
Population aged 15–25, 25–30, 30–40, 40–50, 50–65, ≥65 by gender; % Recipients of social benefits;
% Pupils of prep school in age cohort 0–15; Proximity to closest university; % Turnout 1983 (all
interacted with election FE)
Table 3.5: Baseline results and different FE specifications
Green party vote share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NPP-Proximity 0.004∗ −0.000 0.000 0.005∗∗ 0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election × State FE N Y N N Y N
Election × District FE N N Y N N Y
County FE × t N N N Y Y Y
Counties 301 301 301 301 301 301
Observations 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685
R2 0.970 0.977 0.983 0.985 0.989 0.992
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Notation: all displayed coefficients are interacted with a postChernobyl dummy, which is omitted
from the table for better visualisation; Controls: Log(population); Log(population)2; % Female; %
Population aged 15–25, 25–30, 30–40, 40–50, 50–65, ≥65 by gender; % Recipients of social benefits;
% Pupils of prep school in age cohort 0–15; Proximity to closest university; % Turnout 1983 (all
interacted with election FE)
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Figure 3.8: Time-varying treatment effect estimates and 90% CI: Green party vote
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where it remains until 2002 with the exception of the unification election in 1990.
The effect drops sharply for the 2005 and 2009 election and sees a slight rebound in
2013. Taken together, these patterns are compatible with the view that Chernobyl
led to a persistent increase in Green votes until a phase-out from nuclear energy was
officially decided in 2002. The result for 1990 does not fit the pattern but was dom-
inated by one of the most important events in Germany’s contemporaneous history
which the Green party deliberately ignored. Germany’s abandonment of the exit
strategy from nuclear energy and the Fukushima accident brought this topic back
to the public’s attention. This can also be seen from the rising coefficient in 2013
which is, however, not significant at the 10% level.
The final set of checks is concerned with the estimates’ robustness to alter-
native definitions of NPP-proximity regarding the set of facilities used to calculate
proximities as well as the functional form used. The analysis starts with table 3.7
which presents the regression results for 8 alternative treatment specifications. The
specifications differ on three dimensions: 1) status (planned or operating), 2) pur-
pose (including research reactors or not) and 3) location (Germany, Western Europe,
or the entire Europe). Column 5 repeats the baseline results for easier comparison.
From the first three columns one can see that the most of the effect is driven by the
proximity to planned nuclear power plants rather than an operating ones. When
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looking only at facilities in Germany as done in column 1, the two separate effects
actually go into the opposite direction. A speculative explanation of this finding
could be that within Germany, operating plants may be an important employer and
the Greens are thus seen as a threat to local employment after the Chernobyl disas-
ter.11 When pooling operating and planned facilities together, the two effects cancel
each other out in column 4 while in 5 and 6 this pooling only adds some noise and
the point estimate remains almost the same. The last three specifications look at the
impact of proximity to the nearest NPP or research reactor. Doing so diminishes
the size of the coefficients in columns 4 to 6 and leaves them insignificant. Overall,
the results in table 3.7 show that the baseline result is not completely dependent
on the set of NPPs chosen for the proximity measure. The restriction to one single
coefficient rather than two separate ones for planned and operating NPPs, however,
also comes at the cost of masking some heterogeneity in the effect. The precise
way in which NPP-proximity was affecting voting behaviour and which parts of the
population were most responsive is addressed in the following section.
11 An alternative story could be that people had a strong dislike for NPPs being replaced by
less-clean fossil fuel power plants like coal.
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Table 3.6: Differences-in-Differences estimates with time-varying treatment effect
Vote share Greens Social-
Democrats
Liberals Conserva-
tives
Others
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NPP-Proximity × 1976 −0.001 −0.000 −0.004∗ −0.000 0.006
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005)
1980 −0.001 0.004 0.002 −0.007 0.001
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002)
1987 0.004∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ 0.001 0.006 0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
1990 0.001 −0.008∗∗ −0.003 0.014∗ −0.003
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004)
1994 0.004∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.002
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003)
1998 0.005∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.008) (0.004)
2002 0.005 −0.005 −0.005 −0.002 0.007∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.012) (0.002)
2005 0.002 −0.016∗ −0.007∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.000
(0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004)
2009 0.001 −0.024∗∗∗ −0.004 0.030∗∗∗ −0.004
(0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.005)
2013 0.004 −0.023∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ −0.002
(0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.010) (0.005)
County FE Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Counties 301 301 301 301 301
Observations 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685
R2 0.971 0.979 0.936 0.969 0.961
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Notation: all displayed coefficients are interacted with a postChernobyl dummy, which is omitted
from the table for better visualisation; Controls: Log(population); Log(population)2; % Female; %
Population aged 15–25, 25–30, 30–40, 40–50, 50–65, ≥65 by gender; % Recipients of social benefits;
% Pupils of prep school in age cohort 0–15; Proximity to closest university; % Turnout 1983 (all
interacted with election FE)
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Table 3.7: Sensitivity to alternative treatment definitions
Green party vote share
Used facilities Nuclear power plants NPPs + research reactors
Sample Germany Western
Europe
Europe Germany Western
Europe
Europe Germany Western
Europe
Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
NPP-Proximity 0.002 0.004∗ 0.004∗ 0.002 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
NPP-Proximity (operating) −0.004∗ 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
NPP-Proximity (planned) 0.004∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.004∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Counties 301 301 301 301 301 301 301 301 301
Observations 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685
R2 0.971 0.971 0.971 0.970 0.970 0.970 0.970 0.970 0.970
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Notation: all displayed coefficients are interacted
with a postChernobyl dummy, which is omitted from the table for better visualisation; Controls: Log(population); Log(population)2; % Female; %
Population aged 15–25, 25–30, 30–40, 40–50, 50–65, ≥65 by gender; % Recipients of social benefits; % Pupils of prep school in age cohort 0–15; Proximity
to closest university; % Turnout 1983 (all interacted with election FE)
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3.7 Mechanisms
3.7.1 Changes in the political landscape
As the results in table 3.4 have already shown, it was not only the Green party
which gained after April 1986 in areas closer to an NPP but also the conservative
CDU/CSU. The parties losing were SPD and FDP who were positioned more at
the centre of the political spectrum. In general, there are many ways of how to
explain this notable change in the political landscape after Chernobyl. One of these
would be that voters systematically punish politicians responsible for the NPP in
their area. Since the location decision is carried out at the state level [Joppke,
1993], this would imply punishing the parties in power at the time of approval. In
order to investigate the relevance of such punishment votes, I construct for each
county the party vote share of the government in power during the approval of the
nearest NPP. This, however, can only be done using the sample of NPPs inside
West Germany, assuming that voters cannot punish foreign governments. Another
way in which the disaster could have changed voting patterns is by raising political
awareness and participation in political life in favour of parties with more extreme
positions. As mentioned in chapter 3.5.2, this could be either because of NPP-
proximity itself or as a result of targeted campaigning in the surrounding areas of
nuclear power plants. Any proximity effect on turnout will thus not be able to
differentiate between these two mechanisms. A third additional explanation would
be that the sudden politicisation of nuclear power usage led to political polarisation
in the local population. Potential lines of conflict in this case could be economic
dependency on the NPP as an employer and the perceived danger or awareness of
nuclear energy’s risks. Voting patterns could have diverged since only the parties
on the very left and right would guarantee the implementation of a distinct pro- or
anti-nuclear policy. In order to measure political polarisation, I construct an index
similar to Xezonakis [2012] for each election in each county.12
The three mentioned channels are investigated in table 3.8. Since the pun-
ishment effect can only be evaluated using nuclear facilities in West Germany, I also
report the results for the Greens and the CDU/CSU in columns 1 and 2. Column
3 shows that the parties approving the respective plant did not receive less votes
in areas located closer to the NPP but, if anything, actually gained after the Cher-
nobyl accident. Hence, there is no empirical support for a punishment mechanism.
12 The formula used is: Polarisation =
√∑
j=1
V oteSharejk(Ideologyjk − Ideologyk)
2. The four
main parties are placed on a discrete left-right ideology scale between -2 and 2 (omitting 0)
for the sake of simplicity.
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Table 3.8: The effect of NPP-proximity on the political landscape
Vote share Greens Conserva-
tives
NPP Ap-
provers
Turnout Polari-
sation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NPP-Proximity (West. Germany) 0.002 0.022∗∗∗ 0.008
(0.002) (0.006) (0.009)
NPP-Proximity (West. Europe) 0.009∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.006)
County FE Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Counties 301 301 301 301 301
Observations 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685
R2 0.970 0.969 0.921 0.978 0.962
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Notation: all displayed coefficients are interacted with a postChernobyl dummy, which is omitted
from the table for better visualisation; Controls: Log(population); Log(population)2; % Female; %
Population aged 15–25, 25–30, 30–40, 40–50, 50–65, ≥65 by gender; % Recipients of social benefits;
% Pupils of prep school in age cohort 0–15; Proximity to closest university; % Turnout 1983 (all
interacted with election FE)
Turnout, on the other hand, increases significantly as a response to NPP-proximity
after April 1986. According to the estimate, living 100km closer to an NPP increases
election participation by almost 1% which is about 1/8 of a standard deviation of
turnout. Given the size of the coefficient, higher participation could explain the
comparatively small gains of the Green party but not the much larger ones of the
conservatives. Finally, in accordance with the single party results, also polarisation
increases significantly after Chernobyl in areas closer to a nuclear power plant. Ar-
eas located 100km closer to a nuclear power plant see polarisation increase by 0.023
which is about one quarter of a standard deviation of the constructed index.
3.7.2 Chernobyl as a formative event
The results in table 3.6 not only provide a robustness test but also reveal that the
effect of NPP-proximity on voting behaviour persists even more than 20 years after
the Chernobyl accident. In the following, I investigate the reasons and mechanisms
underlying this persistence. I evaluate two channels which are both concerned with
the role of Chernobyl as a formative event in people’s life. The first of these is
considering the path-dependence of voting decisions taken shortly after the accident.
As recent empirical research has shown, voters are very hesitant in adjusting political
choices made in the past such as party registration [Kaplan and Mukand, 2014].
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Spontaneous electoral choices made under the emotional influence of a formative
event such as the Chernobyl disaster may therefore have long-lasting effects on
voting. In order to investigate this channel, I exploit the fact that two large German
states were holding state elections between April 1986 and the next Bundestag
election in January 1987: Lower Saxony (15th of July 1986) and Bavaria (12th of
October 1986). This allows me to check whether the effect of NPP-proximity lasted
longer depending on the amount of time voters had before going to the ballot boxes.
Table 3.9 shows that the proximity effect changes depending on months until
the next election. The impact on the large parties CDU/CSU and SPD seems to
be benefiting from voters’ having more time to think about their choice for the
next election. As table 3.9 shows, the negative effect on the social democrats is
mainly driven by counties who could vote shortly after Chernobyl while that of the
conservatives only gains significance in areas which did not vote immediately after
the disaster. This could be because coherence within the SPD was low during this
time and facilitated a spontaneous swing to left-wing fringe parties. Both regression
output and marginal effect plot in figure 3.9 also show that NPP-proximity did not
notably change its effect on Greens’ votes. The effect of proximity is decreasing for
Liberals and other parties in months until the next election. As table 3.9 shows,
fringe parties are actually significantly benefiting from NPP-proximity and close
elections. Path dependency originating from early elections after Chernobyl is thus,
if anything, mostly favouring fringe parties.13
The second channel looks into the role of age as a proxy for how formative
the effect of NPP-proximity was for the average population of a county. This as-
sumes that the political beliefs of youths are easier to shape than those of elder
people. Giuliano and Spilimbergo [2014], for instance, have shown that experienc-
ing economic recession during the impressionable years of 18 to 25 has considerable
long-term effects on people’s political views. In order to explore this mechanisms, I
interact the treatment variable with the share of 15 to 25 years olds at the time of
the accident.14 The regression results in table 3.10 immediately show that mostly
conservatives and others are affected by the interchange between NPP-proximity
and the share of adolescents around April 1986. The effect on the Green party, in
contrast, is decreasing in the affected counties’ share of 15 to 25 year olds and is
13 Liberals are not counted as fringe parties in this case. The marginal effect of NPP-proximity
on the FDP is close to zero and insignificant in counties with an early election and significantly
negative otherwise.
14 This procedure requires the inclusion of % aged 15-251983 × post-Chernobyl along with % aged
15-25t × election which could create a multicollinearity problem. I thus use pre-Chernobyl
controls as of 1983 interacted with election fixed-effects in all regressions looking at the effect
of pre-Chernobyl characteristics.
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Table 3.9: Memory effect of NPP-proximity
Greens Social-
Dem.
Liberals Conser-
vatives
Others Turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NPP-Proximity 0.002 −0.028∗∗ 0.006 0.010 0.011 0.004
(0.005) (0.012) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.008)
Months until next election 0.001∗∗ 0.001 0.000 −0.002∗ −0.000 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Prox. × Mon.s next elec. 0.000 0.002 −0.002∗ 0.002 −0.002∗ 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Counties 301 301 301 301 301 301
Observations 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685
R2 0.971 0.979 0.937 0.969 0.961 0.979
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Notation: all displayed coefficients are interacted with a postChernobyl dummy, which is omitted
from the table for better visualisation; Controls: Log(population); Log(population)2; % Female; %
Population aged 15–25, 25–30, 30–40, 40–50, 50–65, ≥65 by gender; % Recipients of social benefits;
% Pupils of prep school in age cohort 0–15; Proximity to closest university; % Turnout 1983 (all
interacted with election FE)
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Figure 3.9: Marginal effect of NPP-Proximity on voting conditional on months to
next election after Chernobyl
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only significant in the lower third of the distribution. Figure 3.10 shows that the
treatment effect for the CDU/CSU is strongest for the upper half of the adolescents’
distribution and insignificant or even negative for the other one. The positive effect
of NPP-proximity on conservative votes is thus driven by areas with a young pop-
ulation during the Chernobyl accident which insinuates that young people in those
areas were mainly socialised towards pro-nuclear parties rather than the Greens.
3.7.3 The socio-economic dimension of the Chernobyl effect
The final mechanism I am investigating addresses how different parts of society
were responding to the Chernobyl disaster and living closer or farther away from
a nuclear power plant. For this analysis, I look at effect heterogeneity along two
important socio-economic dimensions – economic well-being and education – which
I can measure before the treatment at the county level. Table 3.11 shows the results
of the baseline specification after interacting NPP-proximity with the population
share of benefit recipients before April 1986. Doing so only decreases the coefficient
for the conservatives but leaves the remaining parties unaffected. The marginal ef-
fect plots in figure 3.11 for the parties benefiting from NPP-proximity illustrate that
the treatment effect on both Greens and CDU/CSU is strongest in the middle of the
distribution even though the marginal effects are never significant. Overall, differ-
ences in economic well-being seem to have little explanatory power for heterogeneity
in the proximity effect.
Given that these results could also reflect differences in educational attain-
ment, the analysis proceeds with exploring the heterogeneity coming from variation
in the level of education. Unlike age and economic well-being, education seems to
be a dimension which only increases the effect from NPP-proximity for the con-
servative parties. Looking at the non-interacted coefficients on NPP-proximity in
table 3.12, the gains of the CDU/CSU from nuclear plants after Chernobyl turns
negative for (hypothetical) counties with no children attending preparatory school,
while the coefficient on the Green party barely changes. The fact that the baseline
effect is shifted far more towards the conservatives is, according to the estimates
in table 3.12 mostly a result of county differences in educational attainment. The
higher the share of students in preparatory schools, the more the CDU/CSU is
gaining from NPP-proximity and the more social democrats and liberals are losing
from proximity to the nearest NPP. In the marginal effect plots in figure 3.12, one
can see that the marginal effect for the Greens is almost invariant to educational
attainment unlike the conservatives who see their effect strongly rise in counties of
higher education.
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Table 3.10: Effect heterogeneity of NPP-proximity depending on age
Greens Social-
Dem.
Liberals Conser-
vatives
Others Turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NPP-Proximity 0.028 0.062 0.035 −0.228∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ −0.017
(0.027) (0.050) (0.032) (0.063) (0.037) (0.035)
Prox. × % aged 15-25 pre-Cherno. −0.153 −0.487 −0.211 1.455∗∗∗−0.605∗∗ 0.137
(0.170) (0.314) (0.204) (0.406) (0.239) (0.214)
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Counties 301 301 301 301 301 301
Observations 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685
R2 0.968 0.979 0.936 0.975 0.956 0.974
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Notation: all displayed coefficients are interacted with a postChernobyl dummy, which is omitted
from the table for better visualisation; Controls: Log(population); Log(population)2; % Female; %
Population aged 15–25, 25–30, 30–40, 40–50, 50–65, ≥65 by gender; % Recipients of social benefits;
% Pupils of prep school in age cohort 0–15; Proximity to closest university; % Turnout (all as of
1983 and interacted with election FE)
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Figure 3.10: Marginal effect of NPP-Proximity on voting conditional on % ages 15-25
before Chernobyl
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Table 3.11: Effect heterogeneity of NPP-proximity depending on economic well-being
Greens Social-
Dem.
Liberals Conser-
vatives
Others Turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NPP-Proximity 0.004 −0.019 0.004 0.002 0.009 −0.001
(0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.008)
Prox. × % Benefit recip. pre-Ch. −0.050 0.107 −0.158 0.336 −0.234 0.353
(0.343) (0.561) (0.338) (0.624) (0.371) (0.378)
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Counties 301 301 301 301 301 301
Observations 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685
R2 0.968 0.979 0.936 0.975 0.956 0.974
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Notation: all displayed coefficients are interacted with a postChernobyl dummy, which is omitted
from the table for better visualisation; Controls: Log(population); Log(population)2; % Female; %
Population aged 15–25, 25–30, 30–40, 40–50, 50–65, ≥65 by gender; % Recipients of social benefits;
% Pupils of prep school in age cohort 0–15; Proximity to closest university; % Turnout (all as of
1983 and interacted with election FE)
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Figure 3.11: Marginal effect of NPP-Proximity on voting conditional on % benefit
recipients before Chernobyl
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Table 3.12: Effect heterogeneity of NPP-proximity depending on education
Greens Social-
Dem.
Liberals Conser-
vatives
Others Turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NPP-Proximity 0.003 −0.012 0.007 −0.006 0.008∗ 0.001
(0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005)
Prox. × % Prep. school pre-Cherno. 0.001 −0.034 −0.040∗ 0.094∗ −0.021 0.027
(0.023) (0.046) (0.022) (0.052) (0.028) (0.027)
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Counties 301 301 301 301 301 301
Observations 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685
R2 0.968 0.979 0.936 0.975 0.956 0.974
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Notation: all displayed coefficients are interacted with a postChernobyl dummy, which is omitted
from the table for better visualisation; Controls: Log(population); Log(population)2; % Female; %
Population aged 15–25, 25–30, 30–40, 40–50, 50–65, ≥65 by gender; % Recipients of social benefits;
% Pupils of prep school in age cohort 0–15; Proximity to closest university; % Turnout (all as of
1983 and interacted with election FE)
-0.015
-0.010
-0.005
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.00 0.08 0.16 0.24 0.32 0.40 0.48 0.56
% prep. school pre-Chernobyl
M
a
rg
in
a
l 
e
ff
e
c
t 
o
f 
N
P
P
-P
ro
x
im
it
y
 (
in
 1
0
0
k
m
)
0.00
0.04
0.08
0.12
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f O
b
s
e
rv
a
tio
n
s
Bu¨ndnis/Die Gru¨nen
-0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.00 0.08 0.16 0.24 0.32 0.40 0.48 0.56
% prep. school pre-Chernobyl
M
a
rg
in
a
l 
e
ff
e
c
t 
o
f 
N
P
P
-P
ro
x
im
it
y
 (
in
 1
0
0
k
m
)
0.00
0.04
0.08
0.12
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f O
b
s
e
rv
a
tio
n
s
CDU/CSU
Figure 3.12: Marginal effect of NPP-Proximity on voting conditional on % prep.
school before Chernobyl
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Without an in-depth analysis, one can only speculate about the reasons for
the patterns described in this section. It seems, however, that polarisation from
NPP-proximity after Chernobyl consists of two different effects: higher votes for the
Green party may actually be the result of increased environmental concerns which
would explain to some extent the losses of the ideologically close social-democrats.
Given the results on education and share of benefit recipients, this effect seems
to be independent of socio-economic characteristics. The treatment effect on the
CDU/CSU, in turn, was shown to originate from counties with a high levels of
education. If one also takes into account the positive impact of adolescents on
the conservative gains after Chernobyl, one can conclude that comparatively young
and educated counties near a nuclear power plants were switching their votes more
towards the conservative parties after Chernobyl. A possible explanation for this
could be fear of declining economic prosperity after a shut-down of the nuclear
facility or different level a backlash caused by the hysteria about the safety of NPPs
in Germany immediately after the Chernobyl disaster.
3.8 Conclusion
This paper investigated the effect of an experience with a mainly psychological im-
pact on political beliefs in a distant country. In a case study, I looked at the electoral
response to the Chernobyl disaster in West Germany and analysed how counties lo-
cated closer or farther away from the nearest nuclear power plant responded in
Bundestag elections after April 1986. The disaster can be regarded as a forma-
tive experience since nuclear energy and awareness of its dangers were not a salient
political issue at this time and only opposed by the small Green party and minor
groupings. At the political level, I find a small, significant impact of NPP-proximity
after April 1986 on Green party vote which is in line with research on the NIMBY
effect. The results, however, also indicate a general and long-lasting polarising effect
and highlight that the party benefiting the most from proximity were in fact the
conservatives. Since they were the only pro-nuclear party after Chernobyl, this vote
can be interpreted as a signal of support for nuclear energy.
In terms of mechanisms, I demonstrate that the role of Chernobyl as an
experience only materialises in the gains of the conservative CDU/CSU who are
particularly benefiting from proximity in areas with a larger share of 15-25 year
olds. Further analysis reveals that counties with high educational attainment coun-
ties exhibit a similar pattern. The results are similar to findings on the the 1976
California primary elections in which particularly educated citizens voted against an
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exit from nuclear energy. Economic differences across areas do not explain the inten-
sity of this proximity effect. The results can be reconciled by the fact that knowledge
about an NPP’s actual danger may lower risk perception and turn citizens attention
more towards the economic consequences of abandoning nuclear energy. This is in
line with economic research on the relation between education and risk assessment
[Shaw, 1996].
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3.A Tables
Table 3.13: The effect of NPP-proximity on other parties (Standardised coefficients)
Vote share Greens Social-
Democrats
Liberals Conserva-
tives
Others
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NPP-Proximity 0.034∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.040 0.058∗∗∗ −0.011
(0.018) (0.016) (0.026) (0.019) (0.018)
County FE Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Counties 301 301 301 301 301
Observations 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685
R2 0.970 0.979 0.936 0.969 0.961
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Notation: all displayed coefficients are interacted with a postChernobyl dummy, which is omitted
from the table for better visualisation; Controls: Log(population); Log(population)2; % Female; %
Population aged 15–25, 25–30, 30–40, 40–50, 50–65, ≥65 by gender; % Recipients of social benefits;
% Pupils of prep school in age cohort 0–15; Proximity to closest university; % Turnout 1983 (all
interacted with election FE)
Table 3.14: Baseline results using pre-treatment controls only
Greens Social-
Dem.
Liberals Conser-
vatives
Others Turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NPP-Proximity 0.003 −0.017∗∗∗ 0.001 0.008 0.005 0.005
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Counties 301 301 301 301 301 301
Observations 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685
R2 0.968 0.979 0.936 0.975 0.956 0.974
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Notation: all displayed coefficients are interacted with a postChernobyl dummy, which is omitted
from the table for better visualisation; Controls: Log(population); Log(population)2; % Female; %
Population aged 15–25, 25–30, 30–40, 40–50, 50–65, ≥65 by gender; % Recipients of social benefits;
% Pupils of prep school in age cohort 0–15; Proximity to closest university; % Turnout (all as of
1983 and interacted with election FE)
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Table 3.15: Baseline results and different functional forms
Green party vote share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NPP-Proximity 0.004∗ −0.002 −0.008 −0.024
(0.002) (0.007) (0.014) (0.032)
NPP-Proximity2 0.006 0.016 0.064
(0.006) (0.026) (0.095)
NPP-Proximity3 −0.006 −0.059
(0.013) (0.107)
NPP-Proximity4 0.020
(0.040)
County FE Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Counties 301 301 301 301
Observations 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685
R2 0.970 0.971 0.971 0.971
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01;
Notation: all displayed coefficients are interacted with a postChernobyl dummy, which is omitted
from the table for better visualisation; Controls: Log(population); Log(population)2; % Female; %
Population aged 15–25, 25–30, 30–40, 40–50, 50–65, ≥65 by gender; % Recipients of social benefits;
% Pupils of prep school in age cohort 0–15; Proximity to closest university; % Turnout 1983 (all
interacted with election FE)
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Table 3.16: Memory effect of NPP-proximity (detailed)
Greens Conservatives Turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
NPP-Proximity 0.004∗ 0.002 0.002 0.020∗∗∗ 0.013∗ 0.010 0.009∗∗∗ 0.007 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.014) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008)
Late election 0.010∗∗∗ 0.004 0.006∗
(0.003) (0.008) (0.004)
NPP-Proximity × Late election −0.001 0.026∗ 0.004
(0.005) (0.015) (0.007)
Months to next election 0.001∗∗ −0.002∗ −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
NPP-Proximity × Months to next election 0.000 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Counties 301 301 301 301 301 301 301 301 301
Observations 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685
R2 0.970 0.972 0.971 0.969 0.969 0.969 0.978 0.978 0.979
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Notation: all displayed coefficients are interacted
with a postChernobyl dummy, which is omitted from the table for better visualisation; Controls: Log(population); Log(population)2; % Female; %
Population aged 15–25, 25–30, 30–40, 40–50, 50–65, ≥65 by gender; % Recipients of social benefits; % Pupils of prep school in age cohort 0–15; Proximity
to closest university; % Turnout 1983 (all interacted with election FE)
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